This blog post analyzes "TM Sgnl," an Android app marketed as a secure messaging platform used by some Trump officials, including Mike Waltz. The author reverse-engineered the app, revealing it relies on the open-source Signal protocol but lacks crucial security features like forward secrecy and disappearing messages. Furthermore, TM Sgnl uses its own centralized server, raising concerns about data privacy and potential vulnerabilities compared to the official Signal app, which uses a federated server architecture. The analysis concludes that despite presenting itself as a secure alternative, TM Sgnl likely offers weaker security and potentially exposes user data to greater risk.
The Guardian reports that Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, was inadvertently added to a Signal group chat containing dozens of Biden administration officials due to a typo in his phone number. The chat, intended for senior staff communication, briefly exposed Goldberg to internal discussions before the error was noticed and he was removed. While Goldberg himself didn't leak the chat's contents, the incident highlights the potential for accidental disclosure of sensitive information through insecure communication practices, especially in a digital age where typos are common. The leak itself, originating from within the chat, exposed the Biden administration's internal debates about handling classified documents and the Afghanistan withdrawal.
Hacker News commenters discuss the irony of a journalist infiltrating a supposedly secure Signal group chat aimed at keeping communications private. Several highlight the ease with which Goldberg seemingly gained access, suggesting a lack of basic security practices like invite links or even just asking who added him. This led to speculation about whether it was a deliberate leak orchestrated by someone within the group, questioning the true level of concern over the exposed messages. Some commenters debated the newsworthiness of the leak itself, with some dismissing the content as mundane while others found the revealed dynamics and candid opinions interesting. The overall sentiment reflects skepticism about the security practices of supposedly tech-savvy individuals and amusement at the awkward situation.
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed multiple Russia-aligned threat actors, including APT29 (Cozy Bear) and Sandworm, actively targeting Signal users. These campaigns primarily focused on stealing authentication material from Signal servers, likely to bypass Signal's robust encryption and gain access to user communications. Although Signal's server-side infrastructure was targeted, the attackers needed physical access to the device to complete the compromise, significantly limiting the attack's effectiveness. While Signal's encryption remains unbroken, the targeting underscores the lengths to which nation-state actors will go to compromise secure communications.
HN commenters express skepticism about the Google blog post, questioning its timing and motivations. Some suggest it's a PR move by Google, designed to distract from their own security issues or promote their own messaging platforms. Others point out the lack of technical details in the post, making it difficult to assess the credibility of the claims. A few commenters discuss the inherent difficulties of securing any messaging platform against determined state-sponsored actors and the importance of robust security practices regardless of the provider. The possibility of phishing campaigns, rather than Signal vulnerabilities, being the attack vector is also raised. Finally, some commenters highlight the broader context of the ongoing conflict and the increased targeting of communication platforms.
Signal's cryptography is generally well-regarded, using established and vetted protocols like X3DH and Double Ratchet for secure messaging. The blog post author reviewed Signal's implementation and found it largely sound, praising the clarity of the documentation and the overall design. While some minor theoretical improvements were suggested, like using a more modern key derivation function (HKDF over SHA-256) and potentially exploring post-quantum cryptography for future-proofing, the author concludes that Signal's current cryptographic choices are robust and secure, offering strong confidentiality and integrity protections for users.
Hacker News users discussed the Signal cryptography review, mostly agreeing with the author's points. Several highlighted the importance of Signal's Double Ratchet algorithm and the trade-offs involved in achieving strong security while maintaining usability. Some questioned the practicality of certain theoretical attacks, emphasizing the difficulty of exploiting them in the real world. Others discussed the value of formal verification efforts and the overall robustness of Signal's protocol design despite minor potential vulnerabilities. The conversation also touched upon the importance of accessible security audits and the challenges of maintaining privacy in messaging apps.
X (formerly Twitter) is currently blocking links to the encrypted messaging app Signal. Users attempting to post links containing "signal.me" are encountering errors or finding their posts failing to send. This block appears targeted, as links to other messaging platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram remain functional. While the reason for the block is unconfirmed, speculation points to Elon Musk's past disagreements with Signal or a potential attempt to bolster X's own encrypted messaging feature.
