Researchers discovered a vulnerability chain in SAP systems allowing for privilege escalation. Initially, a missing authorization check in a specific diagnostic tool allowed an attacker with low privileges to execute operating system commands as the sapadm user. This wasn't sufficient for full control, so they then exploited a setuid binary, sapstartsrv, designed to switch users. By manipulating the binary's expected environment, they were able to execute commands as root, achieving complete system compromise. This highlights the danger of accumulated vulnerabilities, especially within complex systems employing setuid binaries, and underscores the need for thorough security assessments within SAP environments.
curl-impersonate is a specialized version of curl designed to mimic the behavior of popular web browsers like Chrome, Firefox, and Safari. It achieves this by accurately replicating their respective User-Agent strings, TLS fingerprints (including cipher suites and supported protocols), and HTTP header sets, making it a valuable tool for web developers and security researchers who need to test website compatibility and behavior across different browser environments. It simplifies the process of fetching web content as a specific browser would, allowing users to bypass browser-specific restrictions or analyze how a website responds to different browser profiles.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and potential misuse of curl-impersonate. Some praised its simplicity for testing and debugging, highlighting the ease of switching between browser profiles. Others expressed concern about its potential for abuse, particularly in fingerprinting and bypassing security measures. Several commenters questioned the long-term viability of the project given the rapid evolution of browser internals, suggesting that maintaining accurate impersonation would be challenging. The value for penetration testing was also debated, with some arguing its usefulness for identifying vulnerabilities while others pointed out its limitations in replicating complex browser behaviors. A few users mentioned alternative tools like mitmproxy offering more comprehensive browser manipulation.
Zxc is a Rust-based TLS proxy designed as a Burp Suite alternative, featuring a unique terminal-based UI built with tmux and Vim. It aims to provide a streamlined and efficient intercepting proxy experience within a familiar text-based environment, leveraging the power and customizability of Vim for editing HTTP requests and responses. Zxc intercepts and displays TLS traffic, allowing users to inspect and modify it directly within their terminal workflow. This approach prioritizes speed and a minimalist, keyboard-centric workflow for security professionals comfortable with tmux and Vim.
Hacker News users generally expressed interest in zxc, praising its novel approach to TLS interception and debugging. Several commenters appreciated the use of familiar tools like tmux and vim for the UI, finding it a refreshing alternative to more complex, dedicated tools like Burp Suite. Some raised concerns about performance and scalability compared to established solutions, while others questioned the practical benefits over existing, feature-rich alternatives. A few commenters expressed a desire for additional features like WebSocket support. Overall, the project was seen as an intriguing experiment with potential, though some skepticism remained regarding its real-world viability and competitiveness.
Caido is a free and open-source web security auditing toolkit designed for speed and ease of use. It offers a modular architecture with various plugins for tasks like subdomain enumeration, port scanning, directory brute-forcing, and vulnerability detection. Caido aims to simplify common security workflows by automating repetitive tasks and presenting results in a clear, concise manner, making it suitable for both beginners and experienced security professionals. Its focus on performance and a streamlined command-line interface allows for quick security assessments of web applications and infrastructure.
HN users generally praised Caido's simplicity and ease of use, especially for quickly checking basic security headers. Several commenters appreciated the focus on providing clear, actionable results without overwhelming users with excessive technical detail. Some suggested integrations with other tools or CI/CD pipelines. A few users expressed concern about potential false positives or the limited scope of tests compared to more comprehensive security suites, but acknowledged its value as a first-line checking tool. The developer actively responded to comments, addressing questions and acknowledging suggestions for future development.
The blog post details a sophisticated, low-and-slow password spray attack targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Instead of rapid, easily detected attempts, the attackers used a large botnet to try a small number of common passwords against a massive list of usernames, cycling through different IP addresses and spreading attempts over weeks or months. This approach evaded typical rate-limiting security measures. The attack was discovered through unusual authentication patterns showing a high failure rate with specific common passwords across many accounts. The post emphasizes the importance of strong, unique passwords, multi-factor authentication, and robust monitoring to detect such subtle attacks.
