A phishing attack leveraged Google's URL shortener, g.co, to mask malicious links. The attacker sent emails appearing to be from a legitimate source, containing a g.co shortened link. This short link redirected to a fake Google login page designed to steal user credentials. Because the initial link displayed g.co, it bypassed suspicion and instilled a false sense of security, making the phishing attempt more effective. The post highlights the danger of trusting shortened URLs, even those from seemingly reputable services, and emphasizes the importance of carefully inspecting links before clicking.
A security vulnerability, dubbed "0-click," allowed remote attackers to deanonymize users of various communication platforms, including Signal, Discord, and others, by simply sending them a message. Exploiting flaws in how these applications handled media files, specifically embedded video previews, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the target's device without any interaction from the user. This code could then access sensitive information like the user's IP address, potentially revealing their identity. While the vulnerability affected the Electron framework underlying these apps, rather than the platforms themselves, the impact was significant as it bypassed typical security measures and allowed complete deanonymization with no user interaction. This vulnerability has since been patched.
Hacker News commenters discuss the practicality and impact of the described 0-click deanonymization attack. Several express skepticism about its real-world applicability, noting the attacker needs to be on the same local network, which significantly limits its usefulness compared to other attack vectors. Some highlight the importance of the disclosure despite these limitations, as it raises awareness of potential vulnerabilities. The discussion also touches on the technical details of the exploit, with some questioning the "0-click" designation given the requirement for the target to join a group call. Others point out the responsibility of Electron, the framework used by the affected apps, for not sandboxing UDP sockets effectively, and debate the trade-offs between security and performance. A few commenters discuss potential mitigations and the broader implications for user privacy in online communication platforms.
Summary of Comments ( 76 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42810252
HN users discuss a sophisticated phishing attack using g.co shortened URLs. Several express concern about Google's seeming inaction on the issue, despite reports. Some suggest solutions like automatically blocking known malicious short URLs or requiring explicit user confirmation before redirecting. Others question the practicality of such solutions given the vast scale of Google's services. The vulnerability of URL shorteners in general is highlighted, with some suggesting they should be avoided entirely due to the inherent security risks. The discussion also touches upon the user's role in security, advocating for caution and skepticism when encountering shortened URLs. Some users mention being successfully targeted by this attack, and the frustration of banks accepting screenshots of g.co links as proof of payment. The conversation emphasizes the ongoing tension between user convenience and security, and the difficulty of completely mitigating phishing risks.
The Hacker News thread discussing the phishing attack involving g.co has a significant number of comments exploring various facets of the issue. Several commenters express surprise and concern that Google's own URL shortener was leveraged in this attack, highlighting the perceived irony and the potential erosion of trust. Some discuss the technical mechanics of how the attack likely worked, including the use of Unicode characters to create lookalike domains or exploiting vulnerabilities in open redirects.
A recurring theme is the difficulty in identifying phishing attempts, especially with shortened URLs. Commenters debate the responsibility of URL shorteners in preventing such abuse and whether Google should implement stricter validation or warning systems for g.co links. Some suggest alternative approaches, such as displaying the full target URL on hover or requiring explicit user confirmation before redirecting.
Several users share their personal experiences with similar phishing attacks, emphasizing the increasing sophistication of these schemes. Some discuss the limitations of current security measures, including email filters and browser protections, and the need for greater user education and awareness. The role of two-factor authentication is also discussed, with some arguing that it would have mitigated the effectiveness of this specific attack.
A few commenters dive into the legal and ethical implications of using g.co for phishing, questioning Google's liability and potential responses to the issue. They also explore the broader implications for URL shorteners and the challenges in balancing usability with security. Some express skepticism about the long-term viability of URL shortening services in light of these security concerns.
A smaller subset of the comments offer technical advice on how to identify and avoid phishing attempts, including checking the full URL, being wary of suspicious emails, and enabling stronger security settings. There's also some discussion of the potential for browser extensions or other tools to help users identify potentially malicious shortened URLs.
Finally, a few commenters offer more cynical perspectives, suggesting that such attacks are inevitable and that users should ultimately be responsible for their own security. Some express resignation to the constant threat of phishing and the difficulty in completely eradicating such scams.