Stories with Tag Access Control

• Sign in as anyone: Bypassing SAML SSO authentication with parser differentials

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  Posted: 2025-03-15 19:06:01

  Verbose tl;dr

  A critical vulnerability was discovered impacting multiple SAML single sign-on (SSO) libraries across various programming languages. This vulnerability stemmed from inconsistencies in how different XML parsers interpret and handle XML signatures within SAML assertions. Attackers could exploit these "parser differentials" by crafting malicious SAML responses where the signature appeared valid to the service provider's parser but actually signed different data than what the identity provider intended. This allowed attackers to potentially impersonate any user, gaining unauthorized access to systems protected by vulnerable SAML implementations. The blog post details the vulnerability's root cause, demonstrates exploitation scenarios, and lists the affected libraries and their patched versions.

  This GitHub blog post details a critical vulnerability discovered in certain implementations of SAML Single Sign-On (SSO), stemming from inconsistencies in how different XML parsers interpret specially crafted SAML responses. This vulnerability, dubbed “SAML Parser Differential,” allowed attackers to potentially impersonate any user within an affected organization, gaining unauthorized access to sensitive data and systems.

  The core issue lies in the way SAML assertions, which are XML documents used to confirm a user's identity, are processed. SAML uses XML signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of these assertions. However, due to variations in how different XML parsers handle XML signature wrapping attacks and differences in how they canonicalize XML during signature verification, a malicious actor could manipulate the structure of the SAML response. This manipulation involved inserting carefully crafted XML elements within the signed portion of the assertion that some parsers would include during signature validation while others would discard.

  Specifically, the attacker could inject an arbitrary NameID element, which identifies the user, into a legitimate SAML response. A vulnerable service provider (SP), using a parser that ignores these injected elements during signature validation, would accept the tampered response as valid. Subsequently, when processing the assertion to extract the user identity, this SP's parser would then include the injected NameID, effectively granting the attacker access as the impersonated user.

  The blog post explains that the root cause is the lack of robust XML canonicalization during signature verification. Canonicalization is a process of standardizing the XML document before signing and verifying, ensuring consistent interpretation across different parsers. The vulnerability arises when the signing identity provider (IdP) and the verifying SP use different XML parsers with varying canonicalization implementations, creating a mismatch in how the XML is interpreted.

  GitHub discovered this vulnerability through internal research and responsible disclosure processes. They identified affected open-source libraries, including python-saml and ruby-saml, as well as their own internal SAML implementation. Upon discovery, GitHub promptly patched their systems and collaborated with the maintainers of the affected open-source libraries to release fixes. The post emphasizes the importance of using robust and consistent XML canonicalization techniques during both signing and verification processes to mitigate this type of vulnerability. It also stresses the need for developers to carefully review and update their SAML implementations to ensure they are protected against parser differential attacks. Finally, the post underscores the crucial role of security research and responsible disclosure in identifying and addressing vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.

  • SAML
  • SSO
  • Security
  • Authentication
  • Vulnerability
  • Exploit
  • parser
  • XML
  • Differential
  • Single Sign-On
  • Cybersecurity
  • Identity Management
  • Access Control
  • Web Security
  • GitHub

  Summary of Comments ( 102 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43374519

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News commenters discuss the complexity of SAML and the difficulty of ensuring consistent parsing across different implementations. Several point out that this vulnerability highlights the inherent fragility of relying on complex, XML-based standards like SAML, especially when multiple identity providers and service providers are involved. Some suggest that simpler authentication methods would be less susceptible to such parsing discrepancies. The discussion also touches on the importance of security audits and thorough testing, particularly for critical systems relying on SSO. A few commenters expressed surprise that such a vulnerability could exist, highlighting the subtle nature of the exploit. The overall sentiment reflects a concern about the complexity and potential security risks associated with SAML implementations.

  The Hacker News post titled "Sign in as anyone: Bypassing SAML SSO authentication with parser differentials" (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43374519) has generated a substantial discussion with several compelling comments.

  Many commenters focus on the complexities and nuances of SAML implementations, highlighting how these intricacies can lead to vulnerabilities. One commenter points out the inherent difficulty in handling XML securely, given its flexibility and the various ways different parsers interpret it. This aligns with the article's core issue: differing interpretations of SAML assertions between identity providers and service providers. They explain that XML's extensibility and features like DTDs create a complex attack surface that's hard to fully secure. Another echoes this sentiment, noting the historical challenges with XML security and how it often relies on "gentlemen's agreements" regarding data handling, which can easily break down.

  Several users discuss the practical implications of this type of vulnerability. Some emphasize the importance of careful validation on both the IdP and SP sides, suggesting that robust schema validation and strict adherence to standards are crucial for preventing such exploits. A commenter shares a personal anecdote of encountering a similar issue, illustrating how seemingly minor differences in XML parsing can have significant security consequences in real-world scenarios. They detail how different namespace handling between systems caused login failures, highlighting the fragility of SAML implementations.