HN users discussed the practicality of the password spraying attack described in the article, questioning its effectiveness against organizations with robust security measures like rate limiting, account lockouts, and multi-factor authentication. Some commenters highlighted the importance of educating users about password hygiene and the need for strong, unique passwords. Others pointed out that the attack's "slow and steady" nature, while evasive, could be detected through careful log analysis and anomaly detection systems. The discussion also touched on the ethical implications of penetration testing and the responsibility of security researchers to disclose vulnerabilities responsibly. Several users shared personal anecdotes about encountering similar attacks and the challenges in mitigating them. Finally, some commenters expressed skepticism about the novelty of the attack, suggesting that it was a well-known technique and not a groundbreaking discovery.
A security researcher discovered a critical vulnerability in a major New Zealand service provider's website. By manipulating a forgotten password request, they were able to inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executed when an administrator viewed the request in their backend system. This cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allowed the researcher to gain access to administrator cookies and potentially full control of the provider's systems. Although they demonstrated the vulnerability by merely changing the administrator's password, they highlighted the potential for far more damaging actions. The researcher responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the provider, who promptly patched the flaw and awarded them a bug bounty.
HN commenters discuss the ethical implications of the author's actions, questioning whether responsible disclosure was truly attempted given the short timeframe and lack of clear communication with the affected company. Several express skepticism about the "major" provider claim, suggesting it might be smaller than portrayed. Some doubt the technical details, pointing out potential flaws in the exploit description. Others debate the legality of the actions under New Zealand law, with some suggesting potential CFAA violations, despite the author's New Zealand origin. A few commenters offer alternative explanations for the observed behavior, proposing it might be a misconfiguration rather than a vulnerability. The overall sentiment is critical of the author's approach, emphasizing the potential for harm and the importance of responsible disclosure practices.
SubImage, a Y Combinator W25 startup, launched a tool that allows you to see your cloud infrastructure through the eyes of an attacker. It automatically scans public-facing assets, identifying vulnerabilities and potential attack paths without requiring any credentials or agents. This external perspective helps companies understand their real attack surface and prioritize remediation efforts, focusing on the weaknesses most likely to be exploited. The goal is to bridge the gap between security teams' internal view and the reality of how attackers perceive their infrastructure, leading to a more proactive and effective security posture.
The Hacker News comments section for SubImage expresses cautious interest and skepticism. Several commenters question the practical value proposition, particularly given existing open-source tools like Amass and Shodan. Some doubt the ability to accurately replicate attacker reconnaissance, citing the limitations of automated tools compared to a dedicated human adversary. Others suggest the service might be more useful for smaller companies lacking dedicated security teams. The pricing model also draws criticism, with users expressing concern about per-asset costs potentially escalating quickly. A few commenters offer constructive feedback, suggesting integrations or features that would enhance the product, such as incorporating attack path analysis. Overall, the reception is lukewarm, with many awaiting further details and practical demonstrations of SubImage's capabilities before passing judgment.
Security researcher Eric Daigle discovered a significant vulnerability in several "smart" apartment intercom systems. By exploiting a poorly implemented API within these systems, he was able to remotely unlock building doors and individual apartment units using only his phone and publicly available information. He accomplished this by crafting specific HTTP requests that bypassed security measures, granting him unauthorized access. Daigle responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the affected vendors, prompting them to address the issue and improve their security protocols. This highlighted the risk associated with insecure IoT devices and the importance of robust API security in connected building systems.
