Hackers breached the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a US Treasury department agency responsible for regulating national banks, gaining access to approximately 150,000 email accounts. The OCC discovered the breach during its investigation of the MOVEit Transfer vulnerability exploitation, confirming their systems were compromised between May 27 and June 12. While the agency claims no evidence suggests other Treasury systems were affected or that sensitive data beyond email content was accessed, they are continuing their investigation and working with law enforcement.
The blog post details a sophisticated, low-and-slow password spray attack targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Instead of rapid, easily detected attempts, the attackers used a large botnet to try a small number of common passwords against a massive list of usernames, cycling through different IP addresses and spreading attempts over weeks or months. This approach evaded typical rate-limiting security measures. The attack was discovered through unusual authentication patterns showing a high failure rate with specific common passwords across many accounts. The post emphasizes the importance of strong, unique passwords, multi-factor authentication, and robust monitoring to detect such subtle attacks.
HN users discussed the practicality of the password spraying attack described in the article, questioning its effectiveness against organizations with robust security measures like rate limiting, account lockouts, and multi-factor authentication. Some commenters highlighted the importance of educating users about password hygiene and the need for strong, unique passwords. Others pointed out that the attack's "slow and steady" nature, while evasive, could be detected through careful log analysis and anomaly detection systems. The discussion also touched on the ethical implications of penetration testing and the responsibility of security researchers to disclose vulnerabilities responsibly. Several users shared personal anecdotes about encountering similar attacks and the challenges in mitigating them. Finally, some commenters expressed skepticism about the novelty of the attack, suggesting that it was a well-known technique and not a groundbreaking discovery.
Mobile Verification Toolkit (MVT) helps investigators analyze mobile devices (Android and iOS) for evidence of compromise. It examines device backups, file system images, and targeted collections, looking for artifacts related to malware, spyware, and unauthorized access. MVT checks for indicators like jailbreaking/rooting, suspicious installed apps, configuration profiles, unusual network activity, and signs of known exploits. The toolkit provides detailed reports highlighting potential issues and aids forensic examiners in identifying and understanding security breaches on mobile platforms.
HN users discuss the practicality and legality of MVT (Mobile Verification Toolkit), a tool for forensic analysis of mobile devices. Some express concerns about the complexity of interpreting the results and the potential for false positives, emphasizing the need for expertise. Others debate the legality of using such tools, especially in employment contexts, with some suggesting potential violations of privacy laws depending on the jurisdiction and the nature of the data collected. A few commenters point out that the tools are valuable but must be used responsibly and ethically, recommending comparing results against a known good baseline and considering user privacy implications. The utility for average users is questioned, with the consensus being that it's more suited for professionals in law enforcement or corporate security. Finally, alternative tools and resources are mentioned, including existing forensic suites and open-source projects.
Huntress Labs researchers uncovered a campaign where Russian-speaking actors impersonated the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) to distribute the Stealc information-stealing malware. Using a fake EFF domain and mimicking the organization's visual branding, the attackers lured victims with promises of privacy-enhancing tools, instead delivering a malicious installer. This installer deployed Stealc, designed to pilfer sensitive data like passwords, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet information. The campaign leveraged the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA and utilized Pyramid, a new command-and-control framework, to manage infected machines. This represents a concerning trend of threat actors exploiting trusted organizations to distribute increasingly sophisticated malware.
Hacker News users discussed the sophistication of the Stealc malware operation, particularly its use of Telegram for command-and-control and its rapid iteration to incorporate features from other malware. Some questioned the attribution to Russian actors solely based on language, highlighting the prevalence of Russian speakers in the cybersecurity world regardless of nationality. Others pointed out the irony of using "EFF" in the impersonation, given the Electronic Frontier Foundation's focus on privacy and security. The effectiveness of the multi-stage infection process, including the use of legitimate services like Discord and Telegram, was also noted. Several commenters discussed the blog post's technical depth, appreciating the clear explanation of the malware's functionality and the investigation process. Finally, some users expressed skepticism about the actual impact of such malware, suggesting the targets are likely low-value and the operation more opportunistic than targeted.