  The conversation also delves into the broader security implications. One comment suggests that these types of vulnerabilities underscore the importance of defense in depth, advocating for multiple layers of security rather than relying solely on SAML. Another raises concerns about the increasing complexity of modern authentication systems, arguing that this complexity itself contributes to vulnerabilities. They suggest simpler authentication methods might be more secure in the long run.

  A few commenters offer more technical insights. One explains how XML Canonicalization (C14N) is designed to mitigate these kinds of issues, but its effectiveness depends on consistent implementation across systems. Another points out that this vulnerability highlights the need for proper input sanitization and validation, not just in web applications, but in all systems that process external data. A specific technical detail mentioned is the significance of the NameID element within SAML assertions and how its interpretation plays a crucial role in the exploit.

  Finally, some comments offer practical advice for developers and security professionals, recommending thorough testing and auditing of SAML implementations, particularly focusing on edge cases and potential discrepancies between different parsers. They also suggest utilizing existing security testing tools and resources to identify and address these vulnerabilities proactively.

• Azure's Weakest Link? How API Connections Spill Secrets

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  Posted: 2025-03-12 06:43:07

  Verbose tl;dr

  Azure API Connections, while offering convenient integration between services, pose a significant security risk due to their over-permissive default configurations. The post demonstrates how easily a compromised low-privilege Azure account can exploit these broadly scoped permissions to escalate access and extract sensitive data, including secrets from linked Key Vaults and other connected services. Essentially, API Connections grant access not just to the specified API, but often to the entire underlying identity of the connected resource, allowing malicious actors to potentially take control of significant portions of an Azure environment. The article highlights the urgent need for administrators to meticulously review and restrict API Connection permissions to the absolute minimum required, emphasizing the principle of least privilege.

  The blog post "Azure's Weakest Link? How API Connections Spill Secrets" by Nick Engevik details a significant security vulnerability related to how API connections are managed within the Azure cloud ecosystem. The core issue revolves around the excessive permissions granted to Managed Identities, specifically when they are utilized to authenticate and authorize access to API connections. These Managed Identities, which are essentially service principals automatically managed by Azure, are frequently employed for streamlined authentication between various Azure services. However, the author argues that the default configurations often grant these Managed Identities overly broad permissions, exceeding what is strictly necessary for their intended purpose.

  Engevik illustrates the problem by focusing on Azure Logic Apps, a service used for creating automated workflows. He explains that when a Logic App uses a Managed Identity to connect to an API connection, that Managed Identity is often granted the "Contributor" role on the entire API Connection resource. This "Contributor" role provides extensive privileges, including the ability to read and modify the API connection's configuration. Critically, this configuration often contains sensitive information such as API keys, OAuth tokens, and other secrets required for authentication with the target API.

  The vulnerability arises because this broad access extends beyond just using the API connection; it allows the Managed Identity to access and potentially exfiltrate the stored secrets. Engevik demonstrates how a malicious actor, having compromised a single Logic App, could leverage the Managed Identity's excessive permissions to retrieve the secrets stored within the API connection. This then allows them to access the connected third-party API independently of the Logic App, essentially escalating their initial compromise into a more significant breach.

  The author further highlights the insidious nature of this vulnerability by emphasizing the difficulty in detecting such exploits. The actions performed by the compromised Managed Identity appear as legitimate operations initiated by the Logic App, making it challenging to distinguish malicious activity from normal usage. This obfuscation can allow attackers to remain undetected for extended periods, potentially causing significant data breaches.

  Engevik offers several mitigation strategies to address this vulnerability. He recommends adhering to the principle of least privilege, urging users to grant Managed Identities only the necessary permissions required for their intended function, avoiding the overly permissive "Contributor" role. He suggests utilizing the "Reader" role where possible, which grants access to utilize the API connection but restricts modification of its configuration, thus protecting the stored secrets. He also advocates for implementing stricter access controls and monitoring practices to detect and prevent unauthorized access to API connections and their associated secrets. The post concludes by emphasizing the importance of proactive security measures within Azure environments to minimize the risk posed by these overly permissive API connection configurations.

  • Azure
  • API Security
  • Secrets Management
  • Cloud Security
  • API Connections
  • Vulnerability
  • Data Breach
  • Cybersecurity
  • Access Control
  • Authentication
  • Authorization
  • Cloud Computing
  • Microsoft Azure
  • API Keys
  • Sensitive Data
  • Security Best Practices

  Summary of Comments ( 17 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43340505

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users discussed the security implications of Azure API Connections, largely agreeing with the article's premise that they represent a significant attack surface. Several commenters highlighted the complexity of managing permissions and the potential for accidental data exposure due to overly permissive settings. The lack of granular control over data access within an API Connection was a recurring concern. Some users shared anecdotal experiences of encountering similar security issues in Azure, while others suggested alternative approaches like using managed identities or service principals for more secure resource access. The overall sentiment leaned toward caution when using API Connections, urging developers to carefully consider the security implications and explore safer alternatives.

