Starting September 13, 2024, the maximum lifetime for publicly trusted TLS certificates will be reduced to 398 days (effectively 47 days due to calculation specifics). This change, driven by the CA/Browser Forum, aims to improve security by limiting the impact of compromised certificates and encouraging more frequent certificate renewals, promoting better certificate hygiene and faster adoption of security improvements. While automation is key to managing this shorter lifespan, the industry shift will require organizations to adapt their certificate lifecycle processes.
Osprey is a browser extension designed to protect users from malicious websites. It leverages a regularly updated local blacklist to block known phishing, malware, and scam sites before they even load. This proactive approach eliminates the need for constant server communication, ensuring faster browsing and enhanced privacy. Osprey also offers customizable whitelisting and an optional "report" feature that sends anonymized telemetry data to improve its database, helping to protect the wider community.
Hacker News users discussed Osprey's efficacy and approach. Some questioned the extension's reliance on VirusTotal, expressing concerns about privacy and potential false positives. Others debated the merits of blocking entire sites versus specific resources, with some arguing for more granular control. The reliance on browser extensions as a security solution was also questioned, with some preferring network-level blocking. A few users praised the project's open-source nature and suggested improvements like local blacklists and the ability to whitelist specific elements. Overall, the comments reflected a cautious optimism tempered by practical concerns about the extension's implementation and the broader challenges of online security.
Despite being a simple, beneficial, and standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities, adoption of security.txt files (as defined by RFC 9116) remains disappointingly low. A 2025 study by Hartwork found that the vast majority of IT companies, including many prominent names, still do not provide a security.txt file on their websites. This lack of adoption hinders responsible vulnerability disclosure and potentially leaves these organizations more susceptible to exploitation, as researchers lack clear reporting channels. The study emphasizes the continued need for greater awareness and adoption of this straightforward security best practice.
Hacker News users generally agreed with the premise that security.txt adoption is disappointingly low, with several expressing frustration at the security industry's failure to implement basic best practices. Some commenters pointed out that even security-focused companies often lack a security.txt file, highlighting a general apathy or ignorance towards the standard. Others discussed the potential downsides of security.txt, such as increased exposure to automated vulnerability scanning and the possibility of it becoming a target for social engineering attacks. A few suggested that the lack of adoption might stem from the perceived lack of clear benefits or fear of legal repercussions for disclosed vulnerabilities. The overall sentiment reflects a concern for the slow uptake of a seemingly simple yet beneficial security measure.
CSRF and CORS address distinct web security risks and therefore both are necessary. CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) protects against malicious sites tricking a user's browser into making unintended requests to a trusted site where the user is already authenticated. This is achieved through tokens that verify the request originated from the trusted site itself. CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing), on the other hand, dictates which external sites are permitted to access resources from a particular server, focusing on protecting the server itself from unauthorized access by scripts running on other origins. While they both deal with cross-site interactions, CSRF prevents malicious exploitation of a user's existing session, while CORS restricts access to the server's resources in the first place.
Hacker News users discussed the nuances of CSRF and CORS, pointing out that while they both address security concerns related to cross-origin requests, they protect against different threats. Several commenters emphasized that CORS primarily protects the server from unauthorized access by other origins, controlled by the server itself. CSRF, on the other hand, protects users from malicious sites exploiting their existing authenticated sessions on another site, controlled by the user's browser. One commenter offered a clear analogy: CORS is like a bouncer at a club deciding who can enter, while CSRF protection is like checking someone's ID to make sure they're not using a stolen membership card. The discussion also touched upon the practical differences in implementation, like preflight requests in CORS and the use of tokens in CSRF prevention. Some comments questioned the clarity of the original blog post's title, suggesting it might confuse the two distinct mechanisms.
The Dogecoin Foundation's website, doge.gov, was vulnerable to unauthorized changes due to a misconfigured GitHub repository. Essentially, anyone with a GitHub account could propose changes to the site's content through pull requests, which were automatically approved and deployed. This meant malicious actors could easily alter information, potentially spreading misinformation or redirecting users to harmful sites. While the Dogecoin Foundation intended the site to be community-driven, this open setup inadvertently bypassed any meaningful review process, leaving the site exposed for an extended period. The vulnerability has since been addressed.
Hacker News users discuss the implications of the easily compromised doge.gov website, highlighting the lack of security for a site representing a cryptocurrency with a large market cap. Some question the seriousness and legitimacy of Dogecoin as a whole given this vulnerability, while others point out that the site likely holds little real value or sensitive information, minimizing the impact of the "hack." The ease with which the site was altered is seen as both humorous and concerning, with several commenters mentioning the irony of a "meme coin" having such lax security. Several commenters also note the simplicity of the website's infrastructure and the likely use of a static site generator, which contributed to the vulnerability.
