Frustrated with the limitations and privacy concerns of mainstream calendar services, the author embarked on a journey to self-host their calendar data. They chose Radicale as their CalDAV server due to its simplicity and compatibility, and Thunderbird with the TbSync add-on as their client. The process involved setting up Radicale, configuring Thunderbird to connect securely, and migrating existing calendar data. While acknowledging potential challenges like maintaining the server and ensuring data backups, the author emphasizes the benefits of owning their data and controlling access to it. This shift empowers them to choose their preferred software and avoid the potential pitfalls of vendor lock-in and privacy compromises associated with commercial calendar platforms.
The post "Everyone knows all the apps on your phone" argues that the extensive data collection practices of mobile advertising networks effectively reveal which apps individuals use, even without explicit permission. Through deterministic and probabilistic methods linking device IDs, IP addresses, and other signals, these networks can create detailed profiles of app usage across devices. This information is then packaged and sold to advertisers, data brokers, and even governments, allowing them to infer sensitive information about users, from their political affiliations and health concerns to their financial status and personal relationships. The post emphasizes the illusion of privacy in the mobile ecosystem, suggesting that the current opt-out model is inadequate and calls for a more robust approach to data protection.
Hacker News users discussed the privacy implications of app usage data being readily available to mobile carriers and how this data can be used for targeted advertising and even more nefarious purposes. Some commenters highlighted the ease with which this data can be accessed, not just by corporations but also by individuals with basic technical skills. The discussion also touched upon the ineffectiveness of current privacy regulations and the lack of real control users have over their data. A few users pointed out the potential for this data to reveal sensitive information like health conditions or financial status based on app usage patterns. Several commenters expressed a sense of resignation and apathy, suggesting the fight for data privacy is already lost, while others advocated for stronger regulations and user control over data sharing.
Ecosia and Qwant, two European search engines prioritizing privacy and sustainability, are collaborating to build a new, independent European search index called the European Open Web Search (EOWS). This joint effort aims to reduce reliance on non-European indexes, promote digital sovereignty, and offer a more ethical and transparent alternative. The project is open-source and seeks community involvement to enrich the index and ensure its inclusivity, providing European users with a robust and relevant search experience powered by European values.
Several Hacker News commenters express skepticism about Ecosia and Qwant's ability to compete with Google, citing Google's massive data advantage and network effects. Some doubt the feasibility of building a truly independent index and question whether the joint effort will be significantly different from using Bing. Others raise concerns about potential bias and censorship, given the European focus. A few commenters, however, offer cautious optimism, hoping the project can provide a viable privacy-respecting alternative and contribute to a more decentralized internet. Some also express interest in the technical challenges involved in building such an index.
EFF warns that age verification laws, ostensibly designed to restrict access to adult content, pose a serious threat to online privacy. While initially targeting pornography sites, these laws are expanding to encompass broader online activities, such as accessing skincare products, potentially requiring users to upload government IDs to third-party verification services. This creates a massive database of sensitive personal information vulnerable to breaches, government surveillance, and misuse by private companies, effectively turning age verification into a backdoor for widespread online monitoring. The EFF argues that these laws are overbroad, ineffective at their stated goals, and disproportionately harm marginalized communities.
HN commenters express concerns about the slippery slope of age verification laws, starting with porn and potentially expanding to other online content and even everyday purchases. They argue that these laws normalize widespread surveillance and data collection, creating honeypots for hackers and potentially enabling government abuse. Several highlight the ineffectiveness of age gates, pointing to easy bypass methods and the likelihood of children accessing restricted content through other means. The chilling effect on free speech and the potential for discriminatory enforcement are also raised, with some commenters drawing parallels to authoritarian regimes. Some suggest focusing on better education and parental controls rather than restrictive legislation. The technical feasibility and privacy implications of various verification methods are debated, with skepticism towards relying on government IDs or private companies.
The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), along with GCHQ, quietly removed official advice recommending the use of Apple's device encryption for protecting sensitive information. While no official explanation was given, the change coincides with the UK government's ongoing push for legislation enabling access to encrypted communications, suggesting a conflict between promoting security best practices and pursuing surveillance capabilities. This removal raises concerns about the government's commitment to strong encryption and the potential chilling effect on individuals and organizations relying on such advice for data protection.
HN commenters discuss the UK government's removal of advice recommending Apple's encryption, speculating on the reasons. Some suggest it's due to Apple's upcoming changes to client-side scanning (now abandoned), fearing it weakens end-to-end encryption. Others point to the Online Safety Bill, which could mandate scanning of encrypted messages, making previous recommendations untenable. A few posit the change is related to legal challenges or simply outdated advice, with Apple no longer being the sole provider of strong encryption. The overall sentiment expresses concern and distrust towards the government's motives, with many suspecting a push towards weakening encryption for surveillance purposes. Some also criticize the lack of transparency surrounding the change.
