A new vulnerability affects GitHub Copilot and Cursor, allowing attackers to inject malicious code suggestions into these AI-powered coding assistants. By crafting prompts that exploit predictable code generation patterns, attackers can trick the tools into producing vulnerable code snippets, which unsuspecting developers might then integrate into their projects. This "prompt injection" attack doesn't rely on exploiting the tools themselves but rather manipulates the AI models into becoming unwitting accomplices, generating exploitable code like insecure command executions or hardcoded credentials. This poses a serious security risk, highlighting the potential dangers of relying solely on AI-generated code without careful review and validation.
Researchers discovered a vulnerability chain in SAP systems allowing for privilege escalation. Initially, a missing authorization check in a specific diagnostic tool allowed an attacker with low privileges to execute operating system commands as the sapadm user. This wasn't sufficient for full control, so they then exploited a setuid binary, sapstartsrv, designed to switch users. By manipulating the binary's expected environment, they were able to execute commands as root, achieving complete system compromise. This highlights the danger of accumulated vulnerabilities, especially within complex systems employing setuid binaries, and underscores the need for thorough security assessments within SAP environments.
Hacker News users discuss the complexity and potential security risks of SAP's extensive setuid landscape, highlighted by the blog post's detailed vulnerability chain. Several commenters express concern over the sheer number of setuid binaries, suggesting it represents a significant attack surface. Some doubt the practicality of the exploit due to required conditions, while others emphasize the importance of minimizing setuid usage in general. The discussion also touches on the challenges of managing such complex systems and the trade-offs between security and functionality in enterprise software. A few users question the blog post's disclosure timeline, suggesting a shorter timeframe would have been preferable.
This guide provides a curated list of compiler flags for GCC, Clang, and MSVC, designed to harden C and C++ code against security vulnerabilities. It focuses on options that enable various exploit mitigations, such as stack protectors, control-flow integrity (CFI), address space layout randomization (ASLR), and shadow stacks. The guide categorizes flags by their protective mechanisms, emphasizing practical usage with clear explanations and examples. It also highlights potential compatibility issues and performance impacts, aiming to help developers choose appropriate hardening options for their projects. By leveraging these compiler-based defenses, developers can significantly reduce the risk of successful exploits targeting their software.
Hacker News users generally praised the OpenSSF's compiler hardening guide for C and C++. Several commenters highlighted the importance of such guides in improving overall software security, particularly given the prevalence of C and C++ in critical systems. Some discussed the practicality of implementing all the recommendations, noting potential performance trade-offs and the need for careful consideration depending on the specific project. A few users also mentioned the guide's usefulness for learning more about compiler options and their security implications, even for experienced developers. Some wished for similar guides for other languages, and others offered additional suggestions for hardening, like using static and dynamic analysis tools. One commenter pointed out the difference between control-flow hijacking mitigations and memory safety, emphasizing the limitations of the former.
This paper explores practical strategies for hardening C and C++ software against memory safety vulnerabilities without relying on memory-safe languages or rewriting entire codebases. It focuses on compiler-based mitigations, leveraging techniques like Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) and Shadow Stacks, and highlights how these can be effectively deployed even in complex, legacy projects with limited resources. The paper emphasizes the importance of a layered security approach, combining static and dynamic analysis tools with runtime protections to minimize attack surfaces and contain the impact of potential exploits. It argues that while a complete shift to memory-safe languages is ideal, these mitigation techniques offer valuable interim protection and represent a pragmatic approach for enhancing the security of existing C/C++ software in the real world.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed "TypeArmor" system for securing C/C++ code. Some expressed skepticism about its performance overhead and the complexity of retrofitting it onto existing projects, questioning its viability compared to rewriting in memory-safe languages like Rust. Others were more optimistic, viewing TypeArmor as a potentially valuable tool for hardening legacy codebases where rewriting is not feasible. The discussion touched upon the trade-offs between security and performance, the challenges of integrating such a system into real-world projects, and the overall feasibility of achieving robust memory safety in C/C++ without fundamental language changes. Several commenters also pointed out limitations of TypeArmor, such as its inability to handle certain complex pointer manipulations and the potential for vulnerabilities in the TypeArmor system itself. The general consensus seemed to be cautious interest, acknowledging the potential benefits while remaining pragmatic about the inherent difficulties of securing C/C++.