  The Hacker News post "Azure's Weakest Link? How API Connections Spill Secrets" discussing the blog post about Azure API connection security generated several comments. Many commenters engaged with the technical details of the presented issues and offered additional insights and perspectives.

  One compelling line of discussion revolved around the practicality and impact of the described attack. Some commenters questioned the realism of the scenarios presented, arguing that exploiting these vulnerabilities would require a significant level of access already. They pointed out that an attacker with such access likely already had other avenues to achieve their goals, making the API connection vulnerability less critical. Others countered that even if not the easiest attack vector, these weaknesses still represent a significant security risk that shouldn't be ignored. They highlighted scenarios where compromising a less privileged account could be escalated through exploitation of this vulnerability to gain broader access.

  Several commenters also discussed the shared responsibility model in cloud security. They emphasized that while cloud providers like Microsoft are responsible for securing the underlying infrastructure, users are responsible for securing their own applications and configurations. The API connection vulnerabilities highlighted in the article fall under the user's responsibility, making proper configuration and security practices crucial.

  Some comments focused on the broader implications for API security in general. The issues described with Azure API connections, they argued, are not unique to Azure and represent a wider challenge in managing API credentials securely. They called for better tooling and practices for managing secrets and limiting the blast radius of compromised credentials.

  A few comments delved into specific technical details, such as the use of managed identities and the challenges of rotating secrets. These comments offered practical advice and alternative approaches to mitigating the risks associated with API connections.

  Finally, some commenters expressed frustration with the complexity of cloud security and the difficulty of staying on top of best practices. They called for simpler and more intuitive security configurations from cloud providers to reduce the risk of misconfigurations and vulnerabilities.

• Vulnerability in partner.microsoft.com allows unauthenticated access

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  Posted: 2025-03-05 13:58:12

  Verbose tl;dr

  A vulnerability in Microsoft Partner Center (partner.microsoft.com) allowed unauthenticated users to access internal resources. Specifically, improperly configured Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) application and service principal permissions enabled unauthorized access to certain Partner Center APIs. This misconfiguration potentially exposed sensitive business information related to Microsoft partners. Microsoft addressed the vulnerability by correcting the Azure AD application and service principal permissions to prevent unauthorized access.

  A critical vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-49035, has been discovered within the partner.microsoft.com website. This flaw allows unauthenticated, remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. The vulnerability stems from an improperly implemented access control mechanism on the website. Due to this faulty implementation, restrictions intended to limit access to specific resources or functionalities are bypassed. Consequently, an attacker, without needing any valid credentials or authentication, can exploit this weakness to retrieve information that should be protected and restricted to authorized users only. The potential impact of this vulnerability is significant. The compromised data could range from confidential partner information, potentially including business strategies, financial data, and customer details, to internal Microsoft resources. This unauthorized access not only poses a serious risk to Microsoft and its partners but also potentially to the customers of those partners. The exact nature of the exploitable information isn't explicitly defined in the CVE description, but the severity assessment underscores the potential for significant damage. Microsoft has addressed this vulnerability, highlighting the importance of updating affected systems to mitigate the risk of exploitation. While the CVE entry doesn't detail the specific remediation steps, it implies that the fix likely involves correcting the faulty access control implementation on the partner.microsoft.com platform to enforce proper authentication and authorization checks. The severity assigned to this vulnerability, classified as critical, indicates a high likelihood of successful exploitation and a potentially substantial negative impact. The vulnerability existed within the "Partner Center" portion of the website, a portal used by Microsoft partners to manage their relationship with Microsoft.

  • Microsoft
  • Vulnerability
  • CVE-2024-49035
  • partner.microsoft.com
  • Unauthenticated Access
  • Security
  • Cybersecurity
  • NVD
  • NIST
  • Access Control
  • Authorization Bypass

  Summary of Comments ( 0 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43266429

  Verbose tl;dr

  HN users discuss the lack of detail in the CVE report for CVE-2024-49035, making it difficult to assess the actual impact. Some speculate about the potential severity, ranging from trivial to highly impactful depending on the specific exposed data and functionality. The vagueness also raises questions about Microsoft's disclosure process and the potential for more serious underlying issues. Several commenters note the irony of a vulnerability on a partner security portal, highlighting the difficulty of maintaining perfect security even for organizations focused on it. One user questions the use of "unauthenticated access" in the title, suggesting it might be misleading without knowing what level of access was granted.

