Stories with Tag Security Vulnerability

• Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname

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  Posted: 2025-04-19 18:44:17

  Verbose tl;dr

  A vulnerability was reported against SSL.com, a Certificate Authority (CA), allowing fraudulent issuance of SSL certificates for arbitrary MX hostnames. Their domain control validation (DCV) process was flawed: by setting specific TXT records, an attacker could bypass verification checks and obtain certificates for domains they didn't own, potentially enabling man-in-the-middle attacks. SSL.com confirmed and addressed the issue, revoking the fraudulently issued certificates. Mozilla subsequently added SSL.com to their CA incident database.

  This Mozilla bug report details a critical vulnerability discovered within the SSL.com certificate issuance process, potentially enabling malicious actors to fraudulently obtain SSL/TLS certificates for arbitrary mail exchange (MX) hostnames. The core issue stems from SSL.com's flawed domain control validation (DCV) procedures, specifically related to their handling of DNS-based DCV for email domains. Legitimate certificate issuance requires applicants to prove they control the domain for which they are requesting a certificate. One common method involves adding specific DNS records to the domain's DNS zone file. SSL.com purportedly offered a DCV method allowing applicants to create a specific DNS record within the _smtp._tcp service record of their MX domain.

  However, the report reveals that SSL.com's system apparently failed to properly validate the actual MX record resolution. This oversight allowed an attacker, without any control over a target domain, to create the necessary DCV DNS record on a domain they controlled, point an MX record at that domain, and successfully complete the DCV process. This effectively bypassed the intended domain ownership verification, allowing the attacker to obtain a valid certificate for the target's MX hostname, even though they held no legitimate authority over it. Such a fraudulent certificate could then be used to intercept and decrypt email traffic destined for the target domain, posing a significant security risk.

  The reporter demonstrated this vulnerability by successfully obtaining a certificate for mx.mozilla.com without having any legitimate control over the mozilla.com domain. They highlighted that this issue could affect any domain utilizing SSL.com's specific MX-based DCV method. The severity of the vulnerability was underscored by the potential for widespread email interception and the undermining of trust in digital certificates issued by SSL.com. The reporter strongly urged prompt action to address this flaw and revoke any potentially fraudulently issued certificates.

  • SSL
  • TLS
  • Certificate Authority
  • CA
  • SSL.com
  • Domain Control Validation
  • DCV
  • MX Record
  • Hostname
  • Fake Certificate
  • Security Vulnerability
  • Bugzilla
  • Mozilla
  • Phishing
  • Spoofing

  Summary of Comments ( 58 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43738485

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News commenters discuss the severity and implications of the SSL.com vulnerability, with some downplaying its impact due to the requirement of compromising an email account first. Several highlight the unusual nature of DCV through email, questioning its security compared to other methods like DNS or HTTP. The discussion also touches on the complexities of certificate issuance and the potential for abuse, with one commenter suggesting the core issue lies in the CA's trust and the difficulty of verifying domain ownership reliably. Others point out that this vulnerability isn't new and express frustration with the slow response from CAs. The conversation also drifts towards the broader issue of CA trust and the need for better systems, with some suggesting decentralized solutions. Finally, a few comments mention the irony of a security company like SSL.com having such a vulnerability.

  The Hacker News post titled "Ssl.com: DCV bypass and issue fake certificates for any MX hostname" (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43738485) has several comments discussing the implications of the vulnerability described in the linked Bugzilla report.

  Several commenters express surprise and concern over the severity of the vulnerability, allowing the issuance of fake certificates for arbitrary MX hostnames. One commenter highlights the potential for significant damage, noting that email servers could be impersonated, leading to interception of sensitive information. The ease with which the vulnerability could be exploited is also mentioned, emphasizing the risk it posed.

  The discussion delves into the technical details of the vulnerability, with commenters explaining how the Domain Control Validation (DCV) process was bypassed. Specifically, the comments mention how ssl.com's system misinterpreted specific responses, allowing an attacker to claim control over a domain they didn't own. The conversation also touches upon the complexities of properly implementing and securing the various DCV methods.