Researchers at Praetorian discovered a vulnerability in GitHub's CodeQL system that allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code during the build process of CodeQL queries. This was possible because CodeQL inadvertently exposed secrets within its build environment, which a malicious actor could exploit by submitting a specially crafted query. This constituted a supply chain attack, as any repository using the compromised query would unknowingly execute the malicious code. Praetorian responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to GitHub, who promptly patched the issue and implemented additional security measures to prevent similar attacks in the future.
Hacker News users discussed the implications of the CodeQL vulnerability, with some focusing on the ease with which the researcher found and exploited the flaw. Several commenters highlighted the irony of a security analysis tool itself being insecure and the potential for widespread impact given CodeQL's popularity. Others questioned the severity and prevalence of secret leakage in CI/CD environments generally, suggesting the issue isn't as widespread as the blog post implies. Some debated the responsible disclosure timeline, with some arguing Praetorian waited too long to report the vulnerability. A few commenters also pointed out the potential for similar vulnerabilities in other security scanning tools. Overall, the discussion centered around the significance of the vulnerability, the practices that led to it, and the broader implications for supply chain security.
Security researchers exploited a vulnerability in Gemini's sandboxed Python execution environment, allowing them to access and leak parts of Gemini's source code. They achieved this by manipulating how Python's pickle module interacts with the restricted environment, effectively bypassing the intended security measures. While claiming no malicious intent and having reported the vulnerability responsibly, the researchers demonstrated the potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information within Gemini's system. The leaked code included portions related to data retrieval and formatting, but the full extent of the exposed code and its potential impact on Gemini's security are not fully detailed.
Hacker News users discussed the Gemini hack and subsequent source code leak, focusing on the sandbox escape vulnerability exploited. Several questioned the practicality and security implications of running untrusted Python code within Gemini, especially given the availability of more secure and robust sandboxing solutions. Some highlighted the inherent difficulties in completely sandboxing Python, while others pointed out the existence of existing tools and libraries, like gVisor, designed for such tasks. A few users found the technical details of the exploit interesting, while others expressed concern about the potential impact on Gemini's development and future. The overall sentiment was one of cautious skepticism towards Gemini's approach to code execution security.
The popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files was compromised and used to inject malicious code into projects that utilized it. The attacker gained access to the action's repository and added code that exfiltrated environment variables, secrets, and other sensitive information during workflow runs. This action, used by over 23,000 repositories, became a supply chain vulnerability, potentially affecting numerous downstream projects. The maintainers have since regained control and removed the malicious code, but users are urged to review their workflows and rotate any potentially compromised secrets.
Hacker News users discussed the implications of the tj-actions/changed-files compromise, focusing on the surprising longevity of the vulnerability (2 years) and the potential impact on the 23,000+ repositories using it. Several commenters questioned the security practices of relying on third-party GitHub Actions without thorough vetting, emphasizing the need for auditing dependencies and using pinned versions. The ease with which a seemingly innocuous action could be compromised highlighted the broader security risks within the software supply chain. Some users pointed out the irony of a security-focused action being the source of vulnerability, while others discussed the challenges of maintaining open-source projects and the pressure to keep dependencies updated. A few commenters also suggested alternative approaches for achieving similar functionality without relying on third-party actions.
The Salt Typhoon attacks revealed critical vulnerabilities in global telecom infrastructure, primarily impacting Barracuda Email Security Gateway (ESG) appliances. The blog post highlights the insecure nature of these systems due to factors like complex, opaque codebases; reliance on outdated and vulnerable software components; inadequate security testing and patching practices; and a general lack of security prioritization within the telecom industry. These issues, combined with the interconnectedness of telecom networks, create a high-risk environment susceptible to widespread compromise and data breaches, as demonstrated by Salt Typhoon's exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and persistence within compromised systems. The author stresses the urgent need for increased scrutiny, security investment, and regulatory oversight within the telecom sector to mitigate these risks and prevent future attacks.
