Stories with Tag software vulnerabilities

• Nvidia Security Team: “What if we just stopped using C?” (2022)

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  Posted: 2025-02-10 09:16:04

  Verbose tl;dr

  Nvidia's security team advocates shifting away from C/C++ due to its susceptibility to memory-related vulnerabilities, which account for a significant portion of their reported security issues. They propose embracing memory-safe languages like Rust, Go, and Java to improve the security posture of their products and reduce the time and resources spent on vulnerability remediation. While acknowledging the performance benefits often associated with C/C++, they argue that modern memory-safe languages offer comparable performance while significantly mitigating security risks. This shift requires overcoming challenges like retraining engineers and integrating new tools, but Nvidia believes the long-term security gains outweigh the transitional costs.

  In a 2022 blog post titled "Nvidia Security Team: 'What if we just stopped using C?'" hosted on the AdaCore blog, the author discusses a presentation given by Nvidia's security team exploring the possibility of transitioning away from C and C++ in their codebase due to the inherent security risks associated with these languages. The post emphasizes the prevalence of memory safety vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, use-after-free errors, and double frees, which plague C and C++ development and contribute significantly to exploitable security flaws. These vulnerabilities arise from the manual memory management paradigm prevalent in these languages, giving developers extensive control over memory allocation and deallocation, but also leaving them prone to errors.

  The Nvidia team highlighted the increasing cost and complexity of mitigating these vulnerabilities, outlining the various techniques they currently employ, including code reviews, static analysis tools, and dynamic analysis tools like sanitizers. While acknowledging the effectiveness of these methods to a certain extent, they pointed out that these strategies are reactive rather than preventative and require significant ongoing investment. Furthermore, these mitigations don't address the root cause of the problem: the inherent unsafety of manual memory management.

  The post then elaborates on Nvidia's exploration of alternative, memory-safe languages like Rust, Go, and Ada. The blog post focuses particularly on Ada and SPARK, a formally verifiable subset of Ada, emphasizing their robust type system, compile-time error checking, and built-in memory safety features as attractive alternatives to the vulnerabilities of C and C++. The argument presented is that these languages, through their design and features, inherently prevent many of the memory-related vulnerabilities that plague C and C++, leading to more secure code by design.

  While acknowledging the significant undertaking of migrating away from a large, established C/C++ codebase, the Nvidia team expressed a belief that the long-term benefits in terms of improved security, reduced development costs associated with vulnerability mitigation, and a more robust and reliable software ecosystem justify the investment. The post concludes by highlighting Ada and SPARK as strong contenders for replacing C and C++ in safety-critical and security-sensitive applications, and portrays Nvidia's exploration as a significant indication of the growing industry interest in memory-safe languages for mitigating increasingly prevalent and costly security vulnerabilities. This exploration signals a potential shift in programming paradigms for large organizations concerned with software security, moving towards languages that prioritize memory safety by design.

  • Nvidia
  • Security
  • C Programming Language
  • Memory Safety
  • software vulnerabilities
  • Rust
  • C++
  • Ada
  • Programming Languages
  • Software Development
  • 2022

  Summary of Comments ( 148 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42998383

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News commenters largely agree with the AdaCore blog post's premise that C is a major source of vulnerabilities. Many point to Rust as a viable alternative, highlighting its memory safety features and performance. Some discuss the practical challenges of transitioning away from C, citing legacy codebases, tooling, and the existing expertise surrounding C. Others explore alternative approaches like formal verification or stricter coding standards for C. A few commenters push back on the idea of abandoning C entirely, arguing that its performance benefits and low-level control are still necessary for certain applications, and that focusing on better developer training and tools might be a more effective solution. The trade-offs between safety and performance are a recurring theme.

  The Hacker News post titled "Nvidia Security Team: “What if we just stopped using C?” (2022)" has generated a lively discussion with numerous comments. Many commenters agree with the premise that C is inherently unsafe and contributes significantly to software vulnerabilities. Several suggest Rust as a strong contender for replacing C, citing its memory safety features and performance characteristics.

  A recurring theme is the inertia within organizations and the perceived cost and effort of transitioning away from C. Some commenters express skepticism about the feasibility of such a move, particularly in large, established codebases. Others counter this by arguing that the long-term benefits of improved security and reduced maintenance outweigh the initial investment.

  Several compelling comments delve deeper into specific aspects:

  • Some discuss the cultural shift required within development teams to adopt new languages and practices. They emphasize the importance of training and education in ensuring a successful transition.
  • Others point out that while Rust offers advantages, it's not a silver bullet. It has a steeper learning curve than C and may not be suitable for all use cases, especially those requiring very low-level control or interaction with legacy systems.
  • The idea of gradual migration is also discussed, where new code is written in safer languages like Rust while existing C code is maintained or incrementally rewritten. This approach is seen as more pragmatic than a complete overhaul.
  • Some comments highlight the success stories of other companies that have adopted Rust, citing improved security and developer productivity. These examples serve as evidence for the practicality of transitioning away from C.
  • A few commenters raise the issue of tooling and ecosystem maturity. While the Rust ecosystem is rapidly evolving, it's not as mature as C's, which could pose challenges for certain projects.
  • The performance comparison between C and Rust is also a point of discussion. While Rust is generally considered performant, there are specific scenarios where C might offer slight advantages, though these are becoming increasingly rare.

  The comments overall reflect a general sentiment that while moving away from C is a significant undertaking, it is a necessary step towards building more secure and reliable software. The discussion acknowledges the complexities and challenges involved but also expresses optimism about the potential benefits and the growing momentum behind safer alternatives like Rust.

