This blog post explains how one-time passwords (OTPs), specifically HOTP and TOTP, work. It breaks down the process of generating these codes, starting with a shared secret key and a counter (HOTP) or timestamp (TOTP). This input is then used with the HMAC-SHA1 algorithm to create a hash. The post details how a specific portion of the hash is extracted and truncated to produce the final 6-digit OTP. It clarifies the difference between HOTP, which uses a counter and requires manual synchronization if skipped, and TOTP, which uses time and allows for a small window of desynchronization. The post also briefly discusses the security benefits of OTPs and why they are effective against certain types of attacks.
Firebase Studio is a visual development environment built for Firebase, offering a low-code approach to building web and mobile applications. It simplifies backend development with pre-built UI components and integrations for various Firebase services like Authentication, Firestore, Storage, and Cloud Functions. Developers can visually design UI layouts, connect them to data sources, and implement logic without extensive coding. This allows for faster prototyping and development, particularly for frontend developers who may be less familiar with backend complexities. Firebase Studio aims to streamline the entire Firebase development workflow, from building and deploying apps to monitoring performance and user engagement.
HN commenters generally expressed skepticism and disappointment with Firebase Studio. Several pointed out that it seemed like a rebranded version of FlutterFlow, offering little new functionality. Some questioned the value proposition, especially given FlutterFlow's existing presence and the perception of Firebase Studio as a closed-source, vendor-locked solution. Others were critical of the pricing model, considering it expensive compared to alternatives. A few commenters expressed interest in trying it out, but the overall sentiment was one of cautious negativity, with many feeling that it didn't address existing pain points in Firebase development.
Fly.io's blog post details their experience implementing and using macaroons for authorization in their distributed system. They highlight macaroons' advantages, such as decentralized authorization and context-based access control, allowing fine-grained permissions without constant server-side checks. The post outlines the challenges they faced operationalizing macaroons, including managing key rotation, handling third-party caveats, and ensuring efficient verification, and explains their solutions using a centralized root key service and careful caveat design. Ultimately, Fly.io found macaroons effective for their use case, offering flexibility and performance improvements.
HN commenters generally praised the article for its clarity in explaining the complexities of macaroons. Some expressed their prior struggles understanding the concept and appreciated the author's approach. A few commenters discussed potential use cases beyond authorization, such as for building auditable systems and enforcing data governance policies. The extensibility and composability of macaroons were highlighted as key advantages. One commenter noted the comparison to JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and suggested macaroons offered superior capabilities for fine-grained authorization, particularly in distributed systems. There was also brief discussion about alternative authorization mechanisms like SPIFFE and their relationship to macaroons.
Cloudflare has open-sourced OPKSSH, a tool that integrates single sign-on (SSO) with SSH, eliminating the need for managing individual SSH keys. OPKSSH achieves this by leveraging OpenID Connect (OIDC) and issuing short-lived SSH certificates signed by a central Certificate Authority (CA). This allows users to authenticate with their existing SSO credentials, simplifying access management and improving security by eliminating static, long-lived SSH keys. The project aims to standardize SSH certificate issuance and validation through a simple, open protocol, contributing to a more secure and user-friendly SSH experience.
HN commenters generally express interest in OpenPubkey but also significant skepticism and concerns. Several raise security implications around trusting a third party for SSH access and the potential for vendor lock-in. Some question the actual benefits over existing solutions like SSH certificates, agent forwarding, or using configuration management tools. Others see potential value in simplifying SSH key management, particularly for less technical users or in specific scenarios like ephemeral cloud instances. There's discussion around key discovery, revocation speed, and the complexities of supporting different identity providers. The closed-source nature of the server-side component is a common concern, limiting self-hosting options and requiring trust in Cloudflare. Several users also mention existing open-source projects with similar goals and question the need for another solution.
The blog post details a vulnerability in Next.js versions 13.4.0 and earlier related to authorization bypass in middleware. It explains how an attacker could manipulate the req.nextUrl.pathname value within middleware to trick the application into serving protected routes without proper authentication. Specifically, by changing the pathname to begin with /_next/, the middleware logic could be bypassed, allowing access to resources intended to be restricted. The author demonstrates this with an example involving an authentication check for /dashboard that could be circumvented by requesting /_next/dashboard instead. The post concludes by emphasizing the importance of validating and sanitizing user-supplied data, even within seemingly internal properties like req.nextUrl.