  Some commenters question the responsibility of Certificate Authorities (CAs) in preventing such vulnerabilities, suggesting more rigorous checks and validation procedures. The impact on trust in the certificate ecosystem is also a point of discussion, with concerns raised about the potential erosion of user confidence in online security.

  One commenter questions the response time and transparency of ssl.com in addressing the issue. Others speculate on the potential motivations and technical capabilities of actors who might exploit such a vulnerability.

  The comments also explore the broader implications for email security and the challenges of maintaining a secure online environment in the face of constantly evolving threats. The vulnerability is framed within the context of larger systemic issues surrounding digital certificate issuance and validation.

• We hacked Gemini's Python sandbox and leaked its source code (at least some)

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  Posted: 2025-03-28 18:12:58

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  Security researchers exploited a vulnerability in Gemini's sandboxed Python execution environment, allowing them to access and leak parts of Gemini's source code. They achieved this by manipulating how Python's pickle module interacts with the restricted environment, effectively bypassing the intended security measures. While claiming no malicious intent and having reported the vulnerability responsibly, the researchers demonstrated the potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information within Gemini's system. The leaked code included portions related to data retrieval and formatting, but the full extent of the exposed code and its potential impact on Gemini's security are not fully detailed.

  This blog post by Lance Hilliard details a successful exploit of the code execution sandbox used by Google's Gemini language model. The author's primary goal was to assess the security of Gemini's sandboxing mechanism, particularly its ability to prevent access to sensitive information like the model's internal source code. Hilliard achieved this by crafting a series of increasingly sophisticated prompts designed to manipulate Gemini into revealing file paths and ultimately exfiltrating code.

  Initially, Hilliard employed basic prompts requesting information about the system's environment. While Gemini blocked direct requests for sensitive data, it inadvertently revealed the existence of a file named prompts.py through an error message. This unintentional disclosure served as a crucial starting point for the subsequent attack.

  Capitalizing on this discovery, Hilliard devised a strategy using Python's traceback module. By intentionally triggering an error within a hypothetical prompts.py file, he could manipulate the error output to display file contents. Gemini, attempting to provide helpful debugging information in the context of the hypothetical scenario, inadvertently leaked portions of the actual prompts.py file located within its sandboxed environment.

  This method, however, had limitations. The traceback output was truncated, revealing only snippets of the code. To circumvent this, Hilliard devised a more elaborate scheme leveraging Python's inspect module. This module allows introspection of code objects, including access to their source code. By carefully constructing a prompt that invoked inspect.getsource on the previously identified prompts.py file, Hilliard was able to extract larger portions of the source code. The blog post includes examples of both the crafted prompts and the resulting output, demonstrating the successful exfiltration of code related to prompt processing and logging.

  While the obtained code snippets don't reveal the core workings of the Gemini model itself, they offer valuable insights into Gemini's pre- and post-processing mechanisms. The author emphasizes that this exploit demonstrates a vulnerability in Gemini's sandboxing approach, particularly its susceptibility to attacks based on manipulating error handling and code introspection functionalities. Hilliard concludes by speculating on potential improvements to Gemini's sandboxing, such as stricter control over imported modules and more robust sanitization of error messages, to prevent similar exploits in the future. The author also notes the responsible disclosure process followed, indicating they communicated the vulnerability to Google before publicly disclosing the details.

  • Gemini
  • Google Gemini
  • Python
  • Sandbox Escape
  • Source Code Leak
  • Security Vulnerability
  • hacking
  • Software Security
  • AI Security
  • Large Language Model
  • LLM
  • code injection

  Summary of Comments ( 120 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43508418

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users discussed the Gemini hack and subsequent source code leak, focusing on the sandbox escape vulnerability exploited. Several questioned the practicality and security implications of running untrusted Python code within Gemini, especially given the availability of more secure and robust sandboxing solutions. Some highlighted the inherent difficulties in completely sandboxing Python, while others pointed out the existence of existing tools and libraries, like gVisor, designed for such tasks. A few users found the technical details of the exploit interesting, while others expressed concern about the potential impact on Gemini's development and future. The overall sentiment was one of cautious skepticism towards Gemini's approach to code execution security.

