Firefox now fully enforces Certificate Transparency (CT) logging for all TLS certificates, significantly bolstering web security. This means that all newly issued website certificates must be publicly logged in approved CT logs for Firefox to trust them. This measure prevents malicious actors from secretly issuing fraudulent certificates for popular websites, as such certificates would not appear in the public logs and thus be rejected by Firefox. This enhances user privacy and security by making it considerably harder for attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Firefox’s complete enforcement of CT marks a major milestone for internet security, setting a strong precedent for other browsers to follow.
Httptap is a command-line tool for Linux that intercepts and displays HTTP and HTTPS traffic generated by any specified program. It works by injecting a dynamic library into the target process, allowing it to capture requests and responses before they reach the network stack. This provides a convenient way to observe the HTTP communication of applications without requiring proxies or modifying their source code. Httptap presents the captured data in a human-readable format, showing details like headers, body content, and timing information.
Hacker News users discuss httptap, focusing on its potential uses and comparing it to existing tools. Some praise its simplicity and ease of use for quickly inspecting HTTP traffic, particularly for debugging. Others suggest alternative tools like mitmproxy, tcpdump, and Wireshark, highlighting their more advanced features, such as SSL decryption and broader protocol support. The conversation also touches on the limitations of httptap, including its current lack of HTTPS decryption and potential performance impact. Several commenters express interest in contributing features, particularly HTTPS support. Overall, the sentiment is positive, with many appreciating httptap as a lightweight and convenient option for simple HTTP inspection.
Summary of Comments ( 78 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43175793
HN commenters generally praise Mozilla for implementing Certificate Transparency (CT) enforcement in Firefox, viewing it as a significant boost to web security. Some express concern about the potential for increased centralization and the impact on smaller Certificate Authorities (CAs). A few suggest that CT logs themselves are a single point of failure and advocate for further decentralization. There's also discussion around the practical implications of CT enforcement, such as the risk of legitimate websites being temporarily inaccessible due to log issues, and the need for robust monitoring and alerting systems. One compelling comment highlights the significant decrease in mis-issued certificates since the introduction of CT, emphasizing its positive impact. Another points out the potential for domain fronting abuse being impacted by CT enforcement.
The Hacker News post discussing Mozilla's blog post about Certificate Transparency in Firefox has generated a moderate number of comments, most of which express general approval of the move toward greater transparency and security.
Several commenters delve into the technical intricacies of Certificate Transparency (CT) and its implementation. One commenter points out the importance of CT logs being available and questions the robustness of the system if a major log provider were to experience an outage. Another echoes this concern, emphasizing the need for redundancy and geographically diverse log servers to prevent single points of failure. They also discuss the potential performance implications of browser-side CT enforcement, though they acknowledge that the impact is likely minimal with modern hardware.
Another thread discusses the issue of "rogue" Certificate Authorities (CAs) and how CT helps to mitigate the risks associated with them. Commenters explain that while CT doesn't prevent a rogue CA from issuing a certificate, it does make it much harder for them to do so undetected, as the certificate would be publicly logged and visible to scrutiny. This increased visibility acts as a deterrent and allows for quicker identification and revocation of improperly issued certificates.
A few commenters touch upon the history of CT and its gradual adoption by browsers and CAs. They express satisfaction that Firefox is now fully enforcing CT, bringing it in line with other major browsers and further solidifying the technology's role in web security.
One commenter raises the concern that while CT is beneficial, it also introduces a new potential attack vector: the CT logs themselves. If a malicious actor were to compromise a CT log, they could potentially insert fake entries or suppress legitimate ones. However, other users counter this point by explaining the mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of CT logs, such as Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) and the distributed nature of the logs.
Some of the more technically inclined commenters discuss the nuances of different CT log implementations and the challenges associated with monitoring and auditing them. They also touch upon the potential for using CT data for purposes beyond security, such as research and analysis of certificate issuance trends.
Overall, the comments on the Hacker News post reflect a positive reception to Firefox's implementation of mandatory CT. While some concerns and potential challenges are raised, the general consensus is that CT represents a significant advancement in web security and that its widespread adoption is a positive development for the internet.