  The Hacker News post titled "Vulnerability in partner.microsoft.com allows unauthenticated access" linking to a NIST vulnerability disclosure (CVE-2024-49035) has a modest number of comments, generating a brief discussion around the nature of the vulnerability and its potential impact.

  Several commenters focused on the ambiguity surrounding the actual impact of the vulnerability. The NIST disclosure provides limited technical detail, stating only that it allows "unauthenticated access." Commenters questioned what exactly an attacker could do with this unauthenticated access. Could they retrieve sensitive data? Modify information? Or was it simply access to a publicly available area that didn't require authentication in the first place? This lack of clarity was a central theme in the discussion.

  One commenter pointed out the apparent irony of a vulnerability existing on a partner portal specifically designed for managing security products. They highlighted the potential reputational damage this could cause Microsoft, especially given its focus on security.

  There's also a brief exchange regarding the use of "unauthenticated access" versus "unauthorized access." One commenter suggests the former is a subset of the latter, arguing that all unauthenticated access is unauthorized, but not all unauthorized access is necessarily unauthenticated. This spurred a short discussion about the nuances of these terms in a security context.

  Finally, some comments speculated on the root cause of the vulnerability, suggesting possibilities like misconfigured access control lists (ACLs) or an internal tool inadvertently exposed to the public. However, these remained speculations due to the limited information available in the NIST disclosure. No commenter claimed definitive knowledge of the vulnerability's technical details beyond what was publicly disclosed.

  Overall, the discussion reflects a cautious interest in the vulnerability, tempered by the lack of detailed information. Commenters clearly recognize the potential seriousness of an unauthenticated access vulnerability on a Microsoft partner portal, but the limited disclosure prevents a deeper analysis of the issue.

• Breaking into apartment buildings in five minutes on my phone

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  Posted: 2025-02-24 15:48:16

  Verbose tl;dr

  Security researcher Eric Daigle discovered a significant vulnerability in several "smart" apartment intercom systems. By exploiting a poorly implemented API within these systems, he was able to remotely unlock building doors and individual apartment units using only his phone and publicly available information. He accomplished this by crafting specific HTTP requests that bypassed security measures, granting him unauthorized access. Daigle responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the affected vendors, prompting them to address the issue and improve their security protocols. This highlighted the risk associated with insecure IoT devices and the importance of robust API security in connected building systems.

  In a detailed blog post titled "Breaking into apartment buildings in five minutes on my phone," security researcher Eric Daigle meticulously documents a concerning vulnerability he discovered affecting numerous apartment buildings utilizing a specific access control system. Daigle commences by elucidating the prevalent adoption of smart access control systems in modern residential buildings, emphasizing the shift away from traditional physical keys towards digital solutions involving mobile applications and intercom systems integrated with internet-connected devices. He then proceeds to describe his methodical process of identifying and exploiting a security flaw within one such system, meticulously outlining each step of his research without divulging sensitive technical details that could be misused by malicious actors.

  Daigle's investigation began with casual observation of the system in his own building. He noticed certain peculiarities in the system's behavior that piqued his interest, prompting further exploration. Through careful analysis and experimentation, using only his phone and publicly accessible information, he discovered a vulnerability that permitted unauthorized access to the building's directory – a digital repository containing tenant names and associated intercom codes. This directory, typically protected behind authentication mechanisms, became accessible due to an oversight in the system's design and implementation. Specifically, Daigle identified a logical flaw in the way the system handled user authentication and authorization, allowing him to circumvent these security measures and gain unauthorized access to the directory.

  The implications of this vulnerability are substantial, as it potentially granted Daigle the ability to access not just his own building, but potentially dozens or even hundreds of other buildings employing the same vulnerable access control system. With access to the tenant directory, an individual could potentially impersonate a resident, gaining access to the building and potentially individual apartments. Daigle responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the vendor responsible for the system, allowing them time to develop and deploy a patch before publicly disclosing the issue on his blog. He carefully details the responsible disclosure process, highlighting the communication exchanges with the vendor and the steps taken to ensure the vulnerability was addressed before being made public. He concludes by emphasizing the importance of robust security practices in the development and deployment of internet-connected devices, especially those related to physical security and access control. Furthermore, he encourages other security researchers to responsibly disclose vulnerabilities they discover to help improve the security posture of these increasingly ubiquitous systems.