  The Hacker News post "We hacked Gemini's Python sandbox and leaked its source code (at least some)" generated several comments discussing the Gemini sandbox escape and subsequent source code leak. Many commenters focused on the technical details of the exploit, particularly the use of inspect and gc modules within the restricted Python environment. Some expressed surprise at the vulnerability given Google's resources and expertise.

  A recurring theme was the difficulty of sandboxing Python effectively. Several users pointed out the inherent challenges in securing a dynamic language like Python, especially when providing access to powerful introspection features. The discussion touched upon various sandboxing approaches, including using separate processes, virtual machines, or custom interpreters, with commenters acknowledging the trade-offs between security and performance.

  Some comments questioned the ethics and motivations behind publishing the exploit and leaked code, while others argued that responsible disclosure necessitates some level of public demonstration. There was debate about the potential impact of the leak, with some downplaying its significance due to the limited scope of the exposed code, while others suggested it could reveal valuable insights into Gemini's internal workings.

  Several commenters praised the ingenuity of the exploit, describing it as a clever demonstration of Python's flexibility and the inherent difficulty in fully constraining its capabilities. The use of gc.get_objects() to bypass restrictions was highlighted as particularly ingenious.

  The discussion also extended to the broader implications for large language models (LLMs) and the challenges of securing their increasingly complex functionalities. Some users speculated about the possibility of further exploits and the need for improved sandboxing techniques in the LLM space. There was also some discussion about the legal and ethical implications of accessing and publishing proprietary code, even in the context of security research. Overall, the comments reflect a mix of technical analysis, ethical considerations, and speculation about the future of LLM security.

• Removing Jeff Bezos from My Bed

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  Posted: 2025-02-21 16:27:54

  Verbose tl;dr

  The blog post "Removing Jeff Bezos from My Bed" details the author's humorous, yet slightly unsettling, experience with Amazon's Echo Show 15 and its personalized recommendations. The author found that the device, positioned in their bedroom, consistently suggested purchasing a large, framed portrait of Jeff Bezos. While acknowledging the technical mechanisms likely behind this odd recommendation (facial recognition misidentification and correlated browsing data), they highlight the potential for such personalized advertising to become intrusive and even creepy within the intimate space of a bedroom. The post emphasizes the need for more thoughtful consideration of the placement and application of AI-powered advertising, especially as smart devices become increasingly integrated into our homes.

  In a richly detailed and engagingly humorous narrative presented on the Truffle Security blog, the author recounts their somewhat surreal and ultimately frustrating experience with a malfunctioning Amazon Echo Show device. The chronicle begins with the innocent purchase of said device, motivated by the perfectly reasonable desire to have a smart alarm clock and access to readily available information. This initial acquisition leads to the unexpected and rather unsettling discovery of Jeff Bezos, Amazon's founder and former CEO, appearing on the Echo Show's screen. Not as a static image, mind you, but as an animated, almost lifelike presence that the author describes, with a touch of whimsical hyperbole, as "haunting" their bedside.

  The author meticulously details the escalating stages of their attempts to exorcise this digital Bezos from their bedroom sanctuary. Initially, they attempt to resolve the issue through conventional means, meticulously navigating the labyrinthine menus of the device's settings. This proves fruitless, leading to a progressively more desperate series of troubleshooting steps. They unplug the device, only to have the spectral Bezos reappear upon reconnection. They consult online forums, seeking solace and solutions from the collective wisdom of the internet, but find only echoes of their own bewilderment. They even resort to the drastic measure of a factory reset, a digital equivalent of starting from scratch, yet even this fails to banish the persistent presence of the virtual Bezos.

  Throughout this technological ordeal, the author maintains a witty and self-deprecating tone, interspersing their technical frustrations with amusing anecdotes and observations. They describe the absurdity of the situation, highlighting the contrast between the mundane desire for a simple alarm clock and the unexpected intrusion of a tech mogul into their personal space. The narrative culminates in the reluctant acceptance of defeat, with the author conceding to the continued presence of the digital Bezos, albeit with a newfound appreciation for the unexpected quirks and occasional absurdities of modern technology. The post concludes with a lingering sense of unresolved mystery, leaving the reader to ponder the true nature of this peculiar technological encounter. Was it a software glitch, a hardware malfunction, or perhaps something even stranger? The answer, it seems, remains elusive.