Hacker News commenters generally agreed with the author's assessment of telecom insecurity. Several highlighted the lack of security focus in the industry, driven by cost-cutting and a perceived lack of significant consequences for breaches. Some questioned the efficacy of proposed solutions like memory-safe languages, pointing to the complexity of legacy systems and the difficulty of secure implementation. Others emphasized the human element, arguing that social engineering and insider threats remain major vulnerabilities regardless of technical improvements. A few commenters offered specific examples of security flaws they'd encountered in telecom systems, further reinforcing the author's points. Finally, some discussed the regulatory landscape, suggesting that stricter oversight and enforcement are needed to drive meaningful change.
The blog post argues that speedrunners possess many of the same skills and mindsets as vulnerability researchers. They both meticulously analyze systems, searching for unusual behavior and edge cases that can be exploited for an advantage, whether that's saving milliseconds in a game or bypassing security measures. Speedrunners develop a deep understanding of a system's inner workings through experimentation and observation, often uncovering unintended functionality. This makes them naturally suited to vulnerability research, where finding and exploiting these hidden flaws is the primary goal. The author suggests that with some targeted training and a shift in focus, speedrunners could easily transition into security research, offering a fresh perspective and valuable skillset to the field.
HN commenters largely agree with the premise that speedrunners possess skills applicable to vulnerability research. Several highlighted the meticulous understanding of game mechanics and the ability to manipulate code execution paths as key overlaps. One commenter mentioned the "arbitrary code execution" goal of both speedrunners and security researchers, while another emphasized the creative problem-solving mindset required for both disciplines. A few pointed out that speedrunners already perform a form of vulnerability research when discovering glitches and exploits. Some suggested that formalizing a pathway for speedrunners to transition into security research would be beneficial. The potential for identifying vulnerabilities before game release through speedrunning techniques was also raised.
The blog post details a vulnerability in the "todesktop" protocol handler, used by numerous applications and websites to open links directly in desktop applications. By crafting malicious links using this protocol, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on a victim's machine simply by getting them to click the link. This affects any application that registers a custom todesktop handler without properly sanitizing user-supplied input, including popular chat platforms, email clients, and web browsers. This vulnerability exposes hundreds of millions of users to potential remote code execution attacks. The author demonstrates practical exploits against several popular applications, emphasizing the severity and widespread nature of this issue. They urge developers to immediately review and secure their implementations of the todesktop protocol handler.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and ethics of the "todesktop" protocol, which allows websites to launch desktop apps. Several commenters pointed out existing similar functionalities like URL schemes and Progressive Web Apps (PWAs), questioning the novelty and necessity of todesktop. Concerns were raised about security implications, particularly the potential for malicious websites to exploit the protocol for unauthorized app launches. Some suggested that proper sandboxing and user confirmation could mitigate these risks, while others remained skeptical about the overall benefit outweighing the security concerns. The discussion also touched upon the potential for abuse by advertisers and the lack of clear benefits compared to existing solutions. A few commenters expressed interest in legitimate use cases, like streamlining workflows, but overall the sentiment leaned towards caution and skepticism due to the potential for malicious exploitation.
Globstar is an open-source static analysis toolkit designed for finding security vulnerabilities in infrastructure-as-code (IaC). It supports various IaC formats like Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, and Dockerfiles, enabling users to scan their infrastructure configurations for potential weaknesses. The tool aims to be developer-friendly, offering features like easy integration into CI/CD pipelines and detailed vulnerability reports with actionable remediation guidance. It's built using the Rust programming language for performance and reliability.
HN users discuss Globstar's potential, particularly its focus on code query and simplification compared to traditional static analysis tools. Some express interest in specific features like the query language, dataflow analysis, and the ability to find unused code. Others question the licensing choice (AGPLv3), suggesting it might hinder adoption in commercial projects. The creator clarifies the license choice, emphasizing Globstar's intention to serve as a collaborative platform and contrasting it with tools offering "source-available" proprietary licenses. Several commenters commend the technical approach, appreciating the Rust implementation and its potential for performance and safety. There's also a discussion on the name, with suggestions for alternatives due to potential confusion with the shell globstar feature (**).
