Stories with Tag Supply Chain Attack

• Public secrets exposure leads to supply chain attack on GitHub CodeQL

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  Posted: 2025-03-30 19:54:46

  Verbose tl;dr

  Researchers at Praetorian discovered a vulnerability in GitHub's CodeQL system that allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code during the build process of CodeQL queries. This was possible because CodeQL inadvertently exposed secrets within its build environment, which a malicious actor could exploit by submitting a specially crafted query. This constituted a supply chain attack, as any repository using the compromised query would unknowingly execute the malicious code. Praetorian responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to GitHub, who promptly patched the issue and implemented additional security measures to prevent similar attacks in the future.

  Praetorian's blog post, "Public Secrets Exposure Leads to Supply Chain Attack on GitHub CodeQL," details a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting GitHub's CodeQL feature. CodeQL, a powerful semantic code analysis engine used for identifying vulnerabilities within software, relies on community-contributed queries to enhance its functionality. These queries are packaged and distributed as CodeQL packs, allowing users to easily integrate them into their workflows.

  The core vulnerability stemmed from the method by which CodeQL packs are built and published. Praetorian researchers discovered that during the build process, sensitive environment variables, specifically GitHub Personal Access Tokens (PATs) and other secrets like AWS credentials, were inadvertently incorporated into the final CodeQL pack. This occurred because the build process used a setup-go action which automatically included all environment variables, including these secrets, in the produced artifact.

  An attacker exploiting this vulnerability could craft a malicious CodeQL query, embed it within a seemingly innocuous CodeQL pack, and then submit it to the CodeQL marketplace. When a user or organization downloaded and executed this malicious pack, the embedded secrets would be exposed, giving the attacker access to the victim’s GitHub repositories and potentially connected cloud resources, depending on the specific secrets leaked. This is particularly concerning because CodeQL is often used in sensitive environments and by security-conscious developers, making it a high-value target.

  Praetorian researchers successfully demonstrated the feasibility of this attack by creating a proof-of-concept CodeQL pack containing a seemingly benign query. They then injected their own PAT into the build environment, which was subsequently embedded within the distributed pack. Upon execution of the pack, their proof-of-concept successfully exfiltrated the embedded PAT, proving that an attacker could gain unauthorized access.

  The researchers responsibly disclosed this vulnerability to GitHub, who acknowledged and addressed the issue by implementing several mitigations. These mitigations included implementing stricter controls on environment variables accessible during the CodeQL pack build process, revoking potentially compromised PATs, and providing guidance to CodeQL pack developers on secure development practices to prevent similar issues in the future. Furthermore, GitHub enhanced their security scanning procedures to detect and prevent the inclusion of secrets within CodeQL packs.

  The incident highlights the potential risks associated with community-contributed code and the importance of securing the software supply chain. It underscores the need for robust security measures throughout the entire development lifecycle, from code creation to distribution and execution, especially in widely used platforms like GitHub and with powerful tools like CodeQL. The vulnerability also emphasizes the critical role of responsible disclosure in addressing security vulnerabilities and protecting the broader software ecosystem.

  • GitHub
  • CodeQL
  • Security
  • Supply Chain Attack
  • Secret Exposure
  • Vulnerability
  • Software Security
  • Cybersecurity
  • Code Analysis
  • static analysis
  • Praetorian
  • Cloud Security
  • DevSecOps
  • Software Supply Chain Security

  Summary of Comments ( 8 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43527044

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users discussed the implications of the CodeQL vulnerability, with some focusing on the ease with which the researcher found and exploited the flaw. Several commenters highlighted the irony of a security analysis tool itself being insecure and the potential for widespread impact given CodeQL's popularity. Others questioned the severity and prevalence of secret leakage in CI/CD environments generally, suggesting the issue isn't as widespread as the blog post implies. Some debated the responsible disclosure timeline, with some arguing Praetorian waited too long to report the vulnerability. A few commenters also pointed out the potential for similar vulnerabilities in other security scanning tools. Overall, the discussion centered around the significance of the vulnerability, the practices that led to it, and the broader implications for supply chain security.

