PunchCard Key Backup is an open-source tool that allows you to physically back up cryptographic keys, like PGP or SSH keys, onto durable, punch-out cards. It encodes the key as a grid of punched holes, readable by a webcam and decodable by the software. This provides a low-tech, offline backup method resistant to digital threats and EMP attacks, ideal for long-term storage or situations where digital backups are unavailable or unreliable. The cards are designed to be easily reproducible and verifiable, and the project includes templates for printing your own cards.
The blog post details how the author significantly sped up the proof-of-work challenge for Google's kernelCTF by leveraging AVX-512 instructions. The challenge involved repeatedly hashing a provided value and checking if the resulting hash met specific criteria. The author initially optimized their C++ implementation with SIMD intrinsics using AVX2, achieving a considerable performance boost. Further analysis revealed potential for even greater gains with AVX-512, but the required VPTERNLOGD instruction wasn't available in the C++ compiler. By resorting to inline assembly and manually managing register allocation, they finally unlocked the full potential of AVX-512, reaching a blazing fast solution that solved the challenge approximately 12 times faster than their initial AVX2 implementation. This allowed them to "beat" the challenge much faster than intended and claim the associated flag.
HN commenters discuss the cleverness of the exploit, focusing on the use of AVX-512 instructions to significantly speed up the proof-of-work computation. Some highlight the inherent tension between performance optimization and security, noting that features designed for speed can sometimes be leveraged for unintended purposes. Others point out that while impressive, this isn't a "break" in the traditional sense, as it doesn't bypass the PoW, but rather optimizes its execution. A few users discuss the potential for similar techniques to be applied elsewhere and the implications for systems relying on similar PoW schemes. Some question the practical impact, given the limited availability of AVX-512 hardware, particularly outside of cloud environments.
Microsandbox offers a new approach to sandboxing, combining the security of virtual machines (VMs) with the speed and efficiency of containers. It achieves this by leveraging lightweight VMs based on Firecracker, coupled with a custom, high-performance VirtioFS filesystem. This architecture results in near-native performance, instant startup times, and low resource overhead, all while maintaining strong isolation between the sandboxed environment and the host. Microsandbox is designed to be easy to use, with a CLI and SDK providing simple APIs for managing and interacting with sandboxes. Its use cases range from secure code execution and remote procedure calls to continuous integration and web application deployment.
Hacker News users discussed Microsandbox's approach to lightweight virtualization, praising its speed and small footprint compared to traditional VMs. Several commenters expressed interest in its potential for security and malware analysis, highlighting the ability to quickly spin up and tear down disposable environments. Some questioned its maturity and the overhead compared to containers, while others pointed out the benefits of hardware-level isolation not offered by containers. The discussion also touched on the niche Microsandbox fills between full VMs and containers, with some suggesting potential use cases like running untrusted code or providing isolated development environments. A few users compared it to similar technologies like gVisor and Firecracker, discussing the trade-offs between security, performance, and complexity.
Nova is a new JavaScript and WebAssembly engine built in Rust, focusing on performance, reliability, and embedability. It aims to provide a fast and secure runtime for server-side JavaScript applications, including serverless functions and edge computing, as well as non-browser environments like game development or IoT devices. Nova supports JavaScript modules, asynchronous programming, and standard Web APIs. It also boasts a small footprint, making it suitable for resource-constrained environments. The project is open-source and still under active development, with a focus on expanding its feature set and improving compatibility with existing JavaScript ecosystems.
HN commenters generally expressed interest in Nova, particularly its Rust implementation and potential performance benefits. Some questioned the practical need for yet another JavaScript engine, especially given the maturity of existing options like V8. Others were curious about specific implementation details, like garbage collection and WebAssembly support. A few pointed out the inherent challenges in competing with established engines, but acknowledged the value of exploring alternative approaches and the potential for niche applications where Nova's unique features might be advantageous. Several users expressed excitement about its potential for integration into other Rust projects. The potential for smaller binary sizes and faster startup times compared to V8 was also highlighted as a potential advantage.
MindFort, a Y Combinator (YC X25) company, has launched an AI-powered continuous penetration testing platform. It uses autonomous agents to probe systems for vulnerabilities, mimicking real-world attacker behavior and adapting to changing environments. This approach aims to provide more comprehensive and realistic security testing than traditional methods, helping companies identify and fix weaknesses proactively. The platform offers continuous vulnerability discovery and reporting, allowing security teams to stay ahead of potential threats.
