Stories with Tag 0-click

• Uncovering a 0-Click RCE in the SuperNote Nomad E-Ink Tablet

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  Posted: 2025-04-07 20:51:02

  Verbose tl;dr

  Security researchers at Prizm Labs discovered a critical zero-click remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the SuperNote Nomad e-ink tablet. Exploiting a flaw in the device's update mechanism, an attacker could remotely execute arbitrary code with root privileges by sending a specially crafted OTA update notification via a malicious Wi-Fi access point. The attack requires no user interaction, making it particularly dangerous. The vulnerability stemmed from insufficient validation of update packages, allowing malicious firmware to be installed. Prizm Labs responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to SuperNote, who promptly released a patch. This vulnerability highlights the importance of robust security measures even in seemingly simple devices like e-readers.

  This blog post by Prizm Labs details the discovery and exploitation of a zero-click remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the SuperNote A5X and A6X e-ink tablets, specifically those running firmware version 3.4.0.33. A zero-click exploit allows an attacker to compromise a device without requiring any interaction from the user. The vulnerability stemmed from the insecure implementation of the OTA (Over-The-Air) update mechanism.

  The researchers began their investigation by analyzing the network traffic during an OTA update. They observed that the update process involved downloading a signed firmware image via HTTPS. While the use of HTTPS provided encryption, it did not protect against malicious manipulation if the attacker could compromise the update server or perform a man-in-the-middle attack. Crucially, the researchers found that the device did not validate the signature of the downloaded update package before writing it to the internal flash memory. This oversight allowed them to craft a malicious firmware update package containing arbitrary code.

  The exploit process involved several steps. First, a malicious update package was constructed. This package contained a modified boot image, effectively replacing the legitimate SuperNote operating system with a malicious one. The malicious boot image included a modified init script designed to establish a reverse shell back to the attacker's machine, granting them full control over the device.

  To deliver the malicious update, the researchers leveraged a classic man-in-the-middle attack technique, using ARP spoofing. ARP spoofing allows an attacker to intercept traffic intended for another device on the local network by impersonating its MAC address. By poisoning the ARP cache of the SuperNote device, the researchers redirected the device's OTA update request to their own malicious server, hosting the crafted update package.

  When the SuperNote attempted to update, it downloaded the malicious package from the attacker's server. Due to the lack of pre-installation signature verification, the device accepted and applied the malicious update. Upon reboot, the modified init script within the malicious boot image executed, establishing the reverse shell and granting the attacker complete control. This access allowed them to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate sensitive data, and essentially take full ownership of the device.

  The researchers highlighted the severity of this vulnerability, as it permitted silent and remote compromise of the targeted device. They responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to Ratta Supernote, the manufacturer of the device, who subsequently released a patched firmware version addressing the issue. The post concludes by emphasizing the importance of secure OTA update implementations and the need for robust security measures in internet-connected devices.

  • SuperNote
  • Nomad
  • e-ink
  • tablet
  • RCE
  • remote code execution
  • 0-click
  • Exploit
  • Vulnerability
  • Security
  • Cybersecurity
  • Hardware Security
  • Firmware
  • Rootkit
  • Prizm Labs

  Summary of Comments ( 8 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43615805

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News commenters generally praised the research and write-up for its clarity and depth. Several expressed concern about the Supernote's security posture, especially given its marketing towards privacy-conscious users. Some questioned the practicality of the exploit given its reliance on connecting to a malicious Wi-Fi network, but others pointed out the potential for rogue access points or compromised legitimate networks. A few users discussed the inherent difficulties in securing embedded devices and the trade-offs between functionality and security. The exploit's dependence on a user-initiated firmware update process was also highlighted, suggesting a slightly reduced risk compared to a fully automatic exploit. Some commenters shared their experiences with Supernote's customer support and device management, while others debated the overall significance of the vulnerability in the context of real-world threats.

  The Hacker News post discussing the 0-click RCE vulnerability in the SuperNote Nomad E-Ink tablet has generated a number of comments exploring various aspects of the vulnerability, its implications, and the SuperNote device itself.

  Several commenters focus on the trade-offs between security and desired functionality, particularly regarding the device's cloud syncing feature. Some argue that the always-on nature of the sync feature, necessary for its intended seamless functionality, inherently increases the risk profile. The decision by SuperNote to leave Wi-Fi always enabled, even when the device is powered off, is highlighted as a key contributing factor to the vulnerability. The discussion touches upon the inherent difficulty of securing devices that require constant network connectivity.

  The technical details of the vulnerability also receive attention. Commenters discuss the specifics of the exploit, including the use of maliciously crafted emails and the exploitation of a stack overflow vulnerability in the device's email client. The discussion highlights the importance of robust input sanitization and secure coding practices to prevent such vulnerabilities. Some commenters question the choice of technology used for the email client, suggesting that a simpler, less feature-rich implementation might have been more secure.

  A recurring theme in the comments is the security of e-ink devices in general. Several users express concerns about the potential for similar vulnerabilities in other e-ink devices and the broader implications for the security of internet-connected devices in general. The relatively closed nature of the SuperNote ecosystem is also brought up, with some commenters suggesting that this may have contributed to the vulnerability going unnoticed for a longer period.

  Several commenters praise the researchers for their responsible disclosure and the detailed write-up of the vulnerability. They acknowledge the importance of such research in improving the security of these devices.

