Huntress Labs researchers uncovered a campaign where Russian-speaking actors impersonated the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) to distribute the Stealc information-stealing malware. Using a fake EFF domain and mimicking the organization's visual branding, the attackers lured victims with promises of privacy-enhancing tools, instead delivering a malicious installer. This installer deployed Stealc, designed to pilfer sensitive data like passwords, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet information. The campaign leveraged the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA and utilized Pyramid, a new command-and-control framework, to manage infected machines. This represents a concerning trend of threat actors exploiting trusted organizations to distribute increasingly sophisticated malware.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed multiple Russia-aligned threat actors, including APT29 (Cozy Bear) and Sandworm, actively targeting Signal users. These campaigns primarily focused on stealing authentication material from Signal servers, likely to bypass Signal's robust encryption and gain access to user communications. Although Signal's server-side infrastructure was targeted, the attackers needed physical access to the device to complete the compromise, significantly limiting the attack's effectiveness. While Signal's encryption remains unbroken, the targeting underscores the lengths to which nation-state actors will go to compromise secure communications.
HN commenters express skepticism about the Google blog post, questioning its timing and motivations. Some suggest it's a PR move by Google, designed to distract from their own security issues or promote their own messaging platforms. Others point out the lack of technical details in the post, making it difficult to assess the credibility of the claims. A few commenters discuss the inherent difficulties of securing any messaging platform against determined state-sponsored actors and the importance of robust security practices regardless of the provider. The possibility of phishing campaigns, rather than Signal vulnerabilities, being the attack vector is also raised. Finally, some commenters highlight the broader context of the ongoing conflict and the increased targeting of communication platforms.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has revealed ScatterBrain, a sophisticated obfuscator used by the PoisonPlug threat actor to disguise malicious JavaScript code injected into compromised routers. ScatterBrain employs multiple layers of obfuscation, including encoding, encryption, and polymorphism, making analysis and detection significantly more difficult. This obfuscator is used to hide malicious payloads delivered through PoisonPlug, which primarily targets SOHO routers, enabling the attackers to perform tasks like credential theft, traffic redirection, and arbitrary command execution. This discovery underscores the increasing sophistication of router-targeting malware and highlights the importance of robust router security practices.
HN commenters generally praised the technical depth and clarity of the Google TAG blog post. Several highlighted the sophistication of the PoisonPlug malware, particularly its use of DLL search order hijacking and process injection techniques. Some discussed the challenges of malware analysis and reverse engineering, with one commenter expressing skepticism about the long-term effectiveness of such analyses due to the constantly evolving nature of malware. Others pointed out the crucial role of threat intelligence in understanding and mitigating these kinds of threats. A few commenters also noted the irony of a Google security team exposing malware hosted on Google Cloud Storage.
Summary of Comments ( 5 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43283884
Hacker News users discussed the sophistication of the Stealc malware operation, particularly its use of Telegram for command-and-control and its rapid iteration to incorporate features from other malware. Some questioned the attribution to Russian actors solely based on language, highlighting the prevalence of Russian speakers in the cybersecurity world regardless of nationality. Others pointed out the irony of using "EFF" in the impersonation, given the Electronic Frontier Foundation's focus on privacy and security. The effectiveness of the multi-stage infection process, including the use of legitimate services like Discord and Telegram, was also noted. Several commenters discussed the blog post's technical depth, appreciating the clear explanation of the malware's functionality and the investigation process. Finally, some users expressed skepticism about the actual impact of such malware, suggesting the targets are likely low-value and the operation more opportunistic than targeted.
The Hacker News post titled "Exposing Russian EFF Impersonators: The Inside Story on Stealc and Pyramid C2" has several comments discussing the linked article about a malware campaign.
Several commenters focus on the technical aspects of the operation. One commenter points out the amateur nature of some of the attackers' mistakes, such as using easily identifiable infrastructure and leaving personally identifiable information exposed. They speculate that this sloppiness could indicate either inexperienced actors or a deliberate attempt to create a distraction. This commenter also expresses skepticism about attributing the attacks specifically to Russia based solely on language used in the malware's code and communication.
Another commenter questions the efficacy of the malware's distribution methods, highlighting the reliance on social engineering and fake websites, which they suggest are relatively unsophisticated tactics. They wonder if the target audience for these attacks might be less technically savvy users who are more susceptible to such lures.
There's a discussion thread about the usage of Telegram for command-and-control infrastructure, with commenters analyzing the benefits and drawbacks from the attacker's perspective. One commenter mentions the irony of using a platform known for its focus on privacy and security for malicious purposes. Another points out the ease with which law enforcement or security researchers could potentially infiltrate or monitor such channels.
Some commenters express concern about the broader implications of these attacks, particularly the potential for escalation and the targeting of critical infrastructure. They discuss the increasing sophistication and frequency of state-sponsored cyberattacks and the need for better defenses.
Finally, a few commenters commend the researchers for their work in uncovering and exposing the campaign, emphasizing the importance of such efforts in combating cybercrime. They also discuss the difficulty in attributing attacks definitively and the complexities of international cooperation in addressing these kinds of threats.