Hacker News users discussed MindFort's approach to continuous penetration testing, expressing both interest and skepticism. Some questioned the efficacy of AI-driven pentesting, highlighting the importance of human intuition and creativity in finding vulnerabilities. Others were concerned about the potential for false positives and the difficulty of interpreting results generated by AI. Conversely, several commenters saw the value in automating repetitive tasks and increasing the frequency of testing, allowing human pentesters to focus on more complex issues. The discussion also touched upon the ethical implications and potential for misuse of such a tool, and the need for responsible disclosure practices. Some users inquired about pricing and specific capabilities, demonstrating a practical interest in the product. Finally, a few comments suggested alternative approaches and open-source tools for penetration testing.
Tesseral is an open-source authentication solution designed for modern applications. It offers a comprehensive platform including user management, multi-factor authentication (MFA), single sign-on (SSO), and customizable branding options. Built with a focus on developer experience, Tesseral aims to simplify the integration of secure authentication into any application through its pre-built UI components and APIs, allowing developers to focus on core product features rather than complex auth implementation. The platform supports multiple identity providers and authentication methods, providing flexibility and control over the login experience.
HN commenters generally expressed interest in Tesseral, praising its comprehensive approach to authentication and modern tech stack. Several pointed out the difficulty of building and maintaining auth infrastructure, making Tesseral a potentially valuable tool. Some questioned the project's longevity and support given its reliance on a relatively small company. Others requested features like self-hosting and alternative database support. A few commenters discussed the licensing and potential conflicts with using the free tier for commercial purposes. Comparison to other auth solutions like Auth0 and Keycloak were also made, with some suggesting Tesseral's focus on end-to-end encryption as a differentiator. Concerns about GDPR compliance and data residency were raised, along with the complexity of managing encryption keys.
This article analyzes the privacy of Monero (XMR), specifically examining potential de-anonymization attacks. It acknowledges Monero's robust privacy features like ring signatures, stealth addresses, and RingCT, which obfuscate transaction details. However, the analysis highlights vulnerabilities, including the possibility of timing analysis, exploiting weaknesses in the transaction mixing process, and leveraging blockchain analysis techniques to link transactions and potentially deanonymize users. The article also discusses how vulnerabilities can arise through user behavior, such as reusing addresses or linking real-world identities to Monero transactions. It concludes that while Monero offers strong privacy, it's not entirely foolproof and users must practice good opsec to maintain their anonymity.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality of Monero's privacy features in light of potential de-anonymization attacks. Some commenters highlighted the importance of distinguishing between theoretical attacks and real-world exploits, arguing that many described attacks are computationally expensive or require unrealistic assumptions. Others emphasized the ongoing "cat and mouse" game between privacy coin developers and researchers, suggesting Monero's privacy is constantly evolving. Several users pointed out the crucial role of user behavior in maintaining privacy, as poor operational security can negate the benefits of Monero's cryptographic features. The discussion also touched upon the trade-offs between privacy and usability, and the different threat models users face. Some commenters expressed skepticism about the long-term viability of any privacy coin achieving perfect anonymity.
Malai is a tool that lets you securely share locally running TCP services, like databases or SSH servers, with others without needing public IPs or port forwarding. It works by creating a secure tunnel between your local service and Malai's servers, generating a unique URL that others can use to access it. This URL incorporates access controls, allowing you to manage who can connect and for how long. Malai emphasizes security by not requiring any changes to your firewall and encrypting all traffic through the tunnel. It aims to simplify the process of sharing local development environments, testing services, or providing temporary access for collaborative debugging.
HN commenters generally praised Malai for its ease of use and potential, especially for sharing development databases and other services quickly. Several pointed out existing similar tools like inlets, ngrok, and localtunnel, comparing Malai's advantages (primarily its focus on security with WireGuard) and disadvantages (such as relying on a central server). Some expressed concerns about the closed-source nature and pricing model, preferring open-source alternatives. Others questioned the performance and scalability compared to established solutions, while some suggested additional features like client-side host selection or mesh networking capabilities. A few commenters shared their successful experiences using Malai, highlighting its simplicity for tasks like sharing local web servers during development.
A vulnerability in GitHub's Memcached Cloud Provider (MCP) allowed unauthorized access to private repositories. Invariant Labs discovered that GitHub used MCP to cache private repository metadata, including the repository name, visibility, and collaborators. By manipulating specific MCP requests, they were able to retrieve this cached data for arbitrary private repositories, effectively bypassing access controls. While the vulnerability did not allow direct access to the repository content itself, the exposed metadata could still reveal sensitive information. GitHub promptly patched the vulnerability after being notified by Invariant Labs.