  • Physical Security
  • Apartment Security
  • Building Security
  • Vulnerability
  • Exploit
  • Cybersecurity
  • IoT Security
  • Smart Home Security
  • Access Control
  • Penetration Testing
  • Ethical Hacking
  • Security Research
  • Building Management Systems
  • Smart Locks

  Summary of Comments ( 24 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43160884

  Verbose tl;dr

  HN commenters discuss the prevalence of easily-exploitable vulnerabilities in building access control systems. Several highlight the inherent insecurity of relying solely on cellular connections for such critical infrastructure, pointing out the ease with which cellular signals can be intercepted or spoofed. Others note the conflict between convenience and security, acknowledging that many residents prioritize ease of access over robust protection. Some commenters share anecdotal experiences with similar vulnerabilities in their own buildings, while others suggest potential solutions, such as requiring secondary authentication factors or utilizing more secure communication protocols. The ethical implications of publicly disclosing such vulnerabilities are also debated, with some arguing for responsible disclosure while others emphasize the urgent need for awareness and immediate action. A few commenters question the author's decision to reveal specific technical details, fearing it could empower malicious actors.

  The Hacker News post "Breaking into apartment buildings in five minutes on my phone" (linking to an article detailing vulnerabilities in apartment building intercom systems) generated a robust discussion with over 100 comments. Many commenters focused on the widespread nature of this security flaw and the lack of incentive for property managers to address it.

  Several commenters shared anecdotes of similar vulnerabilities they'd encountered or exploited, including using default passwords, easily guessable codes, or simply bypassing the systems altogether. One commenter described manipulating the intercom system of their own building to open the main door from anywhere in the world. These personal stories underscored the real-world implications of the article's findings.

  A recurring theme was the inherent conflict of interest between security and cost for property management companies. Commenters pointed out that the cheapest systems are often the most vulnerable, and that property managers prioritize minimizing expenses over implementing robust security measures. This created a sense of resignation among some, suggesting that these issues would persist until either regulations changed or a significant security breach forced the industry's hand.

  The discussion also delved into the technical aspects of the vulnerabilities, with some commenters speculating on the specific technologies used in these intercom systems and potential solutions. Some suggested implementing multi-factor authentication or using more secure communication protocols. Others noted the challenge of retrofitting older buildings with modern security systems.

  Several comments highlighted the ethical considerations of vulnerability disclosure. While the original article author responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to the affected companies, commenters discussed the potential risks of publicly sharing this information, including the possibility of malicious actors exploiting these weaknesses. This sparked a debate about the balance between transparency and security.

  Finally, a number of commenters expressed frustration and disappointment with the state of security in these systems. They criticized the manufacturers for producing insecure products and the property managers for deploying them. Some called for greater consumer awareness and advocacy to push for better security practices in the industry. Overall, the comments painted a picture of a widespread and persistent security problem with limited incentives for change.

• Bad Smart Watch Authentication

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  Posted: 2025-02-09 18:18:47

  Verbose tl;dr

  The blog post "Bad Smart Watch Authentication" details a vulnerability discovered in a smart watch's companion app. The app, when requesting sensitive fitness data, used a predictable, sequential ID in its API requests. This allowed the author, by simply incrementing the ID, to access the fitness data of other users without proper authorization. This highlights a critical flaw in the app's authentication and authorization mechanisms, demonstrating how easily user data could be exposed due to poor security practices.

  This blog post, titled "Bad Smart Watch Authentication," details a security vulnerability discovered by the author, identified as "XSSfox," within the IDO Smartwatch ecosystem. The author meticulously describes a flawed authentication process that could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a user's smartwatch data. The vulnerability centers around the method by which the companion mobile application communicates with the smartwatch via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Specifically, the application transmits an authentication token over BLE to establish a connection and authorize subsequent interactions.

  XSSfox discovered that this authentication token, crucial for securing the connection, possesses a critically short lifespan and is excessively predictable. This predictability stems from the token's derivation from easily obtainable information: the current timestamp. Furthermore, the short validity period, intended to enhance security, ironically exacerbates the issue. The combination of these two weaknesses—predictability and short lifespan—creates a narrow window of opportunity for an attacker, but one that is readily exploitable.

  The attack scenario outlined involves an attacker within Bluetooth range of the victim's smartwatch. This attacker could passively eavesdrop on the BLE communication, capturing the authentication token when the legitimate mobile application connects. Due to the token's predictable nature based on the timestamp, the attacker can accurately calculate future tokens. This allows the attacker, even after the captured token expires, to inject their own, predicted, and valid token into the communication stream, effectively impersonating the authentic mobile application. Consequently, the attacker could gain control of the smartwatch and access sensitive data such as the user's location, fitness information, or potentially even notifications and communication logs.

  The author clearly articulates the technical details of the vulnerability, including the specific format and generation method of the authentication token. They highlight the severity of the issue by explaining the potential consequences of successful exploitation. While the author refrains from explicitly naming the affected smartwatch model, they provide sufficient information to suggest that the vulnerability impacts a specific range of IDO smartwatches. The post concludes with a call to action, urging the manufacturer to address this critical security flaw and implement more robust authentication mechanisms. The overall tone of the post is one of professional concern, emphasizing the importance of responsible disclosure and the need for enhanced security in the realm of wearable technology.