The Hacker News comments discuss the complexity and potential pitfalls of Next.js middleware, particularly regarding authentication. Some commenters argue the example provided in the article is contrived and not representative of typical Next.js usage, suggesting simpler and more robust solutions for authorization. Others point out that the core issue stems from a misunderstanding of how middleware functions, particularly the implications of mutable shared state between requests. Several commenters highlight the importance of carefully considering the order and scope of middleware execution to avoid unexpected behavior. The discussion also touches on broader concerns about the increasing complexity of JavaScript frameworks and the potential for such complexities to introduce subtle bugs. A few commenters appreciate the article for raising awareness of these potential issues, even if the specific example is debatable.
A critical vulnerability was discovered impacting multiple SAML single sign-on (SSO) libraries across various programming languages. This vulnerability stemmed from inconsistencies in how different XML parsers interpret and handle XML signatures within SAML assertions. Attackers could exploit these "parser differentials" by crafting malicious SAML responses where the signature appeared valid to the service provider's parser but actually signed different data than what the identity provider intended. This allowed attackers to potentially impersonate any user, gaining unauthorized access to systems protected by vulnerable SAML implementations. The blog post details the vulnerability's root cause, demonstrates exploitation scenarios, and lists the affected libraries and their patched versions.
Hacker News commenters discuss the complexity of SAML and the difficulty of ensuring consistent parsing across different implementations. Several point out that this vulnerability highlights the inherent fragility of relying on complex, XML-based standards like SAML, especially when multiple identity providers and service providers are involved. Some suggest that simpler authentication methods would be less susceptible to such parsing discrepancies. The discussion also touches on the importance of security audits and thorough testing, particularly for critical systems relying on SSO. A few commenters expressed surprise that such a vulnerability could exist, highlighting the subtle nature of the exploit. The overall sentiment reflects a concern about the complexity and potential security risks associated with SAML implementations.
Azure API Connections, while offering convenient integration between services, pose a significant security risk due to their over-permissive default configurations. The post demonstrates how easily a compromised low-privilege Azure account can exploit these broadly scoped permissions to escalate access and extract sensitive data, including secrets from linked Key Vaults and other connected services. Essentially, API Connections grant access not just to the specified API, but often to the entire underlying identity of the connected resource, allowing malicious actors to potentially take control of significant portions of an Azure environment. The article highlights the urgent need for administrators to meticulously review and restrict API Connection permissions to the absolute minimum required, emphasizing the principle of least privilege.
Hacker News users discussed the security implications of Azure API Connections, largely agreeing with the article's premise that they represent a significant attack surface. Several commenters highlighted the complexity of managing permissions and the potential for accidental data exposure due to overly permissive settings. The lack of granular control over data access within an API Connection was a recurring concern. Some users shared anecdotal experiences of encountering similar security issues in Azure, while others suggested alternative approaches like using managed identities or service principals for more secure resource access. The overall sentiment leaned toward caution when using API Connections, urging developers to carefully consider the security implications and explore safer alternatives.
This project introduces a C++ implementation of AWS IAM authentication for Kafka clients connecting to MSK clusters, eliminating the need for static username/password credentials. The code provides an AwsMskIamSigner class that generates signed SASL/SCRAM parameters using the AWS SDK for C++, allowing secure and temporary authentication against MSK brokers. This implementation offers a more robust and secure approach compared to traditional password-based authentication, leveraging AWS's existing IAM infrastructure for access control.
Hacker News users discussed the complexities and nuances of AWS IAM authentication with Kafka. Several commenters praised the project for tackling a difficult problem and providing a valuable resource, while also acknowledging that the AWS documentation in this area is lacking and can be confusing. Some pointed out potential issues and areas for improvement, such as error handling and the use of boost::beast instead of the AWS SDK. The discussion also touched on the challenges of securely managing secrets and credentials, and the potential benefits of using alternative authentication methods like mTLS. A recurring theme was the desire for simpler, more streamlined authentication mechanisms within the AWS ecosystem.