The post contrasts "war rooms," reactive, high-pressure environments focused on immediate problem-solving during outages, with "deep investigations," proactive, methodical explorations aimed at understanding the root causes of incidents and preventing recurrence. While war rooms are necessary for rapid response and mitigation, their intense focus on the present often hinders genuine learning. Deep investigations, though requiring more time and resources, ultimately offer greater long-term value by identifying systemic weaknesses and enabling preventative measures, leading to more stable and resilient systems. The author argues for a balanced approach, acknowledging the critical role of war rooms but emphasizing the crucial importance of dedicating sufficient attention and resources to post-incident deep investigations.
HN commenters largely agree with the author's premise that "war rooms" for incident response are often ineffective, preferring deep investigations and addressing underlying systemic issues. Several shared personal anecdotes reinforcing the futility of war rooms and the value of blameless postmortems. Some questioned the author's characterization of Google's approach, suggesting their postmortems are deep investigations. Others debated the definition of "war room" and its potential utility in specific, limited scenarios like DDoS attacks where rapid coordination is crucial. A few commenters highlighted the importance of leadership buy-in for effective post-incident analysis and the difficulty of shifting organizational culture away from blame. The contrast between "firefighting" and "fire prevention" through proper engineering practices was also a recurring theme.
The Okta bcrypt incident highlights crucial API design flaws that allowed attackers to bypass account lockout mechanisms. By accepting hashed passwords directly, Okta's API inadvertently circumvented its own security measures. This emphasizes the danger of exposing low-level cryptographic primitives in APIs, as it creates attack vectors that developers might not anticipate. The post advocates for abstracting away such complexities, forcing users to interact with higher-level authentication flows that enforce intended security policies, like lockout mechanisms and rate limiting. This abstraction simplifies security reasoning and reduces the potential for bypasses by ensuring all authentication attempts are subject to consistent security controls, regardless of how the password is presented.
Several commenters on Hacker News praised the original post for its clear explanation of the Okta bcrypt incident and the proposed solutions. Some highlighted the importance of designing APIs that enforce correct usage and prevent accidental misuse, particularly with security-sensitive operations like password hashing. The discussion touched on the tradeoffs between API simplicity and robustness, with some arguing for more opinionated APIs that guide developers towards best practices. Others shared similar experiences with poorly designed APIs leading to security vulnerabilities. A few commenters also questioned Okta's specific implementation choices and debated the merits of different hashing algorithms. Overall, the comments reflected a general agreement with the author's points about the need for more thoughtful API design to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Summary of Comments ( 3 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43631298
Hacker News commenters express skepticism about the reported 150,000 compromised emails, questioning the actual impact and whether this number represents unique emails or includes forwards and replies. Some suggest the number is inflated to justify increased cybersecurity budgets. Others point to the OCC's history of poor cybersecurity practices and a lack of transparency. Several commenters discuss the potential legal and regulatory implications for Microsoft, the email provider, and highlight the ongoing challenge of securing cloud-based email systems. The lack of detail about the nature of the breach and the affected individuals also drew criticism.
The Hacker News post titled "Treasury's OCC Says Hackers Had Access to 150k Emails" has generated several comments discussing the implications of the breach at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
Several commenters express concern over the lack of details regarding the nature of the breach. They question what type of information was contained within the compromised emails and speculate about the potential impact on financial institutions and individuals. The lack of transparency from the OCC is a recurring theme, with some users criticizing the agency for not providing more information about the incident.
One commenter points out the irony of the OCC being hacked, given their role in overseeing the security practices of financial institutions. This sentiment is echoed by others who question the OCC's own cybersecurity posture and the potential implications for the trust and confidence in the agency.
Another discussion thread focuses on the potential severity of the breach. While 150,000 emails might seem small compared to other large-scale data breaches, commenters point out that the sensitive nature of the information likely contained within these emails, pertaining to financial regulation and oversight, could make this a significant incident. They speculate about the potential for insider trading, market manipulation, or other forms of financial crime based on the stolen data.
Some users express frustration with the seemingly constant stream of cyberattacks targeting government agencies and financial institutions. They discuss the need for improved cybersecurity practices and the importance of holding organizations accountable for data breaches. There's also a discussion about the evolving nature of cyber threats and the challenges in staying ahead of sophisticated hackers.
A few commenters offer technical insights into potential attack vectors and methods that could have been used in the breach. They discuss the importance of robust email security practices, including multi-factor authentication and phishing awareness training.
Finally, some commenters question the timing of the disclosure, suggesting that the breach may have occurred earlier than reported. They speculate about the potential reasons for the delay in public disclosure and express concerns about the potential for further damage.