  • smart watch
  • Authentication
  • Security
  • Vulnerability
  • IoT
  • Wearables
  • password
  • biometrics
  • Two-Factor Authentication
  • Authorization
  • Access Control

  Summary of Comments ( 29 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42992368

  Verbose tl;dr

  Several Hacker News commenters criticize the smartwatch authentication scheme described in the article, calling it "security theater" and "fundamentally broken." They point out that relying on a QR code displayed on a trusted device (the watch) to authenticate on another device (the phone) is flawed, as it doesn't verify the connection between the watch and the phone. This leaves it open to attacks where a malicious actor could intercept the QR code and use it themselves. Some suggest alternative approaches, such as using Bluetooth proximity verification or public-key cryptography, to establish a secure connection between the devices. Others question the overall utility of this type of authentication, highlighting the inconvenience and limited security benefits it offers. A few commenters mention similar vulnerabilities in existing passwordless login systems.

  The Hacker News post titled "Bad Smart Watch Authentication" (linking to an article about insecure initial device onboarding processes for smartwatches) has generated several comments discussing the security implications and broader context of the issue.

  Several commenters express general agreement with the article's premise. One commenter points out the irony of having robust security measures for the data in transit, while the initial setup process, which establishes the foundation of trust, is often neglected. They highlight how this weakness undermines the subsequent security layers. Another commenter expands on this, suggesting that the ease of setup is often prioritized over security, creating a vulnerability that sophisticated attackers could exploit.

  The discussion also touches upon the prevalence of this issue beyond smartwatches. One commenter notes that similar vulnerabilities exist in other "Internet of Things" devices, lamenting the widespread lack of secure onboarding practices across the industry. Another user concurs, sarcastically commenting on the seemingly common practice of using easily guessable default passwords or even skipping authentication altogether during setup. They argue this demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding about security among manufacturers.

  Some commenters delve into the technical specifics. One individual questions the efficacy of using a six-digit code for authentication, noting that it provides a relatively small search space for a brute-force attack, especially considering the lack of rate limiting mentioned in the article. Another commenter raises concerns about the potential for physical proximity attacks, suggesting that an attacker within Bluetooth range could potentially intercept or manipulate the pairing process.

  A recurring theme in the comments is the trade-off between security and user experience. Some users acknowledge the difficulty of implementing robust security measures without making the setup process overly complex for the average consumer. However, others argue that security should be a primary concern, particularly given the sensitive nature of the data often collected by these devices. They suggest that manufacturers need to find more creative solutions to balance these competing priorities.

  Finally, a few commenters offer potential solutions, such as using physically unique identifiers or more sophisticated cryptographic protocols during the onboarding process. One commenter suggests employing a technique similar to what some password managers use, where a secondary device is required to authorize the initial setup. Another commenter proposes leveraging the security capabilities of the paired smartphone for a more secure onboarding experience.

• Breaking Down the NSA's Guidance on Zero Trust Implementations (2024)

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  Posted: 2025-01-28 22:28:10

  Verbose tl;dr

  The NSA's 2024 guidance on Zero Trust architecture emphasizes practical implementation and maturity progression. It shifts away from rigid adherence to a specific model and instead provides a flexible, risk-based approach tailored to an organization's unique mission and operational context. The guidance identifies four foundational pillars: device visibility and security, network segmentation and security, workload security and hardening, and data security and access control. It further outlines five levels of Zero Trust maturity, offering a roadmap for incremental adoption. Crucially, the NSA stresses continuous monitoring and evaluation as essential components of a successful Zero Trust strategy.

  The National Security Agency (NSA) recently released updated guidance in June 2024 on implementing Zero Trust security architectures, a significant evolution from their initial 2021 recommendations. This comprehensive document offers a highly detailed and practical roadmap for organizations seeking to bolster their cybersecurity posture against increasingly sophisticated threats. The core principle of Zero Trust, as reiterated and expanded upon in the NSA's guidance, centers on eliminating implicit trust and continuously verifying every user, device, and application attempting to access resources, regardless of their location. This "never trust, always verify" philosophy fundamentally shifts the security paradigm from perimeter-based defenses to a more granular and dynamic approach.

  The 2024 update refines the previous guidance by delving deeper into practical implementation details and offering more specific recommendations. The NSA stresses the importance of micro-segmentation, a key component of Zero Trust, which involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to limit the impact of potential breaches. Should a compromise occur, the damage is contained within that specific micro-segment, preventing lateral movement across the network. The guidance elucidates how to effectively implement micro-segmentation, taking into account varying organizational structures and technological landscapes.

