Despite being a simple, beneficial, and standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities, adoption of security.txt files (as defined by RFC 9116) remains disappointingly low. A 2025 study by Hartwork found that the vast majority of IT companies, including many prominent names, still do not provide a security.txt file on their websites. This lack of adoption hinders responsible vulnerability disclosure and potentially leaves these organizations more susceptible to exploitation, as researchers lack clear reporting channels. The study emphasizes the continued need for greater awareness and adoption of this straightforward security best practice.
CSRF and CORS address distinct web security risks and therefore both are necessary. CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) protects against malicious sites tricking a user's browser into making unintended requests to a trusted site where the user is already authenticated. This is achieved through tokens that verify the request originated from the trusted site itself. CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing), on the other hand, dictates which external sites are permitted to access resources from a particular server, focusing on protecting the server itself from unauthorized access by scripts running on other origins. While they both deal with cross-site interactions, CSRF prevents malicious exploitation of a user's existing session, while CORS restricts access to the server's resources in the first place.
Hacker News users discussed the nuances of CSRF and CORS, pointing out that while they both address security concerns related to cross-origin requests, they protect against different threats. Several commenters emphasized that CORS primarily protects the server from unauthorized access by other origins, controlled by the server itself. CSRF, on the other hand, protects users from malicious sites exploiting their existing authenticated sessions on another site, controlled by the user's browser. One commenter offered a clear analogy: CORS is like a bouncer at a club deciding who can enter, while CSRF protection is like checking someone's ID to make sure they're not using a stolen membership card. The discussion also touched upon the practical differences in implementation, like preflight requests in CORS and the use of tokens in CSRF prevention. Some comments questioned the clarity of the original blog post's title, suggesting it might confuse the two distinct mechanisms.
The Dogecoin Foundation's website, doge.gov, was vulnerable to unauthorized changes due to a misconfigured GitHub repository. Essentially, anyone with a GitHub account could propose changes to the site's content through pull requests, which were automatically approved and deployed. This meant malicious actors could easily alter information, potentially spreading misinformation or redirecting users to harmful sites. While the Dogecoin Foundation intended the site to be community-driven, this open setup inadvertently bypassed any meaningful review process, leaving the site exposed for an extended period. The vulnerability has since been addressed.
Hacker News users discuss the implications of the easily compromised doge.gov website, highlighting the lack of security for a site representing a cryptocurrency with a large market cap. Some question the seriousness and legitimacy of Dogecoin as a whole given this vulnerability, while others point out that the site likely holds little real value or sensitive information, minimizing the impact of the "hack." The ease with which the site was altered is seen as both humorous and concerning, with several commenters mentioning the irony of a "meme coin" having such lax security. Several commenters also note the simplicity of the website's infrastructure and the likely use of a static site generator, which contributed to the vulnerability.
A recent study reveals that CAPTCHAs are essentially a profitable tracking system disguised as a security measure. While ostensibly designed to differentiate bots from humans, CAPTCHAs allow companies like Google to collect vast amounts of user data for targeted advertising and other purposes. This system has cost users a staggering amount of time—an estimated 819 billion hours globally—and has generated nearly $1 trillion in revenue, primarily for Google. The study argues that the actual security benefits of CAPTCHAs are minimal compared to the immense profits generated from the user data they collect. This raises concerns about the balance between online security and user privacy, suggesting CAPTCHAs function more as a data harvesting tool than an effective bot deterrent.
Hacker News users generally agree with the premise that CAPTCHAs are exploitative. Several point out the irony of Google using them for training AI while simultaneously claiming they prevent bots. Some highlight the accessibility issues CAPTCHAs create, particularly for disabled users. Others discuss alternatives, such as Cloudflare's Turnstile, and the privacy implications of different solutions. The increasing difficulty and frequency of CAPTCHAs are also criticized, with some speculating it's a deliberate tactic to push users towards paid "captcha-free" services. Several commenters express frustration with the current state of CAPTCHAs and the lack of viable alternatives.
The FTC is taking action against GoDaddy for allegedly failing to adequately protect its customers' sensitive data. GoDaddy reportedly allowed unauthorized access to customer accounts on multiple occasions due to lax security practices, including failing to implement multi-factor authentication and neglecting to address known vulnerabilities. These lapses facilitated phishing attacks and other fraudulent activities, impacting millions of customers. As a result, GoDaddy will pay $21.3 million and be required to implement a comprehensive information security program subject to independent assessments for the next 20 years.
Hacker News commenters generally agree that GoDaddy's security practices are lacking, with some pointing to personal experiences of compromised sites hosted on the platform. Several express skepticism about the effectiveness of the FTC's actions, suggesting the fines are too small to incentivize real change. Some users highlight the conflict of interest inherent in GoDaddy's business model, where they profit from selling security products to fix vulnerabilities they may be partially responsible for. Others discuss the wider implications for web hosting security and the responsibility of users to implement their own protective measures. A few commenters defend GoDaddy, arguing that shared responsibility exists and users also bear the burden for securing their own sites. The discussion also touches upon the difficulty of patching WordPress vulnerabilities and the overall complexity of website security.
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https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43235972
Hacker News users generally agreed with the premise that security.txt adoption is disappointingly low, with several expressing frustration at the security industry's failure to implement basic best practices. Some commenters pointed out that even security-focused companies often lack a security.txt file, highlighting a general apathy or ignorance towards the standard. Others discussed the potential downsides of security.txt, such as increased exposure to automated vulnerability scanning and the possibility of it becoming a target for social engineering attacks. A few suggested that the lack of adoption might stem from the perceived lack of clear benefits or fear of legal repercussions for disclosed vulnerabilities. The overall sentiment reflects a concern for the slow uptake of a seemingly simple yet beneficial security measure.
The Hacker News post titled "Most IT companies fail to serve security.txt for RFC 9116 in 2025" generated a moderate number of comments discussing the adoption (or lack thereof) of the security.txt standard. Several commenters expressed a general sentiment of disappointment and frustration with the slow uptake of such a simple, yet beneficial, security practice.
One compelling line of discussion revolved around the practical challenges and perceived lack of incentives for companies to implement security.txt. Some argued that security researchers often find vulnerabilities through means other than those advertised in a security.txt file, therefore diminishing its perceived value for companies. Others countered this point by highlighting the importance of providing a clear and official channel for reporting vulnerabilities, regardless of how they are discovered. This, they argued, can help streamline the vulnerability disclosure process and prevent researchers from resorting to less secure or less desirable methods of contact.
Another commenter pointed out that the absence of security.txt often leads to wasted time and effort for security researchers who have to resort to searching for contact information through various channels, potentially leading to delayed vulnerability disclosures. This reinforces the argument that security.txt benefits both the reporting party and the receiving organization.
The issue of discoverability also arose, with some commenters questioning how effective security.txt is if search engines aren't indexing it reliably. This raised concerns about the practical utility of the standard if it's not easily findable by those who need it.
Finally, a few comments touched upon the potential legal implications of not having a security.txt file, suggesting that in the future, its absence might be considered negligent, especially in regulated industries. This adds another layer of incentive for companies to adopt the standard, moving beyond best practice and towards a potential legal requirement.
While no single comment was overwhelmingly compelling in isolation, the collective discussion painted a picture of a security standard struggling with adoption despite its simplicity and potential benefits. The comments highlighted the tension between the perceived effort required for implementation and the potential benefits, as well as the need for improved discoverability and potential future legal implications that might drive wider adoption.