The blog post details a sophisticated, low-and-slow password spray attack targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Instead of rapid, easily detected attempts, the attackers used a large botnet to try a small number of common passwords against a massive list of usernames, cycling through different IP addresses and spreading attempts over weeks or months. This approach evaded typical rate-limiting security measures. The attack was discovered through unusual authentication patterns showing a high failure rate with specific common passwords across many accounts. The post emphasizes the importance of strong, unique passwords, multi-factor authentication, and robust monitoring to detect such subtle attacks.
The Okta bcrypt incident highlights crucial API design flaws that allowed attackers to bypass account lockout mechanisms. By accepting hashed passwords directly, Okta's API inadvertently circumvented its own security measures. This emphasizes the danger of exposing low-level cryptographic primitives in APIs, as it creates attack vectors that developers might not anticipate. The post advocates for abstracting away such complexities, forcing users to interact with higher-level authentication flows that enforce intended security policies, like lockout mechanisms and rate limiting. This abstraction simplifies security reasoning and reduces the potential for bypasses by ensuring all authentication attempts are subject to consistent security controls, regardless of how the password is presented.
Several commenters on Hacker News praised the original post for its clear explanation of the Okta bcrypt incident and the proposed solutions. Some highlighted the importance of designing APIs that enforce correct usage and prevent accidental misuse, particularly with security-sensitive operations like password hashing. The discussion touched on the tradeoffs between API simplicity and robustness, with some arguing for more opinionated APIs that guide developers towards best practices. Others shared similar experiences with poorly designed APIs leading to security vulnerabilities. A few commenters also questioned Okta's specific implementation choices and debated the merits of different hashing algorithms. Overall, the comments reflected a general agreement with the author's points about the need for more thoughtful API design to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Summary of Comments ( 15 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43512944
HN users discussed the practicality of the password spraying attack described in the article, questioning its effectiveness against organizations with robust security measures like rate limiting, account lockouts, and multi-factor authentication. Some commenters highlighted the importance of educating users about password hygiene and the need for strong, unique passwords. Others pointed out that the attack's "slow and steady" nature, while evasive, could be detected through careful log analysis and anomaly detection systems. The discussion also touched on the ethical implications of penetration testing and the responsibility of security researchers to disclose vulnerabilities responsibly. Several users shared personal anecdotes about encountering similar attacks and the challenges in mitigating them. Finally, some commenters expressed skepticism about the novelty of the attack, suggesting that it was a well-known technique and not a groundbreaking discovery.
The Hacker News post titled "Unmasking a slow and steady password spray attack" (linking to a Petra Security Substack article) generated a moderate number of comments, primarily focusing on the technical aspects and implications of the described attack.
Several commenters discussed the effectiveness and practicality of the described attack method. Some expressed skepticism about its widespread applicability, highlighting that the specific vulnerability exploited (allowing unlimited login attempts without lockout) is becoming increasingly rare due to improved security practices. They pointed out that many modern systems implement robust rate-limiting and account lockout mechanisms, making such slow and steady password spraying significantly less effective.
Others acknowledged the potential danger, particularly in environments where security practices are less mature. They noted that legacy systems or organizations with inadequate security configurations could still be vulnerable to this type of attack. There was some debate around the trade-offs between security and usability, with some suggesting that overly aggressive lockout policies can negatively impact legitimate users.
A few commenters delved into the technical details of the attack, discussing methods for detection and mitigation. They mentioned techniques like analyzing login logs for suspicious patterns, implementing multi-factor authentication, and using honeypot accounts to trap attackers. The use of threat intelligence feeds to identify commonly used passwords and block them proactively was also suggested.
Some comments focused on the attacker's persistence and methodology. The slow and steady nature of the attack, designed to evade detection, was highlighted as a key characteristic. The discussion also touched upon the resources and infrastructure required by the attackers to execute such campaigns, suggesting that they might be more sophisticated than initially assumed.
Finally, there was a brief discussion about the broader implications of this type of attack, including the potential damage to reputation and financial losses for affected organizations. The importance of proactive security measures and ongoing vigilance was emphasized as a key takeaway.