  • IoT Security
  • smart home
  • privacy
  • Security Vulnerability
  • connected devices
  • alexa
  • amazon echo
  • voice assistants
  • surveillance
  • Data Collection
  • Cybersecurity
  • Home Automation
  • vulnerability disclosure
  • responsible disclosure
  • Ethical Hacking

  Summary of Comments ( 8 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43129439

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users generally found the linked blog post humorous and relatable. Several commenters shared similar experiences with unwanted targeted ads, highlighting the creepiness factor and questioning the effectiveness of such highly personalized marketing. Some discussed the technical aspects of how these ads are generated, speculating about data collection practices and the algorithms involved. A few expressed concerns about privacy and the potential for misuse of personal information. Others simply appreciated the author's witty writing style and the absurdity of the situation. The top comment humorously suggested an alternative headline: "Man Discovers Retargeting."

  The Hacker News post "Removing Jeff Bezos from My Bed" (linking to a Truffle Security blog post of the same name) generated a moderate amount of discussion, with a number of commenters focusing on the technical aspects of smart home integrations and the inherent security and privacy risks they present.

  Several commenters echoed the author's concerns about the pervasiveness of smart devices and the potential for unintended consequences, particularly regarding data collection and privacy. One commenter highlighted the irony of adding complexity to simplify life, noting the potential for things to break down and the resulting frustration. This sentiment was shared by others who expressed skepticism about the supposed benefits of smart home technology compared to its potential downsides.

  Discussion also arose around the specific vulnerabilities of connecting disparate systems. One user pointed out the potential dangers of allowing third-party applications, like the sleep tracking app mentioned in the article, access to core home automation systems. They emphasized that even if individual components are secure, the integration points can introduce vulnerabilities. Another user underscored the risk of relying on cloud services for local network device control, potentially exposing the entire system to outside access through vulnerabilities in the cloud infrastructure.

  The technical details of the author's setup and potential solutions were also debated. Some users suggested alternative approaches to achieve similar functionality without relying on cloud-based integration. One commenter specifically recommended using Home Assistant, an open-source home automation platform, highlighting its local control capabilities and flexibility. Others discussed the benefits and drawbacks of different communication protocols like MQTT and the trade-offs between convenience and security.

  While some users found the blog post's tone humorous, others criticized it for being overly dramatic or for implying that the issues described are unique to Amazon's ecosystem. They argued that similar risks exist with other smart home platforms and that the core problem is the inherent complexity of integrating numerous devices and services.

  Finally, a few commenters offered anecdotes of their own experiences with smart home quirks and failures, further emphasizing the potential for unintended consequences when relying on interconnected technology. These personal accounts resonated with the overall theme of the discussion, highlighting the real-world implications of the security and privacy concerns raised in the blog post.

• AMD: Microcode Signature Verification Vulnerability

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  Posted: 2025-02-03 17:59:13

  Verbose tl;dr

  A high-severity vulnerability, dubbed "SQUIP," affects AMD EPYC server processors. This flaw allows attackers with administrative privileges to inject malicious microcode updates, bypassing AMD's signature verification mechanism. Successful exploitation could enable persistent malware, data theft, or system disruption, even surviving operating system reinstalls. While AMD has released patches and updated documentation, system administrators must apply the necessary BIOS updates to mitigate the risk. This vulnerability underscores the importance of secure firmware update processes and highlights the potential impact of compromised low-level system components.

  A significant security vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2023-20593, has been discovered in AMD processors, specifically affecting the Platform Security Processor (PSP). This vulnerability pertains to the microcode update mechanism, a critical process for patching and improving the functionality of the processor's firmware. The core issue lies in the insufficient verification of the cryptographic signatures of microcode updates.

