NIST has chosen HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) as the fifth and final public-key encryption algorithm to standardize for post-quantum cryptography. HQC, based on code-based cryptography, offers small public key and ciphertext sizes, making it suitable for resource-constrained environments. This selection concludes NIST's multi-year effort to standardize quantum-resistant algorithms, adding HQC alongside the previously announced CRYSTALS-Kyber for general encryption, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ for digital signatures. These algorithms are designed to withstand attacks from both classical and quantum computers, ensuring long-term security in a future with widespread quantum computing capabilities.
This proposal introduces an effect system to C2x, aiming to enhance code modularity, optimization, and correctness by explicitly declaring and checking the side effects of functions. It defines a set of effect keywords, like reads and writes, to annotate function parameters and return values, indicating how they are accessed. These annotations are part of the function's type and are checked by the compiler, ensuring that declared effects match the function's actual behavior. The proposal also includes a mechanism for polymorphism over effects, enabling more flexible code reuse and separate compilation without sacrificing effect safety. This mechanism allows for abstracting over effects, so that functions can be written generically to operate on data structures with varying levels of mutability.
The Hacker News comments on the C2y effect system proposal express a mix of skepticism and cautious interest. Several commenters question the practicality and performance implications of implementing such a system in C, citing the language's existing complexity and the potential for significant overhead. Concerns are raised about the learning curve for developers and the possibility of introducing subtle bugs. Some find the proposal intriguing from a research perspective but doubt its widespread adoption. A few express interest in exploring the potential benefits of improved code analysis and error detection, particularly for concurrency and memory management, though acknowledge the challenges involved. Overall, the consensus leans towards viewing the proposal as an interesting academic exercise with limited real-world applicability in its current form.
Summary of Comments ( 80 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43332944
HN commenters discuss NIST's selection of HQC, expressing surprise and skepticism. Several highlight HQC's vulnerability to side-channel attacks and question its suitability despite its speed advantages. Some suggest SPHINCS+ as a more robust, albeit slower, alternative. Others note the practical implications of the selection, including the need for hybrid approaches and the potential impact on existing systems. The relatively small key and ciphertext sizes of HQC are also mentioned as positive attributes. A few commenters delve into the technical details of HQC and its underlying mathematical principles. Overall, the sentiment leans towards cautious interest in HQC, acknowledging its strengths while emphasizing its vulnerabilities.
The Hacker News post titled "NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption" has generated a moderate number of comments discussing various aspects of the announcement. Several compelling threads of conversation emerge.
One key area of discussion revolves around the surprise selection of HQC, a code-based cryptosystem, given its perceived vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks. Commenters express concern about the practicality and security of deploying HQC in real-world scenarios where side-channel attacks are a significant threat. Some question NIST's decision-making process and wonder if the selection criteria adequately weighed these security concerns. Comparisons are made to other code-based systems, and the potential implications for the broader post-quantum cryptography landscape are debated.
Another significant topic is the performance characteristics of HQC, particularly its relatively large public key size. Commenters discuss the challenges of managing and transmitting such large keys, especially in resource-constrained environments. The potential impact on network bandwidth and storage requirements is also considered. Some commenters speculate on the feasibility of optimizing HQC implementations to mitigate these performance limitations.
The standardization process itself is also subject to scrutiny. Commenters discuss the complexities of evaluating and selecting post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, highlighting the inherent trade-offs between security, performance, and implementation complexity. The long-term implications of standardization are considered, with some expressing concerns about the potential for future vulnerabilities and the need for ongoing research and development in this area.
Finally, some comments delve into the technical details of HQC, explaining its underlying principles and comparing it to other post-quantum cryptographic approaches. These comments provide valuable insights for those seeking a deeper understanding of the algorithm and its place within the broader field of post-quantum cryptography. There's also a discussion of the ongoing nature of security research, with some commenters emphasizing the need for continued vigilance and adaptation in the face of evolving threats.