  Some comments delve into the practical implications of the vulnerability, discussing the potential for data theft and other malicious activities. The potential impact on users' privacy is a particular concern, given the sensitive nature of information often stored on such devices.

  Finally, a few comments discuss the response from SuperNote, noting the company's acknowledgement of the vulnerability and their commitment to releasing a patch. There's some discussion about the timeliness of the response and the broader implications for the trust and reputation of the SuperNote brand.

• 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

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  Posted: 2025-01-21 14:59:44

  Verbose tl;dr

  A security vulnerability, dubbed "0-click," allowed remote attackers to deanonymize users of various communication platforms, including Signal, Discord, and others, by simply sending them a message. Exploiting flaws in how these applications handled media files, specifically embedded video previews, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the target's device without any interaction from the user. This code could then access sensitive information like the user's IP address, potentially revealing their identity. While the vulnerability affected the Electron framework underlying these apps, rather than the platforms themselves, the impact was significant as it bypassed typical security measures and allowed complete deanonymization with no user interaction. This vulnerability has since been patched.

  A newly disclosed vulnerability, dubbed the "0-click deanonymization attack," poses a significant threat to user privacy on several popular communication platforms, including Signal, Discord, and others employing WebRTC, a real-time communication technology. This attack exploits a subtle flaw in the way these platforms handle IP address leaks within WebRTC connections, allowing a malicious actor to uncover the IP address of a target user without any interaction from the target—hence the "0-click" designation.

  The exploit leverages Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) and Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) servers, integral components of WebRTC's functionality. These servers facilitate the establishment of peer-to-peer connections by assisting clients in discovering their public IP addresses and traversing network address translation (NAT) gateways. Normally, these IP addresses are exchanged between communicating parties. However, the vulnerability arises from the fact that these platforms inadvertently expose IP addresses to STUN/ICE servers even before a connection is fully established, and crucially, even if the target user declines or ignores a call.

  The attacker initiates a WebRTC connection request to the target user. Even if the target doesn't accept the call, the target's client still interacts with the STUN/ICE servers, revealing its IP address in the process. The attacker, by controlling or monitoring the STUN/ICE server, can passively intercept this communication and capture the target's IP address. This allows for deanonymization, linking the target's online identity on the platform to their real-world location and potentially revealing their true identity.

  This vulnerability is particularly insidious because it requires no action from the target user. Merely receiving a connection request, even an ignored or rejected one, is sufficient for the attack to succeed. This bypasses traditional defenses against IP address leaks, such as disabling WebRTC entirely or using VPNs, as the leakage occurs before these protective measures can effectively intervene. While VPNs might mask the true IP address, the timing correlation between the call attempt and the observed IP address on the VPN server could still provide valuable information to a determined attacker.

  The technical details of the exploit involve manipulating the JavaScript execution within the target's browser to control the flow of WebRTC negotiation and observe the STUN/ICE server interactions. The author of the disclosure emphasizes the simplicity of the attack and its broad applicability to any platform utilizing WebRTC without adequate safeguards. The potential consequences of this vulnerability are serious, ranging from targeted harassment and doxing to large-scale surveillance and privacy breaches.

  • signal
  • Discord
  • deanonymization
  • privacy
  • Security
  • Vulnerability
  • attack
  • metadata
  • 0-click
  • Exploit
  • IP address
  • online privacy
  • communication platforms
  • messaging apps

  Summary of Comments ( 294 )
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42780816

  Verbose tl;dr

  Hacker News commenters discuss the practicality and impact of the described 0-click deanonymization attack. Several express skepticism about its real-world applicability, noting the attacker needs to be on the same local network, which significantly limits its usefulness compared to other attack vectors. Some highlight the importance of the disclosure despite these limitations, as it raises awareness of potential vulnerabilities. The discussion also touches on the technical details of the exploit, with some questioning the "0-click" designation given the requirement for the target to join a group call. Others point out the responsibility of Electron, the framework used by the affected apps, for not sandboxing UDP sockets effectively, and debate the trade-offs between security and performance. A few commenters discuss potential mitigations and the broader implications for user privacy in online communication platforms.

  The Hacker News post titled "0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms" generated a significant discussion with a variety of comments. Several commenters focused on the technical aspects of the exploit, highlighting how seemingly innocuous features like generating link previews could be manipulated to leak IP addresses. There's a strong consensus that the core issue stems from servers fetching content from user-supplied URLs without proper safeguards.

  Some commenters questioned the "0-click" nature of the attack, arguing that a user still needs to engage with a message containing a malicious link, even if they don't explicitly click it. Others pointed out that the practicality of the attack is limited by the need for the attacker to control a server capable of logging IP addresses connecting to it.

  The discussion also touched upon the responsibility of different platforms. Some commenters argued that platforms like Signal and Discord should have implemented better protections against this type of attack, while others emphasized that the underlying issue lies with the broader ecosystem of link previews and the lack of standardized security measures.

  A few commenters provided technical insights into potential mitigations, including the use of proxy servers for fetching previews and stricter validation of URLs. The feasibility and potential downsides of these solutions were also debated.

  Some users shared anecdotal evidence of similar attacks or vulnerabilities they've encountered in the past, reinforcing the concern about the potential for abuse of link preview functionality.

  Finally, there was some discussion about the ethical implications of researching and disclosing such vulnerabilities, with opinions varying on the responsible approach to handling such sensitive information. The overall sentiment seems to be one of concern about the potential privacy implications of this attack vector and the need for a broader industry response to address the underlying issues.