Torii is a new, framework-agnostic authentication library for Rust designed for flexibility and ease of use. It provides a simple, consistent API for various authentication methods, including password-based logins, OAuth 2.0 providers (like Google and GitHub), and email verification. Torii aims to handle the complex details of these processes, leaving developers to focus on their application logic. It achieves this by offering building blocks for sessions, user management, and authentication flows, allowing customization to fit different project needs and avoid vendor lock-in.
Hacker News users discussed Torii's potential, praising its framework-agnostic nature and clean API. Some expressed interest in its suitability for desktop applications and WASM environments. One commenter questioned the focus on providers over protocols like OAuth 2.0, suggesting a protocol-based approach would be more flexible. Others questioned the need for another authentication library given the existing ecosystem in Rust. Concerns were also raised about the maturity of the library and the potential maintenance burden of supporting various providers. The overall sentiment leaned towards cautious optimism, acknowledging the project's promise while awaiting further development and community feedback.
Starting March 1st, Docker Hub will implement rate limits for anonymous (unauthenticated) image pulls. Free users will be limited to 100 pulls per six hours per IP address, while authenticated free users get 200 pulls per six hours. This change aims to improve the stability and performance of Docker Hub. Paid Docker Hub subscriptions will not have pull rate limits. Users are encouraged to log in to their Docker Hub account when pulling images to avoid hitting the new limits.
Hacker News users discuss the implications of Docker Hub's new rate limits on unauthenticated pulls. Some express concern about the impact on CI/CD pipelines, suggesting the 100 pulls per 6 hours for authenticated free users is also too low for many use cases. Others view the change as a reasonable way for Docker to manage costs and encourage users to authenticate or use alternative registries. Several commenters share workarounds, such as using a private registry or caching images more aggressively. The discussion also touches on the broader ecosystem and the role of Docker Hub within it, with some users questioning its long-term viability given past pricing changes and policy shifts. A few users report encountering unexpected behavior with the limits, suggesting potential inconsistencies in enforcement.
The Stytch blog post discusses the rising challenge of detecting and mitigating the abuse of AI agents, particularly in online platforms. As AI agents become more sophisticated, they can be exploited for malicious purposes like creating fake accounts, generating spam and phishing attacks, manipulating markets, and performing denial-of-service attacks. The post outlines various detection methods, including analyzing behavioral patterns (like unusually fast input speeds or repetitive actions), examining network characteristics (identifying multiple accounts originating from the same IP address), and leveraging content analysis (detecting AI-generated text). It emphasizes a multi-layered approach combining these techniques, along with the importance of continuous monitoring and adaptation to stay ahead of evolving AI abuse tactics. The post ultimately advocates for a proactive, rather than reactive, strategy to effectively manage the risks associated with AI agent abuse.
HN commenters discuss the difficulty of reliably detecting AI usage, particularly with open-source models. Several suggest focusing on behavioral patterns rather than technical detection, looking for statistically improbable actions or sudden shifts in user skill. Some express skepticism about the effectiveness of any detection method, predicting an "arms race" between detection and evasion techniques. Others highlight the potential for false positives and the ethical implications of surveillance. One commenter suggests a "human-in-the-loop" approach for moderation, while others propose embracing AI tools and adapting platforms accordingly. The potential for abuse in specific areas like content creation and academic integrity is also mentioned.
Kagi Search has integrated Privacy Pass, a privacy-preserving technology, to reduce CAPTCHA frequency for paid users. This allows Kagi to verify a user's legitimacy without revealing their identity or tracking their browsing habits. By issuing anonymized tokens via the Privacy Pass browser extension, users can bypass CAPTCHAs, improving their search experience while maintaining their online privacy. This added layer of privacy is exclusive to paying Kagi subscribers as part of their commitment to a user-friendly and secure search environment.
HN commenters generally expressed skepticism about Kagi's Privacy Pass implementation. Several questioned the actual privacy benefits, pointing out that Kagi still knows the user's IP address and search queries, even with the pass. Others doubted the practicality of the system, citing the potential for abuse and the added complexity for users. Some suggested alternative privacy-enhancing technologies like onion routing or decentralized search. The effectiveness of Privacy Pass in preventing fingerprinting was also debated, with some arguing it offered minimal protection. A few commenters expressed interest in the technology and its potential, but the overall sentiment leaned towards cautious skepticism.