Hacker News users discuss the implications of the MCP vulnerability, with some highlighting the severity of accessing private repositories and the potential for malicious actors to exploit this weakness for data breaches or sabotage. Others question the responsibility of developers who used MCP and the level of trust placed in third-party tools. The impracticality of manually verifying every commit's origin is also brought up, emphasizing the need for robust security measures within GitHub and similar platforms. Several commenters express surprise at the vulnerability existing for so long undetected and speculate on the reasons, including the complexity of modern software development and the potential for overlooking seemingly minor features like MCP. The lack of attention given to MCP likely contributed to the delayed discovery. Some also discuss the potential legal ramifications for both GitHub and developers affected by the vulnerability.
The blog post discusses the increasing trend of websites using JavaScript-based "proof of work" systems to deter web scraping. These systems force clients to perform computationally expensive JavaScript calculations before accessing content, making automated scraping slower and more resource-intensive. The author argues this approach is ultimately flawed. While it might slow down unsophisticated scrapers, determined adversaries can easily reverse-engineer the JavaScript, bypass the proof of work, or simply use headless browsers to render the page fully. The author concludes that these systems primarily harm legitimate users, particularly those with low-powered devices or slow internet connections, while providing only a superficial barrier to dedicated scrapers.
HN commenters discuss the effectiveness and ethics of JavaScript "proof of work" anti-scraper systems. Some argue that these systems are easily bypassed by sophisticated scrapers, while inconveniencing legitimate users, particularly those with older hardware or disabilities. Others point out the resource cost these systems impose on both clients and servers. The ethical implications of blocking access to public information are also raised, with some arguing that if the data is publicly accessible, scraping it shouldn't be artificially hindered. The conversation also touches on alternative anti-scraping methods like rate limiting and fingerprinting, and the general cat-and-mouse game between website owners and scrapers. Several users suggest that a better approach is to offer an official API for data access, thus providing a legitimate avenue for obtaining the desired information.
This blog post explores the Windows registry as an attack surface, focusing on how registry keys with weak permissions can be exploited for privilege escalation. The author details a systematic method for analyzing registry permissions, using a custom tool to identify writable keys accessible by lower-privileged users. They demonstrate how seemingly innocuous write access can be leveraged to manipulate application behavior, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. Specifically, the post examines vulnerable registry keys related to application autostart locations and DLL hijacking, illustrating how attackers could modify these keys to execute malicious code during system startup or when a legitimate application loads a DLL. Ultimately, the post highlights the significant security risks posed by insecure registry permissions and emphasizes the need for developers and system administrators to carefully manage these permissions to minimize potential attack vectors.
Hacker News users discussed the complexity and attack surface of the Windows Registry, largely agreeing with the article's points. Several highlighted the registry's evolution as a key factor in its vulnerability, noting how legacy components and backwards compatibility requirements create security challenges. Some pointed out specific registry-related attack vectors like hijacking file associations and manipulating COM objects. Others praised the Project Zero researcher for their deep dive, while a few questioned the practicality of exploiting some of the identified weaknesses. A common thread was the acknowledgment of the registry's crucial role in Windows, making securing it a complex and ongoing problem.
This research investigates the real-world risks of targeted physical attacks against cryptocurrency users. By analyzing 122 documented incidents from 2010 to 2023, the study categorizes attack methods (robbery, kidnapping, extortion, assault), quantifies financial losses (ranging from hundreds to millions of dollars), and identifies common attack vectors like SIM swapping, social engineering, and online information exposure. The findings highlight the vulnerability of cryptocurrency users to physical threats, particularly those publicly associated with large holdings, and emphasize the need for improved security practices and law enforcement awareness. The study also analyzes geographical distribution of attacks and correlations between attack characteristics, like the use of violence, and the amount stolen.
Hacker News users discuss the practicality and likelihood of the physical attacks described in the paper, with some arguing they are less concerning than remote attacks. Several commenters highlight the importance of robust key management and the use of hardware wallets as strong mitigations against such threats. One commenter notes the paper's exploration of attacks against multi-party computation (MPC) setups and the challenges in physically securing geographically distributed parties. Another points out the paper's focus on "evil maid" style attacks where an attacker gains temporary physical access. The overall sentiment suggests the paper is interesting but focuses on niche attack vectors less likely than software or remote exploits.