HN commenters discuss the prevalence of easily-exploitable vulnerabilities in building access control systems. Several highlight the inherent insecurity of relying solely on cellular connections for such critical infrastructure, pointing out the ease with which cellular signals can be intercepted or spoofed. Others note the conflict between convenience and security, acknowledging that many residents prioritize ease of access over robust protection. Some commenters share anecdotal experiences with similar vulnerabilities in their own buildings, while others suggest potential solutions, such as requiring secondary authentication factors or utilizing more secure communication protocols. The ethical implications of publicly disclosing such vulnerabilities are also debated, with some arguing for responsible disclosure while others emphasize the urgent need for awareness and immediate action. A few commenters question the author's decision to reveal specific technical details, fearing it could empower malicious actors.
Zach Holman's post "Nontraditional Red Teams" advocates for expanding the traditional security-focused red team concept to other areas of a company. He argues that dedicated teams, separate from existing product or engineering groups, can provide valuable insights by simulating real-world user behavior and identifying potential problems with products, marketing campaigns, and company policies. These "red teams" can act as devil's advocates, challenging assumptions and uncovering blind spots that internal teams might miss, ultimately leading to more robust and user-centric products and strategies. Holman emphasizes the importance of empowering these teams to operate independently and providing them the freedom to explore unconventional approaches.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's premise that "red teams" are often misused, focusing on compliance and shallow vulnerability discovery rather than true adversarial emulation. Several highlighted the importance of a strong security culture and open communication for red teaming to be effective. Some commenters shared anecdotes about ineffective red team exercises, emphasizing the need for clear objectives and buy-in from leadership. Others discussed the difficulty in finding skilled red teamers who can think like real attackers. A compelling point raised was the importance of "purple teaming" – combining red and blue teams for collaborative learning and improvement, rather than treating it as a purely adversarial exercise. Finally, some argued that the term "red team" has become diluted and overused, losing its original meaning.
Summary of Comments ( 5 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43634408
Hacker News users discuss the complexity and potential security risks of SAP's extensive setuid landscape, highlighted by the blog post's detailed vulnerability chain. Several commenters express concern over the sheer number of setuid binaries, suggesting it represents a significant attack surface. Some doubt the practicality of the exploit due to required conditions, while others emphasize the importance of minimizing setuid usage in general. The discussion also touches on the challenges of managing such complex systems and the trade-offs between security and functionality in enterprise software. A few users question the blog post's disclosure timeline, suggesting a shorter timeframe would have been preferable.
The Hacker News post titled "One Bug Wasn't Enough: Escalating Twice Through SAP's Setuid Landscape" has generated several comments discussing the complexities and security challenges inherent in SAP systems.
One commenter highlights the sheer size and interconnected nature of SAP deployments, suggesting that this complexity contributes to the difficulty in securing these systems. They point out that even with dedicated security teams, vulnerabilities can persist due to the vast attack surface. This commenter also emphasizes the challenge of maintaining a balance between security and functionality, as overly restrictive security measures can hinder business operations.
Another commenter focuses on the specific vulnerabilities mentioned in the article, discussing the implications of setuid binaries and the potential for privilege escalation. They delve into the technical details of the exploits, explaining how an attacker could leverage these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or system resources. They also touch on the importance of proper patching and configuration management to mitigate such risks.
Several commenters express concern over the prevalence of security issues in enterprise software like SAP. They discuss the potential financial and reputational damage that can result from successful attacks, and they urge organizations to prioritize security investments and best practices. One commenter even draws a parallel to the complexities and security challenges often seen in mainframe systems.
A few commenters also discuss the challenges of applying traditional security practices to complex systems like SAP. They suggest that a more holistic and integrated approach is needed, incorporating elements of vulnerability management, incident response, and security awareness training. They also highlight the importance of collaboration between security teams and business stakeholders to ensure that security measures are aligned with business objectives.
Finally, some comments offer practical advice for securing SAP systems, including recommendations for vulnerability scanning tools, security hardening guides, and penetration testing services. They also emphasize the importance of staying up-to-date on the latest security patches and advisories. One commenter specifically mentions the value of engaging with external security experts to conduct independent security assessments.