The blog post "Bad Smart Watch Authentication" details a vulnerability discovered in a smart watch's companion app. The app, when requesting sensitive fitness data, used a predictable, sequential ID in its API requests. This allowed the author, by simply incrementing the ID, to access the fitness data of other users without proper authorization. This highlights a critical flaw in the app's authentication and authorization mechanisms, demonstrating how easily user data could be exposed due to poor security practices.
Several Hacker News commenters criticize the smartwatch authentication scheme described in the article, calling it "security theater" and "fundamentally broken." They point out that relying on a QR code displayed on a trusted device (the watch) to authenticate on another device (the phone) is flawed, as it doesn't verify the connection between the watch and the phone. This leaves it open to attacks where a malicious actor could intercept the QR code and use it themselves. Some suggest alternative approaches, such as using Bluetooth proximity verification or public-key cryptography, to establish a secure connection between the devices. Others question the overall utility of this type of authentication, highlighting the inconvenience and limited security benefits it offers. A few commenters mention similar vulnerabilities in existing passwordless login systems.
The Okta bcrypt incident highlights crucial API design flaws that allowed attackers to bypass account lockout mechanisms. By accepting hashed passwords directly, Okta's API inadvertently circumvented its own security measures. This emphasizes the danger of exposing low-level cryptographic primitives in APIs, as it creates attack vectors that developers might not anticipate. The post advocates for abstracting away such complexities, forcing users to interact with higher-level authentication flows that enforce intended security policies, like lockout mechanisms and rate limiting. This abstraction simplifies security reasoning and reduces the potential for bypasses by ensuring all authentication attempts are subject to consistent security controls, regardless of how the password is presented.
Several commenters on Hacker News praised the original post for its clear explanation of the Okta bcrypt incident and the proposed solutions. Some highlighted the importance of designing APIs that enforce correct usage and prevent accidental misuse, particularly with security-sensitive operations like password hashing. The discussion touched on the tradeoffs between API simplicity and robustness, with some arguing for more opinionated APIs that guide developers towards best practices. Others shared similar experiences with poorly designed APIs leading to security vulnerabilities. A few commenters also questioned Okta's specific implementation choices and debated the merits of different hashing algorithms. Overall, the comments reflected a general agreement with the author's points about the need for more thoughtful API design to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Token Security, a cybersecurity startup focused on protecting "machine identities" (like API keys and digital certificates used by software and devices), has raised $20 million in funding. The company aims to combat the growing threat of hackers exploiting these often overlooked credentials, which are increasingly targeted as a gateway to sensitive data and systems. Their platform helps organizations manage and secure these machine identities, reducing the risk of breaches and unauthorized access.
HN commenters discuss the increasing attack surface of machine identities, echoing the article's concern. Some question the novelty of the problem, pointing out that managing server certificates and keys has always been a security concern. Others express skepticism towards Token Security's approach, suggesting that complexity in security solutions often introduces new vulnerabilities. The most compelling comments highlight the difficulty of managing machine identities at scale in modern cloud-native environments, where ephemeral workloads and automated deployments exacerbate the existing challenges. There's also discussion around the need for better tooling and automation to address this growing security gap.
This blog post explores using a Backend for Frontend (BFF) pattern with Keycloak to secure an Angular application. It advocates for abstracting Keycloak's complexities from the frontend by placing a Node.js BFF between the Angular application and Keycloak. The BFF handles authentication and authorization, retrieving user roles and access tokens from Keycloak and forwarding them to the Angular client. This simplifies the Angular application's logic and improves security by keeping Keycloak configuration details on the server-side. The post demonstrates how the BFF can obtain an access token using a client credential flow and how the Angular application can then utilize this token for secure communication with backend services, promoting a cleaner separation of concerns and enhanced security.
Hacker News users discuss the complexity and potential overhead introduced by using Keycloak and a Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) pattern with Angular. Several commenters question the necessity of a BFF in simpler applications, suggesting Keycloak could integrate directly with the Angular frontend. Others highlight the benefits of a BFF for abstracting backend services and handling complex authorization logic, especially in larger or microservice-based architectures. The discussion also touches on alternative authentication solutions like Auth0 and FusionAuth, with some users preferring their perceived simplicity. Overall, the comments suggest a balanced view, acknowledging the trade-offs between simplicity and scalability when choosing an architecture involving authentication and authorization.