Type++ is a novel defense against type confusion vulnerabilities that leverages inline type information to enforce type constraints at runtime with minimal overhead. It embeds compact type metadata directly within objects, enabling efficient runtime checks to ensure that memory accesses and operations are consistent with the declared type. The system utilizes a flexible metadata representation supporting diverse types and inheritance hierarchies, and employs a selective instrumentation strategy to minimize performance impact. Evaluation across various benchmarks and real-world applications demonstrates that Type++ effectively detects and prevents type confusion exploits with a modest runtime overhead, typically under 5%, making it a practical solution for enhancing software security.
HN commenters discuss the Type++ paper, generally finding the approach interesting but expressing concerns about performance overhead. Several suggest that a compile-time approach might be preferable, questioning the practicality of runtime checks. Some raise concerns about the complexity of implementation and the potential for bugs within the Type++ system itself. A few highlight the potential benefits for security and catching subtle errors, but the overall sentiment leans towards skepticism regarding the trade-off between safety and performance. The reliance on compiler modifications is also noted as a potential barrier to adoption.
Google is advocating for widespread adoption of memory-safe programming languages like Rust, Go, Swift, and Java to enhance software security. They highlight memory safety vulnerabilities as a significant source of security flaws, impacting a wide range of software, including critical infrastructure. The blog post calls for collaborative efforts across the industry, including open-source communities and standards organizations, to establish and promote memory safety standards, develop better tooling, and encourage a gradual shift away from memory-unsafe languages like C and C++. This transition is presented as essential for securing the future of software development and mitigating persistent vulnerabilities.
Hacker News users generally agree with Google's push for memory safety, citing the prevalence of memory-related vulnerabilities. Several commenters highlight Rust as a strong contender for a safer systems language, praising its performance and security features. Some discuss the challenges of adoption, including the learning curve for Rust and the existing codebase in C/C++. The idea of gradual adoption and tooling to help transition are also mentioned. One commenter notes the importance of standardizing error handling and propagation to complement memory safety. Another emphasizes the need for auditing tools and automated detection capabilities. A few users are more skeptical, suggesting that the focus on memory safety might divert attention from other important security aspects.
Fly.io's blog post announces a significant improvement to Semgrep's usability by eliminating the need for local installations and complex configurations. They've introduced a cloud-based service that directly integrates with GitHub, allowing developers to seamlessly scan their repositories for vulnerabilities and code smells. This streamlined approach simplifies the setup process, automatically handles dependency management, and provides a centralized platform for managing rules and viewing results, making Semgrep a much more practical and appealing tool for security analysis. The post highlights the speed and ease of use as key improvements, emphasizing the ability to get started quickly and receive immediate feedback within the familiar GitHub interface.
Hacker News users discussed Fly.io's announcement of their acquisition of Semgrep and the implications for the static analysis tool. Several commenters expressed excitement about the potential for improved performance and broader language support, particularly for languages like Go and Java. Some questioned the impact on Semgrep's open-source nature, with concerns about potential feature limitations or a shift towards a closed-source model. Others saw the acquisition as positive, hoping Fly.io's resources would accelerate Semgrep's development and broaden its reach. A few users shared positive personal experiences using Semgrep, praising its effectiveness in catching security vulnerabilities. The overall sentiment seems cautiously optimistic, with many eager to see how Fly.io's stewardship will shape Semgrep's future.
Mozilla's code signing journey began with a simple, centralized system using a single key and evolved into a complex, multi-layered approach. Initially, all Mozilla software was signed with one key, posing significant security risks. This led to the adoption of per-product keys, offering better isolation. Further advancements included build signing, allowing for verification even before installer creation, and update signing to secure updates delivered through the application. The process also matured through the use of hardware security modules (HSMs) for safer key storage and automated signing infrastructure for increased efficiency. These iterative improvements aimed to enhance security by limiting the impact of compromised keys and streamlining the signing process.
HN commenters generally praised the article for its clarity and detail in explaining a complex technical process. Several appreciated the focus on the practical, real-world challenges and compromises involved, rather than just the theoretical ideal. Some shared their own experiences with code signing, highlighting additional difficulties like the expense and bureaucratic hurdles, particularly for smaller developers. Others pointed out the inherent limitations and potential vulnerabilities of code signing, emphasizing that it's not a silver bullet security solution. A few comments also discussed alternative or supplementary approaches to software security, such as reproducible builds and better sandboxing.