Kagi Search has integrated Privacy Pass, a privacy-preserving technology, to reduce CAPTCHA frequency for paid users. This allows Kagi to verify a user's legitimacy without revealing their identity or tracking their browsing habits. By issuing anonymized tokens via the Privacy Pass browser extension, users can bypass CAPTCHAs, improving their search experience while maintaining their online privacy. This added layer of privacy is exclusive to paying Kagi subscribers as part of their commitment to a user-friendly and secure search environment.
HN commenters generally expressed skepticism about Kagi's Privacy Pass implementation. Several questioned the actual privacy benefits, pointing out that Kagi still knows the user's IP address and search queries, even with the pass. Others doubted the practicality of the system, citing the potential for abuse and the added complexity for users. Some suggested alternative privacy-enhancing technologies like onion routing or decentralized search. The effectiveness of Privacy Pass in preventing fingerprinting was also debated, with some arguing it offered minimal protection. A few commenters expressed interest in the technology and its potential, but the overall sentiment leaned towards cautious skepticism.
A security vulnerability, dubbed "0-click," allowed remote attackers to deanonymize users of various communication platforms, including Signal, Discord, and others, by simply sending them a message. Exploiting flaws in how these applications handled media files, specifically embedded video previews, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the target's device without any interaction from the user. This code could then access sensitive information like the user's IP address, potentially revealing their identity. While the vulnerability affected the Electron framework underlying these apps, rather than the platforms themselves, the impact was significant as it bypassed typical security measures and allowed complete deanonymization with no user interaction. This vulnerability has since been patched.
Hacker News commenters discuss the practicality and impact of the described 0-click deanonymization attack. Several express skepticism about its real-world applicability, noting the attacker needs to be on the same local network, which significantly limits its usefulness compared to other attack vectors. Some highlight the importance of the disclosure despite these limitations, as it raises awareness of potential vulnerabilities. The discussion also touches on the technical details of the exploit, with some questioning the "0-click" designation given the requirement for the target to join a group call. Others point out the responsibility of Electron, the framework used by the affected apps, for not sandboxing UDP sockets effectively, and debate the trade-offs between security and performance. A few commenters discuss potential mitigations and the broader implications for user privacy in online communication platforms.
Summary of Comments ( 48 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43643343
Hacker News commenters generally praised the author's approach to self-hosting a calendar, emphasizing the importance of data ownership and control. Some questioned the complexity and effort involved, suggesting simpler alternatives like using a privacy-focused calendar provider. A few pointed out potential downsides of self-hosting, including maintenance overhead and the risk of data loss. The discussion also touched on the trade-offs between convenience and control when choosing between self-hosting and third-party services, with some arguing that the benefits of self-hosting outweigh the added complexity. Several commenters shared their own experiences and recommended specific tools and services for self-hosting calendars and other personal data. There was a brief discussion on CalDAV and its limitations, along with alternative protocols.
The Hacker News post discussing self-hosting a calendar solution has generated several comments, primarily focusing on the practicality, security, and complexity of such an endeavor.
Some users express skepticism about the true ownership of data, even when self-hosting. They point out that reliance on third-party hardware and software components still introduces potential vulnerabilities and external dependencies. The discussion delves into the nuances of data ownership, acknowledging that complete control is difficult to achieve in the interconnected digital world.
A recurring theme is the trade-off between convenience and control. While self-hosting offers greater control over data, it often comes at the cost of increased complexity and maintenance. Commenters discuss the technical expertise required to set up and maintain a self-hosted calendar solution, highlighting the challenges of ensuring reliability, security, and accessibility. Several users suggest that for many individuals, the benefits of convenience offered by established calendar services outweigh the potential advantages of self-hosting.
The discussion also touches upon the importance of data backups and disaster recovery planning. Users emphasize the need for robust backup strategies to mitigate the risk of data loss in a self-hosted environment. The conversation highlights the responsibility that comes with self-hosting, as users become solely responsible for the security and integrity of their data.
Several commenters share their personal experiences with self-hosting calendars, offering insights into the challenges and rewards. Some users express satisfaction with their self-hosted setups, emphasizing the benefits of increased privacy and control. Others recount difficulties encountered during the setup and maintenance process, cautioning against undertaking such projects without sufficient technical expertise.
Finally, there's a thread discussing alternative approaches to data ownership and privacy, such as utilizing encrypted calendar services or employing privacy-focused email providers. The discussion explores the spectrum of options available to users concerned about data privacy, recognizing that self-hosting is not a one-size-fits-all solution.