The popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files was compromised and used to inject malicious code into projects that utilized it. The attacker gained access to the action's repository and added code that exfiltrated environment variables, secrets, and other sensitive information during workflow runs. This action, used by over 23,000 repositories, became a supply chain vulnerability, potentially affecting numerous downstream projects. The maintainers have since regained control and removed the malicious code, but users are urged to review their workflows and rotate any potentially compromised secrets.
Azure API Connections, while offering convenient integration between services, pose a significant security risk due to their over-permissive default configurations. The post demonstrates how easily a compromised low-privilege Azure account can exploit these broadly scoped permissions to escalate access and extract sensitive data, including secrets from linked Key Vaults and other connected services. Essentially, API Connections grant access not just to the specified API, but often to the entire underlying identity of the connected resource, allowing malicious actors to potentially take control of significant portions of an Azure environment. The article highlights the urgent need for administrators to meticulously review and restrict API Connection permissions to the absolute minimum required, emphasizing the principle of least privilege.
Hacker News users discussed the security implications of Azure API Connections, largely agreeing with the article's premise that they represent a significant attack surface. Several commenters highlighted the complexity of managing permissions and the potential for accidental data exposure due to overly permissive settings. The lack of granular control over data access within an API Connection was a recurring concern. Some users shared anecdotal experiences of encountering similar security issues in Azure, while others suggested alternative approaches like using managed identities or service principals for more secure resource access. The overall sentiment leaned toward caution when using API Connections, urging developers to carefully consider the security implications and explore safer alternatives.
Despite being a simple, beneficial, and standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities, adoption of security.txt files (as defined by RFC 9116) remains disappointingly low. A 2025 study by Hartwork found that the vast majority of IT companies, including many prominent names, still do not provide a security.txt file on their websites. This lack of adoption hinders responsible vulnerability disclosure and potentially leaves these organizations more susceptible to exploitation, as researchers lack clear reporting channels. The study emphasizes the continued need for greater awareness and adoption of this straightforward security best practice.
Hacker News users generally agreed with the premise that security.txt adoption is disappointingly low, with several expressing frustration at the security industry's failure to implement basic best practices. Some commenters pointed out that even security-focused companies often lack a security.txt file, highlighting a general apathy or ignorance towards the standard. Others discussed the potential downsides of security.txt, such as increased exposure to automated vulnerability scanning and the possibility of it becoming a target for social engineering attacks. A few suggested that the lack of adoption might stem from the perceived lack of clear benefits or fear of legal repercussions for disclosed vulnerabilities. The overall sentiment reflects a concern for the slow uptake of a seemingly simple yet beneficial security measure.
CSRF and CORS address distinct web security risks and therefore both are necessary. CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) protects against malicious sites tricking a user's browser into making unintended requests to a trusted site where the user is already authenticated. This is achieved through tokens that verify the request originated from the trusted site itself. CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing), on the other hand, dictates which external sites are permitted to access resources from a particular server, focusing on protecting the server itself from unauthorized access by scripts running on other origins. While they both deal with cross-site interactions, CSRF prevents malicious exploitation of a user's existing session, while CORS restricts access to the server's resources in the first place.
Hacker News users discussed the nuances of CSRF and CORS, pointing out that while they both address security concerns related to cross-origin requests, they protect against different threats. Several commenters emphasized that CORS primarily protects the server from unauthorized access by other origins, controlled by the server itself. CSRF, on the other hand, protects users from malicious sites exploiting their existing authenticated sessions on another site, controlled by the user's browser. One commenter offered a clear analogy: CORS is like a bouncer at a club deciding who can enter, while CSRF protection is like checking someone's ID to make sure they're not using a stolen membership card. The discussion also touched upon the practical differences in implementation, like preflight requests in CORS and the use of tokens in CSRF prevention. Some comments questioned the clarity of the original blog post's title, suggesting it might confuse the two distinct mechanisms.