The article argues that while "Diffie-Hellman" is often used as a generic term for key exchange, the original finite field Diffie-Hellman (FFDH) is effectively obsolete in practice. Due to its vulnerability to sub-exponential attacks, FFDH requires impractically large key sizes for adequate security. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), leveraging the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves, offers significantly stronger security with smaller key sizes, making it the dominant and practically relevant implementation of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange concept. Thus, when discussing real-world applications, "Diffie-Hellman" almost invariably implies ECDH, rendering FFDH a largely theoretical or historical curiosity.
Hacker News users discuss the practicality and prevalence of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) versus traditional Diffie-Hellman. Many agree that ECC is dominant in modern applications due to its efficiency and smaller key sizes. Some commenters point out niche uses for traditional Diffie-Hellman, such as in legacy systems or specific protocols where ECC isn't supported. Others highlight the importance of understanding the underlying mathematics of both methods, regardless of which is used in practice. A few express concern over potential vulnerabilities in ECC implementations, particularly regarding patents and potential backdoors. There's also discussion around the learning curve for ECC and resources available for those wanting to deepen their understanding.
Tachy0n is a permanent, unpatchable jailbreak for all bootroms from checkm8-vulnerable devices (A5-A11 on iOS 14.x). Leveraging a hardware vulnerability, it modifies the Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) firmware, enabling persistent code execution even after updates or restores. This effectively removes Apple's ability to revoke the jailbreak through software updates. While powerful, Tachy0n is primarily a research project and a proof-of-concept, currently lacking the user-friendly tools of a typical jailbreak. It aims to lay the groundwork for future jailbreaks and serve as a secure platform for experimentation and research on Apple's security systems.
Hacker News users discuss the Tachy0n jailbreak, expressing skepticism about its "last 0day" claim, noting that future iOS versions will likely patch the exploit. Some debate the practicality of the jailbreak given its limited scope to older devices and the availability of checkm8 for similar models. Others commend the technical achievement and the author's clear explanation of the exploit. Concerns about the potential for misuse of the exploit are also raised, alongside discussions about the ethics of disclosing such vulnerabilities. Several commenters point out the limitations of patching bootROM exploits, suggesting this won't be the truly "last" 0day. There's also interest in the potential for using the exploit for purposes other than jailbreaking, like device repair. Finally, a few users share personal anecdotes about jailbreaking and express nostalgia for the practice's heyday.
The author discovered a critical remote zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-37899) in the Linux kernel's SMB implementation, ksmbd, using the o3 fuzzer. This vulnerability allows for remote code execution without authentication, potentially enabling attackers to compromise vulnerable systems. The flaw resides in the handling of extended attributes, specifically when processing EA metadata within SMB2_SET_INFO requests. The fuzzer pinpointed an integer overflow leading to a heap out-of-bounds write, which could then be exploited to gain control. The author developed a proof-of-concept exploit demonstrating arbitrary kernel memory reads and writes, highlighting the severity of the issue. A patch was submitted and accepted upstream, and distributions subsequently released updates addressing this vulnerability.
Hacker News users discussed the efficacy of using static analysis tools like O3, with some praising its potential while acknowledging it's not a silver bullet. Several commenters pointed out the vulnerability seemed relatively simple to spot, questioning the need for O3 in this specific case. The conversation also touched on the disclosure process and the discoverer's decision to publish exploit details before a patch was available, sparking debate about responsible disclosure practices. Some users criticized aspects of the write-up itself, such as claims about the novelty of O3's capabilities. Finally, the prevalence of memory safety issues in C code and the role of tools like Rust in mitigating such vulnerabilities were also discussed.
The author removed the old-school "intermediate" certificate from their HTTPS site configuration. While this certificate was previously included to support older clients, modern clients no longer need it and its inclusion adds complexity, potential points of failure, and very slightly increases page load times. The author argues that maintaining compatibility with extremely outdated systems isn't worth the added hassle and potential security risks, especially considering the negligible real-world user impact. They conclude that simplifying the certificate chain improves security and performance while only affecting a minuscule, practically nonexistent portion of users.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's decision to drop support for legacy SSL/TLS versions. Many share anecdotes of dealing with similar compatibility issues, particularly with older embedded devices and niche software. Some discuss the balance between security and accessibility, acknowledging that dropping older protocols can cause breakage but ultimately increases security for the majority of users. Several commenters offer technical insights, discussing specific vulnerabilities in older TLS versions and the benefits of modern cipher suites. One commenter questions the author's choice of TLS 1.3 as a minimum, suggesting 1.2 as a more compatible, yet still reasonably secure, option. Another thread discusses the challenges of maintaining legacy systems and the pressure to upgrade, even when resources are limited. A few users mention specific tools and techniques for testing and debugging TLS compatibility issues.