  The Hacker News post discussing Praetorian's blog post about a supply chain attack on GitHub CodeQL has generated a significant number of comments (over 100 at the time of this summary). Several compelling threads of discussion emerge from the comments section.

  A major point of discussion revolves around the responsibility and vulnerability disclosure process. Some commenters criticize GitHub for the perceived slow response and lack of transparency in addressing the reported vulnerability. Others defend GitHub, highlighting the complexity of validating and patching such vulnerabilities while minimizing disruption. The discussion delves into the nuances of responsible disclosure, balancing the need for timely patching with preventing exploitation by malicious actors. Some users question the severity of the vulnerability, arguing that exploiting it required significant effort and access.

  Another key discussion thread focuses on the technical details of the vulnerability and the attack vector. Commenters dissect the methods used by the researchers to identify and exploit the vulnerability, sharing their own insights and expertise. This includes discussion of the CodeQL query evaluation process and the potential impact of injecting malicious code. Some users express concern about the broader implications for software supply chain security, given the increasing reliance on third-party code and tools.

  Several comments analyze the specific scenario involving the use of private keys within CodeQL queries. The debate touches upon best practices for managing secrets and the potential risks of exposing sensitive information within code. Some commenters suggest alternative approaches for handling secrets in such scenarios, emphasizing the importance of secure coding practices.

  Another recurring theme is the potential impact of this vulnerability on open-source projects and the broader developer community. Commenters discuss the challenges of securing the software supply chain in the context of open-source development, where code contributions come from various sources with varying levels of security expertise. Some users express concern about the potential for similar vulnerabilities in other code analysis tools and the broader implications for software security.

  Finally, a number of comments offer practical advice and recommendations for developers and security professionals. These include tips for securing CodeQL queries, managing secrets effectively, and implementing robust security practices within the software development lifecycle. Some commenters also share resources and tools for vulnerability scanning and code analysis, highlighting the importance of proactive security measures.

  Overall, the comments section on Hacker News provides a valuable platform for discussion and analysis of the CodeQL supply chain vulnerability. The diverse range of perspectives and expertise represented in the comments contribute to a deeper understanding of the technical details, security implications, and potential solutions related to this vulnerability.

• Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos

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  Posted: 2025-03-14 22:29:46

  Verbose tl;dr

  The popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files was compromised and used to inject malicious code into projects that utilized it. The attacker gained access to the action's repository and added code that exfiltrated environment variables, secrets, and other sensitive information during workflow runs. This action, used by over 23,000 repositories, became a supply chain vulnerability, potentially affecting numerous downstream projects. The maintainers have since regained control and removed the malicious code, but users are urged to review their workflows and rotate any potentially compromised secrets.

  The blog post "Tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action Compromised – used by over 23K repos" by Step Security details a security incident involving a popular GitHub Action, tj-actions/changed-files, which was compromised and used to inject malicious code into the build processes of repositories that depended on it. This action, utilized by over 23,000 repositories, provided a convenient way to identify files changed in a given commit, a common requirement for optimizing workflows.

  The attacker gained control of the tj-actions/changed-files repository by compromising the maintainer's account. They then introduced a malicious commit, specifically version 3.6.0, that included a backdoor. This backdoor injected a malicious script, ./setup.sh, disguised as a harmless setup script. When the compromised action was executed, this script would download and execute a second-stage payload from a remote server controlled by the attacker. This second payload was capable of exfiltrating sensitive information, such as environment variables, secrets, and repository contents, from the affected workflows.

  The blog post emphasizes the severe security implications of this type of supply chain attack, where a compromised dependency can affect a large number of downstream users. It highlights the importance of verifying the integrity and provenance of third-party actions before incorporating them into CI/CD pipelines.