  In properly functioning systems, each microcode update is digitally signed by AMD to guarantee its authenticity and integrity. This signature ensures that the update originates from a trusted source and has not been tampered with. The vulnerability, however, exposes a weakness in the PSP's signature verification process. This weakness allows for the loading and execution of maliciously crafted microcode updates bearing forged or invalid signatures. Because the PSP operates with high privileges, a successful exploit of this vulnerability could grant an attacker near-total control over the affected system.

  The impact of this vulnerability is substantial. A compromised PSP could enable an attacker to bypass security measures, install persistent malware, exfiltrate sensitive data, or even render the system unusable. The privileged nature of the PSP effectively makes it the root of trust for the system; compromising this root allows for the subversion of nearly all other security mechanisms. This means that standard operating system security features, like secure boot, may be circumvented.

  This vulnerability affects a wide range of AMD processors, including those found in both consumer and server platforms. The specific models affected are detailed in the advisory, spanning multiple generations of EPY, Ryzen, and Threadripper CPUs. AMD has acknowledged the vulnerability and released updated AGESA firmware to address the issue. System manufacturers are responsible for incorporating these AGESA updates into their BIOS/UEFI releases, and users are strongly encouraged to apply these updates as soon as they become available from their respective vendors. The fix involves strengthening the signature verification process within the PSP, ensuring that only authentically signed microcode updates are accepted and executed. This corrected verification process mitigates the risk of malicious code execution stemming from forged or otherwise invalid microcode updates. Users should prioritize installing these updates to protect their systems from potential exploitation.

  • AMD
  • Microcode
  • Security Vulnerability
  • Signature Verification
  • CVE-2023-20593
  • Firmware
  • CPU
  • Processor
  • Exploit
  • GHSA-4xq7-4mgh-gp6w
  • Google Security Research
  • x86
  • Hardware Security

  Summary of Comments ( 48 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42920921

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News users discussed the implications of AMD's microcode signature verification vulnerability, expressing concern about the severity and potential for exploitation. Some questioned the practical exploitability given the secure boot process and the difficulty of injecting malicious microcode, while others highlighted the significant potential damage if exploited, including bypassing hypervisors and gaining kernel-level access. The discussion also touched upon the complexity of microcode updates and the challenges in verifying their integrity, with some users suggesting hardware-based solutions for enhanced security. Several commenters praised Google for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability and AMD for promptly addressing it. The overall sentiment reflected a cautious acknowledgement of the risk, balanced by the understanding that exploitation likely requires significant resources and sophistication.

  The Hacker News post titled "AMD: Microcode Signature Verification Vulnerability" (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42920921) has a moderate number of comments discussing various aspects of the vulnerability and its implications.

  Several commenters delve into the technical details of the exploit, highlighting the complexity involved in carrying it out. One user points out that exploiting this vulnerability requires administrative privileges, significantly limiting the risk for average users. They emphasize the difficulty of achieving arbitrary code execution, suggesting that an attacker would need to chain this exploit with another vulnerability to gain full control.

  Another commenter questions the practicality of the attack, suggesting it might be easier to simply reflash the SPI flash directly. This raises a discussion about the different security layers and attack vectors available. Others chime in to discuss the specific scenarios where this particular vulnerability might be relevant, such as in highly secure environments or targeted attacks where physical access is limited.

  A few commenters discuss the disclosure process and commend Google for responsibly reporting the vulnerability to AMD. They also discuss the potential impact on various AMD products and the mitigation efforts being undertaken.

  Some users express concern about the potential for similar vulnerabilities in other hardware components, highlighting the ongoing challenge of securing complex systems. The conversation touches upon the broader security implications of microcode vulnerabilities and the importance of robust verification mechanisms.

  A couple of comments delve into the technical details of microcode updates and the role of Secure Boot in preventing malicious code execution. This leads to a discussion about the effectiveness of different security measures and the limitations of relying solely on microcode signatures for verification.

  While no single comment overwhelmingly dominates the discussion, the collective conversation paints a picture of a complex vulnerability with limited practical exploitability for average users, but potentially significant implications in specific scenarios. The comments highlight the ongoing cat-and-mouse game between security researchers and attackers, and the importance of continuous improvement in hardware security.