OAuth2 is a delegation protocol that lets a user grant a third-party application limited access to their resources on a server, without sharing their credentials. Instead of handing over your username and password directly to the app, you authorize it through the resource server (like Google or Facebook). This authorization process generates an access token, which the app then uses to access specific resources on your behalf, within the scope you've permitted. OAuth2 focuses solely on authorization and not authentication, meaning it doesn't verify the user's identity. It relies on other mechanisms, like OpenID Connect, for that purpose.
HN commenters generally praised the article for its clear explanation of OAuth2, calling it accessible and well-written, particularly appreciating the focus on the "why" rather than just the "how." Some users pointed out potential minor inaccuracies or areas for further clarification, such as the distinction between authorization code grant with PKCE and implicit flow for client-side apps, the role of refresh tokens, and the implications of using a third-party identity provider. One commenter highlighted the difficulty of finding good OAuth2 resources and expressed gratitude for the article's contribution. Others suggested additional topics for the author to cover, such as the challenges of cross-domain authentication. Several commenters also shared personal anecdotes about their experiences implementing or troubleshooting OAuth2.
DualQRCode.com offers a free online tool to create dual QR codes. These codes seamlessly embed a smaller QR code within a larger one, allowing for two distinct links to be accessed from a single image. The user provides two URLs, customizes the inner and outer QR code colors, and downloads the resulting combined code. This can be useful for scenarios like sharing a primary link with a secondary link for feedback, donations, or further information.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and security implications of dual QR codes. Some questioned the real-world use cases, suggesting existing methods like shortened URLs or link-in-bio services are sufficient. Others raised security concerns, highlighting the potential for one QR code to be swapped with a malicious link while the other remains legitimate, thereby deceiving users. The technical implementation was also debated, with commenters discussing the potential for encoding information across both codes for redundancy or error correction, and the challenges of displaying two codes clearly on physical media. Several commenters suggested alternative approaches, such as using a single QR code that redirects to a page containing multiple links, or leveraging NFC technology. The overall sentiment leaned towards skepticism about the necessity and security of the dual QR code approach.
Summary of Comments ( 56 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43653322
HN users generally praised the article for its clear explanation of HOTP and TOTP, breaking down complex concepts into understandable parts. Several appreciated the focus on building the algorithms from the ground up, rather than just using libraries. Some pointed out potential security risks, such as replay attacks and the importance of secure time synchronization. One commenter suggested exploring WebAuthn as a more secure alternative, while another offered a link to a Python implementation of the algorithms. A few discussed the practicality of different hashing algorithms and the history of OTP generation methods. Several users also appreciated the interactive code examples and the overall clean presentation of the article.
The Hacker News post titled "Behind the 6-digit code: Building HOTP and TOTP from scratch" has generated several comments discussing various aspects of one-time passwords (OTPs).
Some users delve into the technical details. One comment explains the importance of the counter value in HOTP (HMAC-based One-Time Password algorithm), highlighting how discrepancies between the server's and client's counter can lead to synchronization issues and failed logins. They suggest potential solutions like resynchronization mechanisms where the server accepts a range of OTPs or the use of TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password algorithm) which relies on time synchronization instead of counters.
Another user questions the necessity of implementing OTP generation from scratch, arguing that existing libraries are generally robust and well-tested. They express concern about potential security vulnerabilities if the implementation isn't carefully vetted. This spurs a discussion about the educational value of building such systems from scratch, with proponents highlighting the deeper understanding gained through the process. This understanding is contrasted with the potential dangers of blindly relying on libraries without comprehending their inner workings.
The discussion also touches on practical considerations. One comment emphasizes the crucial role of proper secret key management, highlighting the risks associated with weak keys. Another user discusses the usability aspects of OTPs, mentioning potential accessibility challenges for users with certain disabilities. The comment suggests alternative authentication methods might be necessary in such cases to ensure inclusivity.
Finally, some users share their personal experiences and preferences regarding different OTP methods. Some prefer authenticator apps while others express skepticism due to the potential inconvenience of losing access to their devices. The conversation around alternative authentication schemes also covers push notifications, SMS-based OTPs, and WebAuthn, briefly touching upon their respective security and usability trade-offs. A recurring theme in these discussions is the importance of striking a balance between security and user experience when choosing an authentication mechanism.