A malicious VS Code extension masquerading as a legitimate "prettiest-json" package was discovered on the npm registry. This counterfeit extension delivered a multi-stage malware payload. Upon installation, it executed a malicious script that downloaded and ran further malware components. These components collected sensitive information from the infected system, including environment variables, running processes, and potentially even browser data like saved passwords and cookies, ultimately sending this exfiltrated data to a remote server controlled by the attacker.
Hacker News commenters discuss the troubling implications of malicious packages slipping through npm's vetting process, with several expressing surprise that a popular IDE extension like "Prettier" could be so easily imitated and used to distribute malware. Some highlight the difficulty in detecting sophisticated, multi-stage attacks like this one, where the initial payload is relatively benign. Others point to the need for improved security measures within the npm ecosystem, including more robust code review and potentially stricter publishing guidelines. The discussion also touches on the responsibility of developers to carefully vet the extensions they install, emphasizing the importance of checking publisher verification, download counts, and community feedback before adding any extension to their workflow. Several users suggest using the official VS Code Marketplace as a safer alternative to installing extensions directly via npm.
A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability was discovered in the now-defunct mobile game Marvel: Contest of Champions (also known as Marvel Rivals). The game's chat functionality lacked proper input sanitization, allowing attackers to inject and execute arbitrary JavaScript code within clients of other players. This could have been exploited to steal sensitive information, manipulate game data, or even potentially take control of affected devices. The vulnerability, discovered by a security researcher while reverse-engineering the game, was responsibly disclosed to Kabam, the game's developer. Although a fix was implemented, the exploit served as a stark reminder of the potential security risks associated with unsanitized user inputs in online games.
Hacker News users discussed the exploit detailed in the blog post, focusing on the surprising simplicity of the vulnerability and the potential impact it could have had. Several commenters expressed amazement that such a basic oversight could exist in a production game, with one pointing out the irony of a game about superheroes being vulnerable to such a mundane attack. The discussion also touched on the responsible disclosure process, with users questioning why Kabam hadn't offered a bug bounty and acknowledging the author's ethical handling of the situation. Some users debated the severity of the vulnerability, with opinions ranging from "not a big deal" to a serious security risk given the game's access to user data. The lack of a detailed technical explanation in the blog post was also noted, with some users desiring more information about the specific code involved.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has revealed ScatterBrain, a sophisticated obfuscator used by the PoisonPlug threat actor to disguise malicious JavaScript code injected into compromised routers. ScatterBrain employs multiple layers of obfuscation, including encoding, encryption, and polymorphism, making analysis and detection significantly more difficult. This obfuscator is used to hide malicious payloads delivered through PoisonPlug, which primarily targets SOHO routers, enabling the attackers to perform tasks like credential theft, traffic redirection, and arbitrary command execution. This discovery underscores the increasing sophistication of router-targeting malware and highlights the importance of robust router security practices.
HN commenters generally praised the technical depth and clarity of the Google TAG blog post. Several highlighted the sophistication of the PoisonPlug malware, particularly its use of DLL search order hijacking and process injection techniques. Some discussed the challenges of malware analysis and reverse engineering, with one commenter expressing skepticism about the long-term effectiveness of such analyses due to the constantly evolving nature of malware. Others pointed out the crucial role of threat intelligence in understanding and mitigating these kinds of threats. A few commenters also noted the irony of a Google security team exposing malware hosted on Google Cloud Storage.
Laurie Tratt's blog post explores the tension between the convenience of transitive dependencies in software development and the security risks they introduce. Transitive dependencies, where a project relies on libraries that themselves have dependencies, simplify development but create a sprawling attack surface. The post argues that while completely eliminating transitive dependencies is impractical, mitigating their risks is crucial. Proposed solutions include tools for visualizing and understanding the dependency tree, stricter version pinning, vulnerability scanning, and possibly leveraging WebAssembly or similar technologies to isolate dependencies. The ultimate goal is to find a balance, retaining the efficiency gains of transitive dependencies while minimizing the potential for security breaches via deeply nested, often unvetted, code.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's premise that transitive dependencies pose a significant security risk. Several highlight the difficulty of auditing even direct dependencies, let alone the exponentially increasing number of transitive ones. Some suggest exploring alternative dependency management strategies like vendoring or stricter version pinning. A few commenters discuss the tradeoff between convenience and security, with one pointing out the parallels to the "DLL hell" problem of the past. Another emphasizes the importance of verifying dependencies through various methods like checksumming and code review. A recurring theme is the need for better tooling to manage the complexity of dependencies and improve security in the software supply chain.