The blog post describes a method to disable specific kernel functions within a user-space process by intercepting system calls. It leverages the ptrace system call to attach to a process, modify its system call table entries to point to a custom function, and then detach. The custom function can then choose to emulate the original kernel function, return an error, or perform other actions, effectively blocking or altering the behavior of targeted system calls for the specified process. This technique allows for granular control over kernel interactions within a user-space process, potentially useful for security sandboxing or debugging.
HN commenters discuss the blog post's method of disabling kernel functions by overwriting the system call table entries with int3 instructions. Several express concerns about the fragility and unsafety of this approach, particularly in multi-threaded environments and due to potential conflicts with security mitigations like SELinux. Some suggest alternatives like using LD_PRELOAD to intercept and redirect function calls or employing seccomp-bpf for finer-grained control. Others question the practical use cases for this technique, acknowledging its potential for debugging or specialized security applications but cautioning against its general use. A few commenters share anecdotal experiences or related techniques, like disabling ptrace to hinder debuggers. The overall sentiment is one of cautious curiosity mixed with skepticism regarding the robustness and practicality of the described method.
"The NSA Selector" details a purported algorithm and scoring system used by the NSA to identify individuals for targeted surveillance based on their communication metadata. It describes a hierarchical structure where selectors, essentially search queries on metadata like phone numbers, email addresses, and IP addresses, are combined with modifiers to narrow down targets. The system assigns a score based on various factors, including the target's proximity to known persons of interest and their communication patterns. This score then determines the level of surveillance applied. The post claims this information was gleaned from leaked Snowden documents, although direct sourcing is absent. It provides a technical breakdown of how such a system could function, aiming to illustrate the potential scope and mechanics of mass surveillance based on metadata.
HN users discuss the practicality and implications of the "NSA selector" tool described in the linked GitHub repository. Some express skepticism about its real-world effectiveness, pointing out limitations in matching capabilities and the potential for false positives. Others highlight the ethical concerns surrounding such tools, regardless of their efficacy, and the potential for misuse. Several commenters delve into the technical details of the selector's implementation, discussing regular expressions, character encoding, and performance considerations. The legality of using such a tool is also debated, with differing opinions on whether simply possessing or running the code constitutes a crime. Finally, some users question the authenticity and provenance of the tool, suggesting it might be a hoax or a misinterpretation of actual NSA practices.
Better Auth is a new authentication framework for TypeScript applications, designed to simplify and streamline the often complex process of user authentication. It offers a drop-in solution with pre-built UI components, backend logic, and integrations for popular databases and authentication providers like OAuth. The framework aims to handle common authentication flows like signup, login, password reset, and multi-factor authentication, allowing developers to focus on building their core product features rather than reinventing the authentication wheel. It also prioritizes security best practices and provides customizable options for adapting to specific application needs.
Hacker News users discussed Better Auth's focus on TypeScript, with some praising the type safety and developer experience benefits while others questioned the need for a new authentication solution given existing options. Several commenters expressed interest in features like social login integration and passwordless authentication, hoping for more details on their implementation. The limited documentation and the developer's reliance on pre-built UI components also drew criticism, alongside concerns about vendor lock-in. Some users suggested exploring alternative approaches like using existing providers or implementing authentication in-house, particularly for simpler projects. The closed-source nature of the project also raised questions about community involvement and future development. Finally, a few commenters offered feedback on the website's design and user experience.
GPS is increasingly vulnerable to interference, both intentional and unintentional, posing a significant risk to critical infrastructure reliant on precise positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). While GPS is ubiquitous and highly beneficial, its inherent weaknesses, including low signal power and lack of authentication, make it susceptible to jamming and spoofing. The article argues for bolstering GPS resilience through various methods such as signal authentication, interference detection and mitigation technologies, and promoting alternative PNT systems and backup capabilities like eLoran. Without these improvements, GPS risks being degraded or even rendered unusable in critical situations, potentially impacting aviation, maritime navigation, financial transactions, and other vital sectors.