  Furthermore, the NSA highlights the critical role of robust identity and access management (IAM) within a Zero Trust architecture. Strong authentication mechanisms, including multi-factor authentication (MFA), are emphasized as essential for verifying user identities before granting access to resources. Continuous monitoring and authorization are also recommended, ensuring that access permissions are dynamically adjusted based on real-time contextual information such as user behavior, location, and device posture. This dynamic approach enhances security by continuously reassessing trust and revoking access when necessary.

  The guidance also provides a pragmatic approach to deployment, acknowledging that a complete overhaul of existing security infrastructure can be a daunting task. The NSA advocates for a phased approach, allowing organizations to gradually transition to Zero Trust principles by prioritizing critical assets and systems. This iterative process allows for flexibility and adaptability, enabling organizations to learn and refine their Zero Trust implementation over time. The guidance emphasizes the importance of continuous monitoring and evaluation, allowing organizations to measure the effectiveness of their Zero Trust implementation and make necessary adjustments.

  The updated guidance from the NSA represents a valuable resource for organizations of all sizes looking to strengthen their cybersecurity defenses in today's complex threat landscape. By providing a detailed and practical framework for implementing Zero Trust principles, the NSA aims to empower organizations to adopt a more proactive and resilient security posture. The emphasis on micro-segmentation, robust IAM, and a phased approach to deployment provides actionable steps for organizations to effectively transition towards a Zero Trust architecture and enhance their overall security posture against evolving cyber threats. This detailed guidance helps organizations better understand and implement Zero Trust principles, promoting a more secure and resilient digital environment.

  • Zero Trust
  • NSA
  • National Security Agency
  • Cybersecurity
  • network security
  • information security
  • 2024 Guidance
  • Implementation
  • best practices
  • Government
  • Federal Government
  • Defense
  • Intelligence
  • Security Architecture
  • Access Control

  Summary of Comments ( 2 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42858940

  Verbose tl;dr

  HN commenters generally agree that the NSA's Zero Trust guidance is a good starting point, even if somewhat high-level and lacking specific implementation details. Some express skepticism about the feasibility and cost of full Zero Trust implementation, particularly for smaller organizations. Several discuss the importance of focusing on data protection and access control as core principles, with suggestions for practical starting points like strong authentication and microsegmentation. There's a shared understanding that Zero Trust is a journey, not a destination, and that continuous monitoring and improvement are crucial. A few commenters offer alternative perspectives, suggesting that Zero Trust is just a rebranding of existing security practices or questioning the NSA's motives in promoting it. Finally, there's some discussion about the challenges of managing complexity in a Zero Trust environment and the need for better tooling and automation.

  The Hacker News post "Breaking Down the NSA's Guidance on Zero Trust Implementations (2024)" has generated a moderate number of comments, exploring different facets of the NSA's recommendations. While not an overwhelming discussion, several compelling points are raised.

  One commenter highlights the apparent disconnect between the NSA's push for Zero Trust and the reality of legacy systems within many government agencies. They argue that true Zero Trust implementation is incredibly challenging, if not impossible, when dealing with older technologies that weren't designed with these principles in mind. This raises the question of practicality and the potential need for phased approaches or compromises in implementation.

  Another comment emphasizes the crucial role of asset management in any successful Zero Trust architecture. They point out that without a clear understanding of all devices, applications, and data flows within an organization, implementing Zero Trust becomes significantly more difficult. Knowing what needs to be protected is a fundamental prerequisite for effective access control and security policy enforcement.

  Several comments discuss the "assume breach" mentality advocated by the NSA. This principle suggests that organizations should operate under the assumption that their systems have already been compromised, and design their security posture accordingly. The discussion revolves around the implications of this mindset, emphasizing the importance of continuous monitoring, threat detection, and incident response capabilities.

  The complexity and cost of implementing Zero Trust are recurring themes in the comments. One commenter points out the potential for vendor lock-in and the challenges of navigating the rapidly evolving landscape of Zero Trust solutions. They suggest a cautious approach, urging organizations to carefully evaluate their needs and avoid rushing into complex implementations without proper planning and consideration.

  Finally, some comments delve into the specifics of the NSA's recommendations, particularly regarding microsegmentation and network security. They discuss the practical challenges of implementing these concepts and the potential benefits in terms of limiting the impact of security breaches.

  Overall, the comments section provides valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with implementing Zero Trust, particularly within the context of government agencies. While there's no single dominant narrative, the discussion highlights the complexity of the issue and the need for careful planning and execution.

• Using your Apple device as an access card in unsupported systems

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  Posted: 2025-01-19 18:01:42

  Verbose tl;dr

  This project describes a method to use an Apple device (iPhone or Apple Watch) as an access card even with unsupported access control systems. It leverages the device's NFC capabilities to read the card's data, then emulates the card using an Arduino and RFID reader/writer. The user taps their physical access card on the RFID reader connected to the Arduino, which then transmits the card data to an Apple device via Bluetooth. The Apple device then stores and transmits this data wirelessly to the Arduino when presented to the reader, effectively cloning the original card's functionality. This allows users to unlock doors and other access points without needing their physical card.