The Okta bcrypt incident highlights crucial API design flaws that allowed attackers to bypass account lockout mechanisms. By accepting hashed passwords directly, Okta's API inadvertently circumvented its own security measures. This emphasizes the danger of exposing low-level cryptographic primitives in APIs, as it creates attack vectors that developers might not anticipate. The post advocates for abstracting away such complexities, forcing users to interact with higher-level authentication flows that enforce intended security policies, like lockout mechanisms and rate limiting. This abstraction simplifies security reasoning and reduces the potential for bypasses by ensuring all authentication attempts are subject to consistent security controls, regardless of how the password is presented.
Several commenters on Hacker News praised the original post for its clear explanation of the Okta bcrypt incident and the proposed solutions. Some highlighted the importance of designing APIs that enforce correct usage and prevent accidental misuse, particularly with security-sensitive operations like password hashing. The discussion touched on the tradeoffs between API simplicity and robustness, with some arguing for more opinionated APIs that guide developers towards best practices. Others shared similar experiences with poorly designed APIs leading to security vulnerabilities. A few commenters also questioned Okta's specific implementation choices and debated the merits of different hashing algorithms. Overall, the comments reflected a general agreement with the author's points about the need for more thoughtful API design to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Summary of Comments ( 205 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43367987
Hacker News users discussed the implications of the
tj-actions/changed-filescompromise, focusing on the surprising longevity of the vulnerability (2 years) and the potential impact on the 23,000+ repositories using it. Several commenters questioned the security practices of relying on third-party GitHub Actions without thorough vetting, emphasizing the need for auditing dependencies and using pinned versions. The ease with which a seemingly innocuous action could be compromised highlighted the broader security risks within the software supply chain. Some users pointed out the irony of a security-focused action being the source of vulnerability, while others discussed the challenges of maintaining open-source projects and the pressure to keep dependencies updated. A few commenters also suggested alternative approaches for achieving similar functionality without relying on third-party actions.The Hacker News post discussing the compromise of the
tj-actions/changed-filesGitHub Action has a substantial number of comments exploring various facets of the incident and its implications.Several commenters discuss the nature of the vulnerability and the attacker's approach. Some point out the seemingly unsophisticated nature of the attack, highlighting the injected code's straightforward execution of a malicious payload without much obfuscation or stealth. Others analyze the specific mechanism of the compromise, noting how the attacker gained access to the maintainer's account and modified the action to include the malicious script. The relative ease with which this popular action was compromised raises concerns about the security of the software supply chain and the potential for similar attacks in the future.
A significant thread of discussion revolves around the responsibilities of open-source maintainers and the challenges they face. Commenters acknowledge the substantial workload often borne by maintainers who volunteer their time and expertise. The incident underscores the difficulty of securing open-source projects, particularly those with a large user base, and the potential consequences of compromised dependencies. Some suggest potential solutions, including increased scrutiny of third-party actions, improved security practices for maintainers, and the development of tools to detect malicious code in actions. The discussion also touches upon the financial aspect of open-source maintenance and the need for better support and resources for maintainers.
Several users express frustration with GitHub's handling of the situation, particularly the perceived lack of communication and transparency. Some commenters criticize the platform's security measures and suggest improvements, such as stricter verification processes for actions and more robust mechanisms for detecting and responding to compromises. Others point out the difficulty of verifying the integrity of third-party code and the need for better tools and practices to address this challenge.
The impact of the compromise on the broader software ecosystem is also a topic of discussion. Commenters speculate on the potential consequences for the thousands of repositories that rely on the affected action, including the possibility of data breaches and other security incidents. The incident highlights the interconnected nature of the software supply chain and the potential for widespread damage from a single compromised component. Some users share their experiences dealing with the fallout from the incident, including the steps they took to mitigate the risk and ensure the security of their projects.
Finally, there's a thread discussing the importance of supply chain security in general and the need for increased vigilance and proactive measures to protect against similar attacks in the future. Commenters suggest various strategies, including code signing, multi-factor authentication, and regular security audits. The incident serves as a wake-up call for the software development community, emphasizing the need for a more robust and secure approach to managing dependencies and protecting the software supply chain.