  The post outlines several mitigation strategies for those who may have used the compromised version. These include immediately reviewing workflow logs for suspicious activity, rotating any potentially exposed secrets, and pinning the action to a known safe version (such as 3.5.1 or earlier) or migrating to an alternative solution. The post specifically suggests the dorny/paths-filter action as a secure replacement.

  Furthermore, the article discusses broader best practices for securing GitHub Actions workflows. It recommends using OpenID Connect (OIDC) to limit the need for long-lived secrets, enabling branch protection rules to prevent unauthorized modifications to workflows, and adopting least-privilege access for GitHub Actions tokens. It also advocates for the development of mechanisms to detect anomalous behavior in workflows and alert administrators to potential compromises, such as unexpected network connections or the execution of unfamiliar scripts. The incident underlines the critical need for continuous vigilance and proactive security measures in the software supply chain.

  • GitHub
  • GitHub Actions
  • Security
  • Software Supply Chain Security
  • Supply Chain Attack
  • Compromised Action
  • tj-actions/changed-files
  • Software Security
  • Cybersecurity
  • Open Source Security
  • Dependency Security
  • Vulnerability
  • malicious code
  • code injection
  • Security Best Practices
  • Security Alert

  Summary of Comments ( 205 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43367987

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users discussed the implications of the tj-actions/changed-files compromise, focusing on the surprising longevity of the vulnerability (2 years) and the potential impact on the 23,000+ repositories using it. Several commenters questioned the security practices of relying on third-party GitHub Actions without thorough vetting, emphasizing the need for auditing dependencies and using pinned versions. The ease with which a seemingly innocuous action could be compromised highlighted the broader security risks within the software supply chain. Some users pointed out the irony of a security-focused action being the source of vulnerability, while others discussed the challenges of maintaining open-source projects and the pressure to keep dependencies updated. A few commenters also suggested alternative approaches for achieving similar functionality without relying on third-party actions.

  The Hacker News post discussing the compromise of the tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action has a substantial number of comments exploring various facets of the incident and its implications.

  Several commenters discuss the nature of the vulnerability and the attacker's approach. Some point out the seemingly unsophisticated nature of the attack, highlighting the injected code's straightforward execution of a malicious payload without much obfuscation or stealth. Others analyze the specific mechanism of the compromise, noting how the attacker gained access to the maintainer's account and modified the action to include the malicious script. The relative ease with which this popular action was compromised raises concerns about the security of the software supply chain and the potential for similar attacks in the future.

  A significant thread of discussion revolves around the responsibilities of open-source maintainers and the challenges they face. Commenters acknowledge the substantial workload often borne by maintainers who volunteer their time and expertise. The incident underscores the difficulty of securing open-source projects, particularly those with a large user base, and the potential consequences of compromised dependencies. Some suggest potential solutions, including increased scrutiny of third-party actions, improved security practices for maintainers, and the development of tools to detect malicious code in actions. The discussion also touches upon the financial aspect of open-source maintenance and the need for better support and resources for maintainers.

  Several users express frustration with GitHub's handling of the situation, particularly the perceived lack of communication and transparency. Some commenters criticize the platform's security measures and suggest improvements, such as stricter verification processes for actions and more robust mechanisms for detecting and responding to compromises. Others point out the difficulty of verifying the integrity of third-party code and the need for better tools and practices to address this challenge.

  The impact of the compromise on the broader software ecosystem is also a topic of discussion. Commenters speculate on the potential consequences for the thousands of repositories that rely on the affected action, including the possibility of data breaches and other security incidents. The incident highlights the interconnected nature of the software supply chain and the potential for widespread damage from a single compromised component. Some users share their experiences dealing with the fallout from the incident, including the steps they took to mitigate the risk and ensure the security of their projects.

  Finally, there's a thread discussing the importance of supply chain security in general and the need for increased vigilance and proactive measures to protect against similar attacks in the future. Commenters suggest various strategies, including code signing, multi-factor authentication, and regular security audits. The incident serves as a wake-up call for the software development community, emphasizing the need for a more robust and secure approach to managing dependencies and protecting the software supply chain.