  This GitHub repository, titled "Apple device as an access card in unsupported systems," details a method for leveraging the NFC capabilities of Apple devices, specifically iPhones and Apple Watches, to emulate access cards, even in systems that do not natively support Apple Wallet or Apple Pay. The author highlights the limitations of Apple's official access card functionality, which restricts usage to specifically partnered systems and requires explicit integration with Apple's ecosystem. This project aims to bypass these restrictions, allowing users to utilize their Apple devices as access cards in a wider range of scenarios, such as accessing buildings, garages, or other secured areas that rely on traditional NFC card readers.

  The core functionality revolves around reading the data from an existing physical access card using an NFC-enabled Android device and an app like NFC TagInfo by NXP. This process extracts the card's unique identifier and other relevant data. This extracted information is then carefully formatted and encoded into an NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) message. This NDEF message is designed to mimic the communication protocol of the original access card.

  The formatted NDEF message can then be written to an iPhone or Apple Watch using an app that supports custom NDEF writing, such as Shortcuts on iOS. The author provides detailed, step-by-step instructions, including screenshots, outlining the precise process for creating the necessary Shortcuts automation. This automation effectively transforms the Apple device into a virtual representation of the original access card.

  Once configured, the user can present their Apple device to the NFC reader, just as they would with the original physical card. The NFC reader interacts with the NDEF message stored on the Apple device, effectively receiving the same identification data as it would from the physical card, hopefully granting access.

  The author acknowledges that this method may not work with all access card systems, particularly those employing advanced security measures like cryptography or challenge-response authentication. The success of this approach depends on the simplicity and reliance on static card identifiers within the targeted access control system. Furthermore, the author emphasizes the ethical considerations and potential legal implications of cloning access cards, urging users to only apply this technique to systems they own or have explicit authorization to access. The provided instructions are intended for educational and experimental purposes, and the author disclaims any responsibility for misuse or unauthorized access attempts.

  • Apple
  • iOS
  • NFC
  • Access Control
  • Security
  • RFID
  • Card Emulation
  • Physical Access
  • Mobile Authentication
  • Hardware Hacking
  • Reverse Engineering
  • DIY

  Summary of Comments ( 92 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42759557

  Verbose tl;dr

  HN users discuss the practicality and security implications of using an Apple device as an access card in unsupported systems. Several commenters point out the inherent security risks, particularly if the system relies solely on NFC broadcasting without further authentication. Others highlight the potential for lock-in and the difficulties in managing lost or stolen devices. Some express skepticism about the reliability of NFC in real-world scenarios, while others suggest alternative solutions like using a Raspberry Pi for more flexible and secure access control. The overall sentiment leans towards caution, with many emphasizing the importance of robust security measures in access control systems.

  The Hacker News post titled "Using your Apple device as an access card in unsupported systems" (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42759557) has generated a moderate number of comments discussing the project and its implications.

  Several commenters express enthusiasm for the project, praising its ingenuity and potential usefulness. They appreciate the ability to leverage existing Apple Wallet functionality for access control systems that haven't officially integrated with Apple's platform. The relative simplicity of the setup and use, particularly the NFC reading aspect, are also highlighted as positive aspects.

  Some users share their existing experiences and challenges with various access control systems, including issues with proprietary apps, key fobs, and the desire for a more unified solution. The Apple device integration is seen as a potential step towards this unification.

  A significant point of discussion revolves around security concerns. Some commenters question the security implications of essentially cloning access cards, particularly regarding the potential for unauthorized duplication and misuse. The developer's response within the comments clarifies that the project does not actually clone or crack the card's security, but rather emulates the card's behavior using the NFC functionality of the Apple device. They emphasize that any existing vulnerabilities in the original card system would remain regardless of this project. This sparked further discussion on the inherent vulnerabilities of certain access card systems themselves.

  There are technical discussions regarding the capabilities and limitations of the NFC functionality in Apple devices, particularly related to reading certain types of cards. Some users inquire about specific card compatibility and the potential for expanding the project's support.

  Finally, a few comments touch upon the legal and ethical considerations of using this approach, with some raising concerns about potential misuse and the need for responsible usage within the bounds of existing access control system regulations. There's also a brief discussion about open-sourcing the hardware component of the project.

  Overall, the comments reflect a mixture of excitement about the project's potential, tempered by pragmatic concerns about security, compatibility, and responsible use. The discussion highlights the ongoing desire for improved and more integrated access control solutions, while acknowledging the inherent complexities and potential pitfalls involved in achieving this goal.