Rebuilding Ubuntu packages from source with sccache, a compiler cache, can drastically reduce compile times, sometimes up to 90%. The author demonstrates this by building the Firefox package, achieving a 7x speedup compared to a clean build and a 2.5x speedup over using the system's build cache. This significant performance improvement is attributed to sccache's ability to effectively cache and reuse compilation results, both locally and remotely via cloud storage. This approach can be particularly beneficial for continuous integration and development workflows where frequent rebuilds are necessary.
The Salt Typhoon attacks revealed critical vulnerabilities in global telecom infrastructure, primarily impacting Barracuda Email Security Gateway (ESG) appliances. The blog post highlights the insecure nature of these systems due to factors like complex, opaque codebases; reliance on outdated and vulnerable software components; inadequate security testing and patching practices; and a general lack of security prioritization within the telecom industry. These issues, combined with the interconnectedness of telecom networks, create a high-risk environment susceptible to widespread compromise and data breaches, as demonstrated by Salt Typhoon's exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and persistence within compromised systems. The author stresses the urgent need for increased scrutiny, security investment, and regulatory oversight within the telecom sector to mitigate these risks and prevent future attacks.
Hacker News commenters generally agreed with the author's assessment of telecom insecurity. Several highlighted the lack of security focus in the industry, driven by cost-cutting and a perceived lack of significant consequences for breaches. Some questioned the efficacy of proposed solutions like memory-safe languages, pointing to the complexity of legacy systems and the difficulty of secure implementation. Others emphasized the human element, arguing that social engineering and insider threats remain major vulnerabilities regardless of technical improvements. A few commenters offered specific examples of security flaws they'd encountered in telecom systems, further reinforcing the author's points. Finally, some discussed the regulatory landscape, suggesting that stricter oversight and enforcement are needed to drive meaningful change.
Huntress Labs researchers uncovered a campaign where Russian-speaking actors impersonated the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) to distribute the Stealc information-stealing malware. Using a fake EFF domain and mimicking the organization's visual branding, the attackers lured victims with promises of privacy-enhancing tools, instead delivering a malicious installer. This installer deployed Stealc, designed to pilfer sensitive data like passwords, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet information. The campaign leveraged the legitimate cloud storage service MEGA and utilized Pyramid, a new command-and-control framework, to manage infected machines. This represents a concerning trend of threat actors exploiting trusted organizations to distribute increasingly sophisticated malware.
Hacker News users discussed the sophistication of the Stealc malware operation, particularly its use of Telegram for command-and-control and its rapid iteration to incorporate features from other malware. Some questioned the attribution to Russian actors solely based on language, highlighting the prevalence of Russian speakers in the cybersecurity world regardless of nationality. Others pointed out the irony of using "EFF" in the impersonation, given the Electronic Frontier Foundation's focus on privacy and security. The effectiveness of the multi-stage infection process, including the use of legitimate services like Discord and Telegram, was also noted. Several commenters discussed the blog post's technical depth, appreciating the clear explanation of the malware's functionality and the investigation process. Finally, some users expressed skepticism about the actual impact of such malware, suggesting the targets are likely low-value and the operation more opportunistic than targeted.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed multiple Russia-aligned threat actors, including APT29 (Cozy Bear) and Sandworm, actively targeting Signal users. These campaigns primarily focused on stealing authentication material from Signal servers, likely to bypass Signal's robust encryption and gain access to user communications. Although Signal's server-side infrastructure was targeted, the attackers needed physical access to the device to complete the compromise, significantly limiting the attack's effectiveness. While Signal's encryption remains unbroken, the targeting underscores the lengths to which nation-state actors will go to compromise secure communications.
HN commenters express skepticism about the Google blog post, questioning its timing and motivations. Some suggest it's a PR move by Google, designed to distract from their own security issues or promote their own messaging platforms. Others point out the lack of technical details in the post, making it difficult to assess the credibility of the claims. A few commenters discuss the inherent difficulties of securing any messaging platform against determined state-sponsored actors and the importance of robust security practices regardless of the provider. The possibility of phishing campaigns, rather than Signal vulnerabilities, being the attack vector is also raised. Finally, some commenters highlight the broader context of the ongoing conflict and the increased targeting of communication platforms.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has revealed ScatterBrain, a sophisticated obfuscator used by the PoisonPlug threat actor to disguise malicious JavaScript code injected into compromised routers. ScatterBrain employs multiple layers of obfuscation, including encoding, encryption, and polymorphism, making analysis and detection significantly more difficult. This obfuscator is used to hide malicious payloads delivered through PoisonPlug, which primarily targets SOHO routers, enabling the attackers to perform tasks like credential theft, traffic redirection, and arbitrary command execution. This discovery underscores the increasing sophistication of router-targeting malware and highlights the importance of robust router security practices.