A recent study reveals that CAPTCHAs are essentially a profitable tracking system disguised as a security measure. While ostensibly designed to differentiate bots from humans, CAPTCHAs allow companies like Google to collect vast amounts of user data for targeted advertising and other purposes. This system has cost users a staggering amount of time—an estimated 819 billion hours globally—and has generated nearly $1 trillion in revenue, primarily for Google. The study argues that the actual security benefits of CAPTCHAs are minimal compared to the immense profits generated from the user data they collect. This raises concerns about the balance between online security and user privacy, suggesting CAPTCHAs function more as a data harvesting tool than an effective bot deterrent.
Hacker News users generally agree with the premise that CAPTCHAs are exploitative. Several point out the irony of Google using them for training AI while simultaneously claiming they prevent bots. Some highlight the accessibility issues CAPTCHAs create, particularly for disabled users. Others discuss alternatives, such as Cloudflare's Turnstile, and the privacy implications of different solutions. The increasing difficulty and frequency of CAPTCHAs are also criticized, with some speculating it's a deliberate tactic to push users towards paid "captcha-free" services. Several commenters express frustration with the current state of CAPTCHAs and the lack of viable alternatives.
The FTC is taking action against GoDaddy for allegedly failing to adequately protect its customers' sensitive data. GoDaddy reportedly allowed unauthorized access to customer accounts on multiple occasions due to lax security practices, including failing to implement multi-factor authentication and neglecting to address known vulnerabilities. These lapses facilitated phishing attacks and other fraudulent activities, impacting millions of customers. As a result, GoDaddy will pay $21.3 million and be required to implement a comprehensive information security program subject to independent assessments for the next 20 years.
Hacker News commenters generally agree that GoDaddy's security practices are lacking, with some pointing to personal experiences of compromised sites hosted on the platform. Several express skepticism about the effectiveness of the FTC's actions, suggesting the fines are too small to incentivize real change. Some users highlight the conflict of interest inherent in GoDaddy's business model, where they profit from selling security products to fix vulnerabilities they may be partially responsible for. Others discuss the wider implications for web hosting security and the responsibility of users to implement their own protective measures. A few commenters defend GoDaddy, arguing that shared responsibility exists and users also bear the burden for securing their own sites. The discussion also touches upon the difficulty of patching WordPress vulnerabilities and the overall complexity of website security.
Summary of Comments ( 85 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43693900
Hacker News users generally express frustration and skepticism towards the reduced TLS certificate lifespan. Many commenters believe this change primarily benefits certificate authorities (CAs) financially, forcing more frequent purchases. Some argue the security benefits are minimal and outweighed by the increased operational burden on system administrators, particularly those managing numerous servers or complex infrastructures. Several users suggest automation is crucial to cope with shorter lifespans and highlight existing tools like certbot. Concerns are also raised about the potential for increased outages due to expired certificates and the impact on smaller organizations or individual users. A few commenters point out potential benefits like faster revocation of compromised certificates and quicker adoption of new cryptographic standards, but these are largely overshadowed by the negative sentiment surrounding the increased administrative overhead.
The Hacker News post titled "TLS Certificate Lifetimes Will Officially Reduce to 47 Days" generated a significant discussion with various perspectives on the implications of shorter certificate lifetimes.
Several commenters expressed concerns about the increased operational burden associated with more frequent certificate renewals. One commenter highlighted the potential for increased outages due to expired certificates, especially for smaller organizations or those with less automated systems. They argued that while automation is possible, it's not always straightforward and can introduce new points of failure. Another commenter echoed this sentiment, pointing out the difficulty in maintaining certificates for a large number of internal services. This commenter specifically noted the challenge of convincing management to invest in automation tools.
The discussion also touched upon the security benefits and trade-offs of shorter certificate lifetimes. Some commenters acknowledged the improved security posture resulting from reduced exposure window for compromised certificates. However, they also questioned whether the added complexity and potential for outages outweigh these benefits. One commenter suggested that Let's Encrypt's 90-day lifetime had already struck a reasonable balance between security and manageability. Another commenter questioned the actual impact on security, arguing that most certificate-related incidents are not due to long-lived certificates, but rather misconfigurations or other vulnerabilities.
The topic of automation and tooling was central to the discussion. Several commenters advocated for robust automation as a necessary solution to manage shorter certificate lifetimes. They mentioned specific tools and services, such as certbot and ACME clients, that can facilitate automated renewals. One commenter suggested that organizations struggling with certificate management should consider managed solutions or cloud providers that handle certificate lifecycle automatically. There was also a discussion about the importance of proper monitoring and alerting systems to prevent outages due to expired certificates.
Some commenters expressed skepticism about the motivations behind the push for shorter lifetimes. They speculated that certificate authorities (CAs) might be financially incentivized to promote more frequent renewals. One commenter jokingly remarked that CAs are "creating job security for themselves" by increasing the administrative burden on their customers.
Finally, a few commenters offered practical advice and tips for managing certificates, such as using a centralized certificate management system and leveraging monitoring tools to track certificate expiry dates. One commenter also highlighted the importance of planning for certificate renewals well in advance to avoid last-minute scrambling and potential outages.