HN commenters largely agree that GPS is vulnerable to interference, both intentional and unintentional. Some highlight the importance of alternative positioning systems like Galileo, Beidou, and GLONASS, as well as inertial navigation for resilience. Others point out the practicality issues of backup systems like Loran-C due to cost and infrastructure requirements. Several comments emphasize the need for robust electronic warfare protection and redundancy in critical systems relying on GPS. A few discuss the potential for improved signal authentication and anti-spoofing measures. The real-world impacts of GPS disruption, such as on financial transactions and emergency services, are also noted as compelling reasons to address these vulnerabilities.
Let's Encrypt will stop issuing certificates for TLS client authentication after January 2026. They cite low usage, significant operational burden disproportionate to the benefit, and incompatibility with their Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol as key reasons. Existing client authentication certificates will continue to function until their expiration date. Let's Encrypt recommends users needing client certificates explore alternative providers like Smallstep or other commercial Certificate Authorities. This decision only affects client certificates, not the much more commonly used server certificates that Let's Encrypt will continue to offer.
HN commenters largely lament Let's Encrypt's decision to end client certificate support. Several express concern about the impact on internal tools and services relying on this authentication method, particularly for smaller organizations or individuals lacking resources to easily migrate. Some suggest alternative solutions like self-signing or using other CAs, but acknowledge these can be cumbersome or expensive. Others question the rationale behind Let's Encrypt's decision, pointing to the continued usefulness of client certificates for specific use cases like SSH access, VPNs, and device authentication. A few commenters express understanding, recognizing the limited demand and potential security complexities associated with client certificates, but still express disappointment at the loss of a free and accessible option.
Swiss-based privacy-focused company Proton, known for its VPN and encrypted email services, is considering leaving Switzerland due to a new surveillance law. The law grants the Swiss government expanded powers to spy on individuals and companies, requiring service providers like Proton to hand over user data in certain circumstances. Proton argues this compromises their core mission of user privacy and confidentiality, potentially making them "less confidential than Google," and is exploring relocation to a jurisdiction with stronger privacy protections.
Hacker News users discuss Proton's potential departure from Switzerland due to new surveillance laws. Several commenters express skepticism of Proton's claims, suggesting the move is motivated more by marketing than genuine concern for user privacy. Some argue that Switzerland is still more privacy-respecting than many other countries, questioning whether a move would genuinely benefit users. Others point out the complexities of running a secure email service, noting the challenges of balancing user privacy with legal obligations and the potential for abuse. A few commenters mention alternative providers and the increasing difficulty of finding truly private communication platforms. The discussion also touches upon the practicalities of relocating a company of Proton's size and the potential impact on its existing infrastructure and workforce.
A security researcher discovered a vulnerability in O2's VoLTE implementation that allowed anyone to determine the approximate location of an O2 customer simply by making a phone call to them. This was achieved by intercepting and manipulating the SIP INVITE message sent during call setup, specifically the "P-Asserted-Identity" header. By slightly modifying the caller ID presented to the target device, the researcher could trigger error messages that revealed location information normally used for emergency services. This information included cell tower IDs, which can be easily correlated with geographic locations. This vulnerability highlighted a lack of proper input sanitization and authorization checks within O2's VoLTE infrastructure, potentially affecting millions of customers. The issue has since been reported and patched by O2.
Hacker News users discuss the feasibility and implications of the claimed O2 VoLTE vulnerability. Some express skepticism about the ease with which an attacker could exploit this, pointing out the need for specialized equipment and the potential for detection. Others debate the actual impact, questioning whether coarse location data (accurate to a cell tower) is truly a privacy violation given its availability through other means. Several commenters highlight the responsibility of mobile network operators to address such security flaws and emphasize the importance of ongoing security research and public disclosure. The discussion also touches upon the trade-offs between functionality (like VoLTE) and security, as well as the potential legal ramifications for O2. A few users mention similar vulnerabilities in other networks, suggesting this isn't an isolated incident.
John L. Young, co-founder of Cryptome, a crucial online archive of government and corporate secrets, passed away. He and co-founder Deborah Natsios established Cryptome in 1996, dedicating it to publishing information suppressed for national security or other questionable reasons. Young tirelessly defended the public's right to know, facing numerous legal threats and challenges for hosting controversial documents, including internal memos, manuals, and blueprints. His unwavering commitment to transparency and freedom of information made Cryptome a vital resource for journalists, researchers, and activists, leaving an enduring legacy of challenging censorship and promoting open access to information.
HN commenters mourn the loss of John Young, co-founder of Cryptome, highlighting his dedication to free speech and government transparency. Several share anecdotes showcasing Young's uncompromising character and the impact Cryptome had on their lives. Some discuss the site's role in publishing sensitive documents and the subsequent government pressure, admiring Young's courage in the face of legal threats. Others praise the simple, ad-free design of Cryptome as a testament to its core mission. The overall sentiment expresses deep respect for Young's contribution to online freedom of information.