HN commenters generally praised the technical depth and clarity of the Google TAG blog post. Several highlighted the sophistication of the PoisonPlug malware, particularly its use of DLL search order hijacking and process injection techniques. Some discussed the challenges of malware analysis and reverse engineering, with one commenter expressing skepticism about the long-term effectiveness of such analyses due to the constantly evolving nature of malware. Others pointed out the crucial role of threat intelligence in understanding and mitigating these kinds of threats. A few commenters also noted the irony of a Google security team exposing malware hosted on Google Cloud Storage.
Researchers discovered a second set of vulnerable internet domains (.gouv.bf, Burkina Faso's government domain) being resold through a third-party registrar after previously uncovering a similar issue with Gabon's .ga domain. This highlights a systemic problem where governments outsource the management of their top-level domains, often leading to security vulnerabilities and potential exploitation. The ease with which these domains can be acquired by malicious actors for a mere $20 raises concerns about potential nation-state attacks, phishing campaigns, and other malicious activities targeting individuals and organizations who might trust these seemingly official domains. This repeated vulnerability underscores the critical need for governments to prioritize the security and proper management of their top-level domains to prevent misuse and protect their citizens and organizations.
Hacker News users discuss the implications of governments demanding access to encrypted data via "lawful access" backdoors. Several express skepticism about the feasibility and security of such systems, arguing that any backdoor created for law enforcement can also be exploited by malicious actors. One commenter points out the "irony" of governments potentially using insecure methods to access the supposedly secure backdoors. Another highlights the recurring nature of this debate and the unlikelihood of a technical solution satisfying all parties. The cost of $20 for the domain used in the linked article also draws attention, with speculation about the site's credibility and purpose. Some dismiss the article as fear-mongering, while others suggest it's a legitimate concern given the increasing demands for government access to encrypted communications.
Summary of Comments ( 10 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43406710
Hacker News users discuss various aspects of the proposed method for speeding up Ubuntu package builds. Some express skepticism, questioning the 90% claim and pointing out potential downsides like increased rebuild times after initial installation and the burden on build servers. Others suggest the solution isn't practical for diverse hardware environments and might break dependency chains. Some highlight the existing efforts within the Ubuntu community to optimize build times and suggest collaboration. A few users appreciate the idea, acknowledging the potential benefits while also recognizing the complexities and trade-offs involved in implementing such a system. The discussion also touches on the importance of reproducible builds and the challenges of maintaining package integrity.
The Hacker News post "Make Ubuntu packages 90% faster by rebuilding them" generated a significant discussion with several compelling comments exploring various facets of the proposed speed improvements.
Several commenters focused on the reproducibility aspect. One user questioned the reproducibility of builds using
ccachegiven its potential to mask underlying issues that might manifest differently on different systems. This concern stemmed from the idea that whileccachemight speed up builds, it could also hide bugs that would otherwise be caught during a clean build. Another commenter echoed this sentiment, emphasizing the importance of clean builds for verifying package integrity and catching errors. They also highlighted the inherent tension between build speed and ensuring correct and reproducible builds across diverse environments.Another thread of conversation revolved around the technical details of the proposed speed improvements. One commenter inquired about the specific changes implemented to achieve the 90% speed increase, prompting the original poster (OP) to provide more context. The discussion delved into the mechanics of
ccacheand how it leverages caching mechanisms to accelerate compilation times. This technical exchange shed light on the underlying principles enabling the performance gains.The practicality and applicability of the proposed changes were also discussed. One commenter questioned whether the changes would be upstreamed, given the potential benefits for a wider audience. This prompted a conversation about the challenges and considerations involved in integrating such changes into the broader Ubuntu ecosystem. Further discussion focused on the trade-offs between build speed and resource consumption, specifically memory usage. Some users raised concerns about the potential impact on systems with limited resources, while others argued that the benefits outweighed the drawbacks.
Finally, some comments focused on alternative approaches and existing best practices. One commenter mentioned that using
ccacheis already a common practice within the community and suggested that the observed speed improvements might not be entirely novel. Another commenter pointed out the importance of distributing build processes to further enhance performance, especially for larger projects. These comments provided valuable context and expanded the discussion beyond the specific approach presented in the original post.