• U.S. Government Disclosed 39 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in 2023, First-Ever Report

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  Posted: 2025-02-06 14:35:04

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  A newly released U.S. government report reveals that 39 zero-day vulnerabilities were disclosed in 2023. This marks the first time the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has publicly shared this data, which is gathered through its Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (VDP). The report covers vulnerabilities affecting a range of vendors, including Google, Apple, and Microsoft, and provides insights into the types of vulnerabilities reported, though specific details are withheld to prevent exploitation. The goal of this increased transparency is to improve vulnerability remediation efforts and bolster overall cybersecurity.

  The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), a crucial component of the United States government's cybersecurity apparatus, has released its inaugural report detailing the disclosure of zero-day vulnerabilities throughout the calendar year 2023. This landmark report, mandated by the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA), sheds light on a critical aspect of national cybersecurity: the identification and mitigation of software flaws exploited by malicious actors before developers have the opportunity to create and deploy patches. The report reveals a significant number of such vulnerabilities, precisely 39, affecting a wide range of software products utilized across diverse sectors of critical infrastructure.

  The disclosed vulnerabilities, classified as zero-days due to their active exploitation prior to public knowledge and patch availability, represent a significant threat to national security and economic stability. These vulnerabilities can be leveraged by adversaries, including nation-state actors, cybercriminals, and hacktivist groups, to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, disrupt essential services, exfiltrate confidential data, and potentially cause substantial physical damage. The CISA report meticulously documents each vulnerability, providing detailed information on the affected vendor, product, assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier, and the date of public disclosure. This comprehensive approach aims to enhance transparency and facilitate a more coordinated response from both government entities and private sector organizations.

  The 39 vulnerabilities detailed in the report impacted a range of vendors, including prominent technology companies such as Google, Apple, and Microsoft. The affected products encompass various operating systems, web browsers, and other commonly used software applications integral to the functioning of critical infrastructure sectors like healthcare, energy, transportation, and financial services. The timely disclosure of these vulnerabilities, facilitated by CISA's established reporting mechanisms, is crucial for enabling affected vendors to develop and disseminate necessary security patches, thereby mitigating the risks associated with active exploitation. Furthermore, the report emphasizes the importance of proactive vulnerability management practices and encourages organizations to prioritize patching efforts and implement robust security controls to minimize their exposure to zero-day exploits.

  This first-of-its-kind report from CISA signifies a pivotal step towards bolstering national cybersecurity resilience. By providing a comprehensive overview of disclosed zero-day vulnerabilities, CISA empowers organizations to better understand the evolving threat landscape and take proactive measures to safeguard their systems against these sophisticated attacks. The report also underscores the ongoing need for collaboration between government and industry to effectively address the shared challenge of identifying, disclosing, and mitigating zero-day vulnerabilities. The insights gleaned from this annual reporting requirement will undoubtedly inform future cybersecurity strategies and contribute to a more secure and resilient digital ecosystem for the nation.

  • Cybersecurity
  • zero-day
  • Vulnerability
  • US Government
  • disclosure
  • CISA
  • National Security
  • software vulnerabilities
  • cyber attacks
  • information security
  • 2023 report
  • vulnerability disclosure program
  • VDP

  Summary of Comments ( 23 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42962702

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users discussed the implications of the US government's first-ever report on zero-day vulnerability disclosures. Some questioned the low number of 39 vulnerabilities, speculating it represents only a small fraction of those actually discovered, with many likely being kept secret for offensive purposes. Others pointed out the inherent limitations in expecting complete transparency from intelligence agencies. Several comments highlighted the report's ambiguity regarding the definition of "zero-day," and whether it includes vulnerabilities actively exploited in the wild. There was also discussion around the value of such disclosures, with some arguing it benefits adversaries more than defenders. Finally, some commenters expressed concern about the potential for the government to hoard vulnerabilities for offensive capabilities, rather than prioritizing patching and defense.

  The Hacker News post discussing the U.S. government's disclosure of 39 zero-day vulnerabilities in 2023 has generated several comments. Many commenters focus on the implications of the report and the government's vulnerability equities process (VEP).

  One compelling line of discussion revolves around the question of whether disclosing 39 vulnerabilities is a high or low number. Some commenters express surprise that the number isn't higher, considering the vast attack surface the U.S. government manages. Others point out that the number might be understated, as the report only covers vulnerabilities discovered by the government itself, not those reported to them by third parties. There's also speculation about the severity of the disclosed vulnerabilities, as the report doesn't offer details on their impact.

  Another key area of discussion centers around the government's decision-making process regarding vulnerability disclosure. Commenters discuss the inherent tension between using vulnerabilities for intelligence gathering and protecting national security by patching them. Some express skepticism about the government's claim that they prioritize patching, while others acknowledge the difficult balancing act involved in the VEP. The lack of transparency in the VEP is also a recurring theme, with commenters calling for more insight into the criteria used for making disclosure decisions.

  Several commenters raise concerns about the potential for these disclosures to be weaponized by malicious actors. They point out that even with responsible disclosure, there's a window of vulnerability between the announcement and the release of patches, which attackers can exploit. This leads to a discussion about the importance of timely patching and the responsibility of software vendors to respond quickly to vulnerability reports.

  Finally, some comments focus on the significance of the report itself. Some see it as a positive step towards greater transparency and accountability, while others remain critical of the limited information provided. There's also discussion about the broader implications of government involvement in vulnerability research and disclosure, and the need for a clear legal and ethical framework for these activities.