SubImage, a Y Combinator W25 startup, launched a tool that allows you to see your cloud infrastructure through the eyes of an attacker. It automatically scans public-facing assets, identifying vulnerabilities and potential attack paths without requiring any credentials or agents. This external perspective helps companies understand their real attack surface and prioritize remediation efforts, focusing on the weaknesses most likely to be exploited. The goal is to bridge the gap between security teams' internal view and the reality of how attackers perceive their infrastructure, leading to a more proactive and effective security posture.
Security researcher Eric Daigle discovered a significant vulnerability in several "smart" apartment intercom systems. By exploiting a poorly implemented API within these systems, he was able to remotely unlock building doors and individual apartment units using only his phone and publicly available information. He accomplished this by crafting specific HTTP requests that bypassed security measures, granting him unauthorized access. Daigle responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the affected vendors, prompting them to address the issue and improve their security protocols. This highlighted the risk associated with insecure IoT devices and the importance of robust API security in connected building systems.
HN commenters discuss the prevalence of easily-exploitable vulnerabilities in building access control systems. Several highlight the inherent insecurity of relying solely on cellular connections for such critical infrastructure, pointing out the ease with which cellular signals can be intercepted or spoofed. Others note the conflict between convenience and security, acknowledging that many residents prioritize ease of access over robust protection. Some commenters share anecdotal experiences with similar vulnerabilities in their own buildings, while others suggest potential solutions, such as requiring secondary authentication factors or utilizing more secure communication protocols. The ethical implications of publicly disclosing such vulnerabilities are also debated, with some arguing for responsible disclosure while others emphasize the urgent need for awareness and immediate action. A few commenters question the author's decision to reveal specific technical details, fearing it could empower malicious actors.
Zach Holman's post "Nontraditional Red Teams" advocates for expanding the traditional security-focused red team concept to other areas of a company. He argues that dedicated teams, separate from existing product or engineering groups, can provide valuable insights by simulating real-world user behavior and identifying potential problems with products, marketing campaigns, and company policies. These "red teams" can act as devil's advocates, challenging assumptions and uncovering blind spots that internal teams might miss, ultimately leading to more robust and user-centric products and strategies. Holman emphasizes the importance of empowering these teams to operate independently and providing them the freedom to explore unconventional approaches.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's premise that "red teams" are often misused, focusing on compliance and shallow vulnerability discovery rather than true adversarial emulation. Several highlighted the importance of a strong security culture and open communication for red teaming to be effective. Some commenters shared anecdotes about ineffective red team exercises, emphasizing the need for clear objectives and buy-in from leadership. Others discussed the difficulty in finding skilled red teamers who can think like real attackers. A compelling point raised was the importance of "purple teaming" – combining red and blue teams for collaborative learning and improvement, rather than treating it as a purely adversarial exercise. Finally, some argued that the term "red team" has become diluted and overused, losing its original meaning.
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https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43161332
The Hacker News comments section for SubImage expresses cautious interest and skepticism. Several commenters question the practical value proposition, particularly given existing open-source tools like Amass and Shodan. Some doubt the ability to accurately replicate attacker reconnaissance, citing the limitations of automated tools compared to a dedicated human adversary. Others suggest the service might be more useful for smaller companies lacking dedicated security teams. The pricing model also draws criticism, with users expressing concern about per-asset costs potentially escalating quickly. A few commenters offer constructive feedback, suggesting integrations or features that would enhance the product, such as incorporating attack path analysis. Overall, the reception is lukewarm, with many awaiting further details and practical demonstrations of SubImage's capabilities before passing judgment.
The Hacker News post for Launch HN: SubImage (YC W25) – See your infra from an attacker's perspective has a moderate number of comments, sparking a discussion around the utility and approach of the presented tool.
Several commenters express skepticism about the value proposition of SubImage. Some argue that existing open-source tools, like nmap and Shodan, already provide similar functionality. They question whether SubImage offers enough differentiation to justify its existence, especially considering it's a commercial product. This skepticism revolves around the perception that simply identifying open ports and services isn't novel and that truly understanding an attacker's perspective requires more sophisticated analysis.
One commenter specifically points out the challenge of accurately mimicking an attacker's reconnaissance process. They contend that attackers often leverage insider knowledge, social engineering, or vulnerabilities beyond simple port scanning. Therefore, a tool that only focuses on publicly exposed services might provide a limited and potentially misleading view of actual attack vectors.
The discussion also touches on the complexity of managing false positives. One commenter expresses concern about the potential for SubImage to generate numerous alerts for services intentionally exposed or misconfigured in non-critical ways. This raises questions about the tool's practicality in real-world scenarios where security teams must prioritize genuine threats amidst a sea of noise.
Conversely, some comments express interest in the tool. They highlight the potential benefits of having an automated and centralized platform for external attack surface monitoring. The convenience of aggregating information from various sources and presenting it in a digestible format is recognized as a potential strength of SubImage.
One commenter specifically asks about SubImage's ability to handle cloud environments and dynamic IP addresses, suggesting a demand for tools that can adapt to the complexities of modern infrastructure.
The founder of SubImage also participates in the discussion, responding to several comments and clarifying the intended purpose of the tool. They emphasize that SubImage aims to complement existing security practices, not replace them. They also acknowledge the limitations of purely external scanning and mention ongoing development to incorporate more sophisticated analysis capabilities.
In summary, the comment section reveals a mixed reception to SubImage. While some see it as a potentially useful addition to the security toolkit, others remain unconvinced of its unique value proposition and express concerns about its practical limitations. The discussion highlights the ongoing need for innovative security solutions while also underscoring the importance of critical evaluation and a nuanced understanding of the threat landscape.