This paper introduces Crusade, a formally verified translation from a subset of C to safe Rust. Crusade targets a memory-safe dialect of C, excluding features like arbitrary pointer arithmetic and casts. It leverages the Coq proof assistant to formally verify the translation's correctness, ensuring that the generated Rust code behaves identically to the original C, modulo non-determinism inherent in C. This rigorous approach aims to facilitate safe integration of legacy C code into Rust projects without sacrificing confidence in memory safety, a critical aspect of modern systems programming. The translation handles a substantial subset of C, including structs, unions, and functions, and demonstrates its practical applicability by successfully converting real-world C libraries.
HN commenters discuss the challenges and nuances of formally verifying the C to Rust transpiler, Cracked. Some express skepticism about the practicality of fully verifying such a complex tool, citing the potential for errors in the formal proofs themselves and the inherent difficulty of capturing all undefined C behavior. Others question the performance impact of the generated Rust code. However, many commend the project's ambition and see it as a significant step towards safer systems programming. The discussion also touches upon the trade-offs between a fully verified transpiler and a more pragmatic approach focusing on common C patterns, with some suggesting that prioritizing practical safety improvements could be more beneficial in the short term. There's also interest in the project's handling of concurrency and the potential for integrating Cracked with existing Rust tooling.
Summary of Comments ( 104 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43677067
HN commenters discuss the potential for malicious prompt injection in AI coding assistants like Copilot and Cursor. Several express skepticism about the "vulnerability" framing, arguing that it's more of a predictable consequence of how these tools work, similar to SQL injection. Some point out that the responsibility for secure code ultimately lies with the developer, not the tool, and that relying on AI to generate security-sensitive code is inherently risky. The practicality of the attack is debated, with some suggesting it would be difficult to execute in real-world scenarios, while others note the potential for targeted attacks against less experienced developers. The discussion also touches on the broader implications for AI safety and the need for better safeguards against these types of attacks as AI tools become more prevalent. Several users highlight the irony of GitHub, a security-focused company, having a product susceptible to this type of attack.
The Hacker News post titled "New Vulnerability in GitHub Copilot, Cursor: Hackers Can Weaponize Code Agents" has generated a number of comments discussing the potential security implications of AI-powered code generation tools.
Several commenters express concern over the vulnerability described in the article, where malicious actors could craft prompts to inject insecure code into projects. They highlight the potential for this vulnerability to be exploited by less skilled attackers, effectively lowering the bar for carrying out attacks. The ease with which these tools can be tricked into generating vulnerable code is a recurring theme, with some suggesting that current safeguards are inadequate.
One commenter points out the irony of using AI for security analysis while simultaneously acknowledging the potential for AI to introduce new vulnerabilities. This duality underscores the complexity of the issue. The discussion also touches upon the broader implications of trusting AI tools, particularly in critical contexts like security and software development.
Some commenters discuss the responsibility of developers to review code generated by these tools carefully. They emphasize that while these tools can be helpful for boosting productivity, they should not replace thorough code review practices. The idea that developers might become overly reliant on these tools, leading to a decline in vigilance and a potential increase in vulnerabilities, is also raised.
A few commenters delve into specific technical aspects, including prompt injection attacks and the inherent difficulty in completely preventing them. They discuss the challenges of anticipating and mitigating all potential malicious prompts, suggesting that this is a cat-and-mouse game between developers of these tools and those seeking to exploit them.
There's a thread discussing the potential for malicious actors to distribute compromised extensions or plugins that integrate with these code generation tools, further amplifying the risk. The conversation also extends to the potential legal liabilities for developers who unknowingly incorporate vulnerable code generated by these AI assistants.
Finally, some users express skepticism about the severity of the vulnerability, arguing that responsible developers should already be scrutinizing any code integrated into their projects, regardless of its source. They suggest that the responsibility ultimately lies with the developer to ensure code safety. While acknowledging the potential for misuse, they downplay the notion that this vulnerability represents a significant new threat.