Tinfoil, a YC-backed startup, has launched a platform offering verifiable privacy for cloud AI. It enables users to run AI inferences on encrypted data without decrypting it, preserving data confidentiality. This is achieved through homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs, allowing users to verify the integrity of the computation without revealing the data or model. Tinfoil aims to provide a secure and trustworthy way to leverage the power of cloud AI while maintaining full control and privacy over sensitive data. The platform currently supports image classification and stable diffusion tasks, with plans to expand to other AI models.
The Hacker News comments on Tinfoil's launch generally express skepticism and concern around the feasibility of their verifiable privacy claims. Several commenters question how Tinfoil can guarantee privacy given the inherent complexities of AI models and potential data leakage. There's discussion about the difficulty of auditing encrypted computation and whether the claimed "zero-knowledge" properties can truly be achieved in practice. Some users point out the lack of technical details and open-sourcing, hindering proper scrutiny. Others doubt the market demand for such a service, citing the costs and performance overhead associated with privacy-preserving techniques. Finally, there's a recurring theme of distrust towards YC companies making bold claims about privacy.
The Magic Leap One bootloader is vulnerable to exploitation, allowing for unauthorized code execution and full system control. A tool called ml1hax leverages this vulnerability, enabling users to bypass security restrictions and gain root access. This access allows for custom operating system installation, kernel modification, and hardware manipulation, effectively unlocking the device. The exploit targets the Lumin OS boot process, allowing arbitrary code execution before secure boot verification. This vulnerability significantly compromises the device's security, enabling unrestricted modification and control.
Hacker News users discussed the potential impact and technical details of the Magic Leap One bootloader exploit. Some expressed excitement about the possibilities of open-sourcing the headset's hardware and software, envisioning a future where the device could run Linux and other operating systems. Others raised concerns about the exploit's limited practicality due to the headset's discontinued status and niche appeal. Several commenters delved into the technical aspects, discussing the exploit's execution, potential uses for research and development, and the implications for similar embedded systems. One commenter highlighted the exploit's novelty, noting it wasn't a typical "fastboot oem unlock" approach, while another pointed to existing methods for achieving similar outcomes. Overall, the sentiment was a mix of curiosity, technical appreciation, and pragmatic skepticism regarding the exploit's real-world impact.
SMS-based two-factor authentication (2FA) is unreliable and discriminatory against people living in mountainous regions. Inconsistent cell service in these areas makes receiving SMS messages for authentication difficult or impossible, effectively excluding them from online services that rely on this method. While SMS 2FA offers a perceived improvement over no 2FA, it presents a false sense of security given its vulnerability to SIM swapping and other attacks. More robust alternatives like authenticator apps or hardware tokens offer better security and accessibility for everyone, including those in areas with poor cell reception. The author, a mountain resident, highlights the real-world consequences of this digital divide and argues for wider adoption of superior 2FA methods.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's premise that SMS 2FA is problematic for people in areas with poor cell reception, highlighting similar experiences in rural areas, on boats, or during travel. Some suggest alternative 2FA methods like hardware tokens or authenticator apps, acknowledging their own challenges related to lost devices or complex setup. Others discuss the security flaws inherent in SMS 2FA, mentioning SIM swapping and SS7 attacks. A few commenters push back, arguing that SMS 2FA is still better than nothing and that the author's situation represents an edge case. The trade-off between security and accessibility is a recurring theme in the discussion.
Passkeys leverage public-key cryptography to enhance login security. Instead of passwords, they utilize a private key stored on the user's device and a corresponding public key registered with the online service. During login, the device uses its private key to sign a challenge issued by the service, proving possession of the correct key without ever transmitting it. This process, based on established cryptographic principles and protocols like WebAuthn, eliminates the vulnerability of transmitting passwords and mitigates phishing attacks, as the private key never leaves the user's device and is tied to a specific website. This model ensures only the legitimate device can authenticate with the service.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and security implications of passkeys. Some expressed concern about vendor lock-in and the reliance on single providers like Apple, Google, and Microsoft. Others questioned the robustness of the recovery mechanisms and the potential for abuse or vulnerabilities in the biometric authentication process. The convenience and improved security compared to passwords were generally acknowledged, but skepticism remained about the long-term viability and potential for unforeseen issues with widespread adoption. A few commenters delved into the technical details, discussing the cryptographic primitives used and the specific aspects of the FIDO2 standard, while others focused on the user experience and potential challenges for less tech-savvy users.
Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in GNU Screen, a terminal multiplexer. These flaws allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially gaining complete control of the targeted system. The issues stem from how screen handles escape sequences in the terminal emulator, including OSC (Operating System Command) sequences used for setting window titles and other functions, and DCS (Device Control String) sequences. Exploitation can occur remotely if the victim uses a vulnerable version of screen within a session permitting terminal control, such as SSH. Patches are available, and users are strongly urged to update immediately.
Hacker News users discuss the implications of the GNU Screen vulnerabilities, focusing on the difficulty of patching due to its widespread usage in critical systems and embedded devices. Some express concern about the potential for exploitation, given Screen's role in managing persistent sessions. Others highlight the challenge of maintaining legacy software and the trade-offs between security and backward compatibility. The maintainers' commitment to addressing the issues is acknowledged, alongside the pragmatic approach of prioritizing the most severe vulnerabilities. The conversation also touches upon the need for better security practices in general, and the importance of considering alternatives to Screen in new projects.
macOS's Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) pop-ups, designed to protect user privacy by requesting permission for apps to access sensitive data, can be manipulated by malicious actors. While generally reliable, TCC relies on the accuracy of the app's declared bundle identifier, which can be spoofed. A malicious app could impersonate a legitimate one, tricking the user into granting it access to protected data like the camera, microphone, or even full disk access. This vulnerability highlights the importance of careful examination of TCC prompts, including checking the app's name and developer information against known legitimate sources before granting access. Even with TCC, users must remain vigilant to avoid inadvertently granting permissions to disguised malware.
Hacker News users discuss the trustworthiness of macOS permission pop-ups, sparked by an article about TinyCheck. Several commenters express concern about TCC's complexity and potential for abuse, highlighting how easily users can be tricked into granting excessive permissions. One commenter questions if Apple's security theater is sufficient, given the potential for malware to exploit these vulnerabilities. Others discuss TinyCheck's usefulness, potential improvements, and alternatives, including using tccutil and other open-source tools. Some debate the practical implications of such vulnerabilities and the likelihood of average users encountering sophisticated attacks. A few express skepticism about the overall threat, arguing that the complexity of exploiting TCC may deter most malicious actors.
Summary of Comments ( 23 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44145202
HN users generally praised the project for its cleverness and simplicity, viewing it as a fun and robust offline backup method. Some discussed the practicality, pointing out limitations like the 255-bit key size being smaller than modern standards. Others suggested improvements such as using a different encoding scheme for greater density or incorporating error correction. Durability of the cards was also a topic, with users considering lamination or metal stamping for longevity. The overall sentiment was positive, appreciating the project as a novel approach to cold storage.
The Hacker News post titled "Show HN: PunchCard Key Backup" generated a moderate discussion with several interesting comments. Many commenters expressed appreciation for the novelty and physicality of the punchcard backup system, contrasting it with the more abstract and digital nature of typical key backup methods.
One commenter highlighted the advantage of this system being resistant to electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), a concern for some individuals preparing for disaster scenarios. They further elaborated on the potential longevity of punchcards, pointing out their durability and resistance to data degradation over time compared to electronic storage media. Another commenter echoed this sentiment, emphasizing the robustness and simplicity of the punchcard approach.
Several commenters discussed the practicality of the system. One questioned the number of keys that could be reasonably stored on a punchcard, while another suggested potential improvements like using a more robust material than card stock for the punchcards. The discussion also touched upon the potential for errors during the punching process and the possibility of developing tools to assist with accurate punching.
One user jokingly compared the method to storing secrets on bananas, alluding to the unusual nature of using fruit for data storage, while acknowledging the cleverness of the punchcard concept.
Some commenters explored the historical context of punchcards, drawing parallels to their use in early computing. One mentioned the potential for using existing punchcard readers to interface with the backup system, bridging the gap between this modern application and its historical roots.
The security aspect was also addressed. A commenter raised the concern that punchcards might not be as secure as other backup methods if not stored carefully, as they are visually decipherable. This led to a discussion about the importance of physical security in any backup strategy, regardless of the medium.
Overall, the comments reflected a mixture of amusement, appreciation for the ingenuity, and practical considerations regarding the punchcard key backup system. The discussion highlighted the trade-offs between simplicity, durability, security, and practicality inherent in this unconventional approach.