Security researcher Eric Daigle discovered a significant vulnerability in several "smart" apartment intercom systems. By exploiting a poorly implemented API within these systems, he was able to remotely unlock building doors and individual apartment units using only his phone and publicly available information. He accomplished this by crafting specific HTTP requests that bypassed security measures, granting him unauthorized access. Daigle responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the affected vendors, prompting them to address the issue and improve their security protocols. This highlighted the risk associated with insecure IoT devices and the importance of robust API security in connected building systems.
Zach Holman's post "Nontraditional Red Teams" advocates for expanding the traditional security-focused red team concept to other areas of a company. He argues that dedicated teams, separate from existing product or engineering groups, can provide valuable insights by simulating real-world user behavior and identifying potential problems with products, marketing campaigns, and company policies. These "red teams" can act as devil's advocates, challenging assumptions and uncovering blind spots that internal teams might miss, ultimately leading to more robust and user-centric products and strategies. Holman emphasizes the importance of empowering these teams to operate independently and providing them the freedom to explore unconventional approaches.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's premise that "red teams" are often misused, focusing on compliance and shallow vulnerability discovery rather than true adversarial emulation. Several highlighted the importance of a strong security culture and open communication for red teaming to be effective. Some commenters shared anecdotes about ineffective red team exercises, emphasizing the need for clear objectives and buy-in from leadership. Others discussed the difficulty in finding skilled red teamers who can think like real attackers. A compelling point raised was the importance of "purple teaming" – combining red and blue teams for collaborative learning and improvement, rather than treating it as a purely adversarial exercise. Finally, some argued that the term "red team" has become diluted and overused, losing its original meaning.
Summary of Comments ( 24 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43160884
HN commenters discuss the prevalence of easily-exploitable vulnerabilities in building access control systems. Several highlight the inherent insecurity of relying solely on cellular connections for such critical infrastructure, pointing out the ease with which cellular signals can be intercepted or spoofed. Others note the conflict between convenience and security, acknowledging that many residents prioritize ease of access over robust protection. Some commenters share anecdotal experiences with similar vulnerabilities in their own buildings, while others suggest potential solutions, such as requiring secondary authentication factors or utilizing more secure communication protocols. The ethical implications of publicly disclosing such vulnerabilities are also debated, with some arguing for responsible disclosure while others emphasize the urgent need for awareness and immediate action. A few commenters question the author's decision to reveal specific technical details, fearing it could empower malicious actors.
The Hacker News post "Breaking into apartment buildings in five minutes on my phone" (linking to an article detailing vulnerabilities in apartment building intercom systems) generated a robust discussion with over 100 comments. Many commenters focused on the widespread nature of this security flaw and the lack of incentive for property managers to address it.
Several commenters shared anecdotes of similar vulnerabilities they'd encountered or exploited, including using default passwords, easily guessable codes, or simply bypassing the systems altogether. One commenter described manipulating the intercom system of their own building to open the main door from anywhere in the world. These personal stories underscored the real-world implications of the article's findings.
A recurring theme was the inherent conflict of interest between security and cost for property management companies. Commenters pointed out that the cheapest systems are often the most vulnerable, and that property managers prioritize minimizing expenses over implementing robust security measures. This created a sense of resignation among some, suggesting that these issues would persist until either regulations changed or a significant security breach forced the industry's hand.
The discussion also delved into the technical aspects of the vulnerabilities, with some commenters speculating on the specific technologies used in these intercom systems and potential solutions. Some suggested implementing multi-factor authentication or using more secure communication protocols. Others noted the challenge of retrofitting older buildings with modern security systems.
Several comments highlighted the ethical considerations of vulnerability disclosure. While the original article author responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to the affected companies, commenters discussed the potential risks of publicly sharing this information, including the possibility of malicious actors exploiting these weaknesses. This sparked a debate about the balance between transparency and security.
Finally, a number of commenters expressed frustration and disappointment with the state of security in these systems. They criticized the manufacturers for producing insecure products and the property managers for deploying them. Some called for greater consumer awareness and advocacy to push for better security practices in the industry. Overall, the comments painted a picture of a widespread and persistent security problem with limited incentives for change.