SubImage, a Y Combinator W25 startup, launched a tool that allows you to see your cloud infrastructure through the eyes of an attacker. It automatically scans public-facing assets, identifying vulnerabilities and potential attack paths without requiring any credentials or agents. This external perspective helps companies understand their real attack surface and prioritize remediation efforts, focusing on the weaknesses most likely to be exploited. The goal is to bridge the gap between security teams' internal view and the reality of how attackers perceive their infrastructure, leading to a more proactive and effective security posture.
The author argues that relying on US-based cloud providers is no longer safe for governments and societies, particularly in Europe. The CLOUD Act grants US authorities access to data stored by US companies regardless of location, undermining data sovereignty and exposing sensitive information to potential surveillance. This risk is compounded by increasing geopolitical tensions and the weaponization of data, making dependence on US cloud infrastructure a strategic vulnerability. The author advocates for shifting towards European-owned and operated cloud solutions that prioritize data protection and adhere to stricter regulatory frameworks like GDPR, ensuring digital sovereignty and reducing reliance on potentially adversarial nations.
Hacker News users largely agreed with the article's premise, expressing concerns about US government overreach and data access. Several commenters highlighted the lack of legal recourse for non-US entities against US government actions. Some suggested the EU's data protection regulations are insufficient against such power. The discussion also touched on the geopolitical implications, with commenters noting the US's history of using its technological dominance for political gain. A few commenters questioned the feasibility of entirely avoiding US cloud providers, acknowledging their advanced technology and market share. Others mentioned open-source alternatives and the importance of developing sovereign cloud infrastructure within the EU. A recurring theme was the need for greater digital sovereignty and reducing reliance on US-based services.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed multiple Russia-aligned threat actors, including APT29 (Cozy Bear) and Sandworm, actively targeting Signal users. These campaigns primarily focused on stealing authentication material from Signal servers, likely to bypass Signal's robust encryption and gain access to user communications. Although Signal's server-side infrastructure was targeted, the attackers needed physical access to the device to complete the compromise, significantly limiting the attack's effectiveness. While Signal's encryption remains unbroken, the targeting underscores the lengths to which nation-state actors will go to compromise secure communications.
HN commenters express skepticism about the Google blog post, questioning its timing and motivations. Some suggest it's a PR move by Google, designed to distract from their own security issues or promote their own messaging platforms. Others point out the lack of technical details in the post, making it difficult to assess the credibility of the claims. A few commenters discuss the inherent difficulties of securing any messaging platform against determined state-sponsored actors and the importance of robust security practices regardless of the provider. The possibility of phishing campaigns, rather than Signal vulnerabilities, being the attack vector is also raised. Finally, some commenters highlight the broader context of the ongoing conflict and the increased targeting of communication platforms.
Token Security, a cybersecurity startup focused on protecting "machine identities" (like API keys and digital certificates used by software and devices), has raised $20 million in funding. The company aims to combat the growing threat of hackers exploiting these often overlooked credentials, which are increasingly targeted as a gateway to sensitive data and systems. Their platform helps organizations manage and secure these machine identities, reducing the risk of breaches and unauthorized access.
HN commenters discuss the increasing attack surface of machine identities, echoing the article's concern. Some question the novelty of the problem, pointing out that managing server certificates and keys has always been a security concern. Others express skepticism towards Token Security's approach, suggesting that complexity in security solutions often introduces new vulnerabilities. The most compelling comments highlight the difficulty of managing machine identities at scale in modern cloud-native environments, where ephemeral workloads and automated deployments exacerbate the existing challenges. There's also discussion around the need for better tooling and automation to address this growing security gap.
Summary of Comments ( 0 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43161332
The Hacker News comments section for SubImage expresses cautious interest and skepticism. Several commenters question the practical value proposition, particularly given existing open-source tools like Amass and Shodan. Some doubt the ability to accurately replicate attacker reconnaissance, citing the limitations of automated tools compared to a dedicated human adversary. Others suggest the service might be more useful for smaller companies lacking dedicated security teams. The pricing model also draws criticism, with users expressing concern about per-asset costs potentially escalating quickly. A few commenters offer constructive feedback, suggesting integrations or features that would enhance the product, such as incorporating attack path analysis. Overall, the reception is lukewarm, with many awaiting further details and practical demonstrations of SubImage's capabilities before passing judgment.
The Hacker News post for Launch HN: SubImage (YC W25) – See your infra from an attacker's perspective has a moderate number of comments, sparking a discussion around the utility and approach of the presented tool.
Several commenters express skepticism about the value proposition of SubImage. Some argue that existing open-source tools, like nmap and Shodan, already provide similar functionality. They question whether SubImage offers enough differentiation to justify its existence, especially considering it's a commercial product. This skepticism revolves around the perception that simply identifying open ports and services isn't novel and that truly understanding an attacker's perspective requires more sophisticated analysis.
One commenter specifically points out the challenge of accurately mimicking an attacker's reconnaissance process. They contend that attackers often leverage insider knowledge, social engineering, or vulnerabilities beyond simple port scanning. Therefore, a tool that only focuses on publicly exposed services might provide a limited and potentially misleading view of actual attack vectors.
The discussion also touches on the complexity of managing false positives. One commenter expresses concern about the potential for SubImage to generate numerous alerts for services intentionally exposed or misconfigured in non-critical ways. This raises questions about the tool's practicality in real-world scenarios where security teams must prioritize genuine threats amidst a sea of noise.
Conversely, some comments express interest in the tool. They highlight the potential benefits of having an automated and centralized platform for external attack surface monitoring. The convenience of aggregating information from various sources and presenting it in a digestible format is recognized as a potential strength of SubImage.
One commenter specifically asks about SubImage's ability to handle cloud environments and dynamic IP addresses, suggesting a demand for tools that can adapt to the complexities of modern infrastructure.
The founder of SubImage also participates in the discussion, responding to several comments and clarifying the intended purpose of the tool. They emphasize that SubImage aims to complement existing security practices, not replace them. They also acknowledge the limitations of purely external scanning and mention ongoing development to incorporate more sophisticated analysis capabilities.
In summary, the comment section reveals a mixed reception to SubImage. While some see it as a potentially useful addition to the security toolkit, others remain unconvinced of its unique value proposition and express concerns about its practical limitations. The discussion highlights the ongoing need for innovative security solutions while also underscoring the importance of critical evaluation and a nuanced understanding of the threat landscape.