Hacker News users discussed potential reasons for X (formerly Twitter) blocking links to Signal, speculating that it's part of a broader trend of Musk suppressing competitors. Some suggested it's an intentional move to stifle alternative platforms, pointing to similar blocking of Substack, Bluesky, and Threads links. Others considered technical explanations like an overzealous spam filter or misconfigured regular expression, though this was deemed less likely given the targeted nature of the block. A few commenters mentioned that Mastodon links still worked, further fueling the theory of targeted suppression. The perceived pettiness of the move and the potential for abuse of power were also highlighted.
A security vulnerability, dubbed "0-click," allowed remote attackers to deanonymize users of various communication platforms, including Signal, Discord, and others, by simply sending them a message. Exploiting flaws in how these applications handled media files, specifically embedded video previews, the attacker could execute arbitrary code on the target's device without any interaction from the user. This code could then access sensitive information like the user's IP address, potentially revealing their identity. While the vulnerability affected the Electron framework underlying these apps, rather than the platforms themselves, the impact was significant as it bypassed typical security measures and allowed complete deanonymization with no user interaction. This vulnerability has since been patched.
Hacker News commenters discuss the practicality and impact of the described 0-click deanonymization attack. Several express skepticism about its real-world applicability, noting the attacker needs to be on the same local network, which significantly limits its usefulness compared to other attack vectors. Some highlight the importance of the disclosure despite these limitations, as it raises awareness of potential vulnerabilities. The discussion also touches on the technical details of the exploit, with some questioning the "0-click" designation given the requirement for the target to join a group call. Others point out the responsibility of Electron, the framework used by the affected apps, for not sandboxing UDP sockets effectively, and debate the trade-offs between security and performance. A few commenters discuss potential mitigations and the broader implications for user privacy in online communication platforms.
The blog post "Das Blinkenlights" details the author's project to recreate the iconic blinking LED display atop the Haus des Lehrers building in Berlin, a symbol of the former East Germany. Using readily available components like an Arduino, LEDs, and a custom-built replica of the original metal frame, the author successfully built a miniature version of the display. The project involved meticulously mapping the light patterns, programming the Arduino to replicate the sequences, and overcoming technical challenges related to power consumption and brightness. The end result was a faithful, albeit smaller-scale, homage to a piece of history, demonstrating the blend of nostalgia and maker culture.
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and appeal of "blinkenlights," large-scale status displays using LEDs. Some found them aesthetically pleasing, nostalgic, and a fun way to visualize complex systems, while others questioned their actual usefulness, suggesting they often display superficial information or become mere decorations. A few comments pointed out the potential for misuse, creating distractions or even security risks by revealing system internals. The maintainability of such displays over time was also questioned. Several users shared examples of interesting blinkenlight implementations, including artistic displays and historical uses. The general consensus seemed to be that while not always practically useful, blinkenlights hold a certain charm and can be valuable in specific contexts.
Summary of Comments ( 249 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43875476
HN commenters discuss the implications of using an obscure, unofficial Signal fork, TM-SGNL, by Trump officials. Several express concerns about the security and trustworthiness of such a client, particularly given its lack of transparency and potential for vulnerabilities. Some question the choice, suggesting it stems from a misunderstanding of Signal's functionality, specifically the belief that official servers could access their data. Others point out the irony of using a supposedly more secure app while simultaneously broadcasting its usage, potentially defeating the purpose. The feasibility of sideloading this app onto government-issued devices is also debated. A few comments highlight the difficulty of truly secure communication, even with robust tools like Signal, if operational security practices are poor. The discussion also touches on the broader issues of government officials' use of encrypted messaging and the challenges of balancing transparency and privacy.
The Hacker News thread linked discusses the article about TM Sgnl, an unofficial Signal fork used by Trump officials. The comments are generally critical of TM Sgnl and skeptical of its security.
One of the most compelling lines of discussion revolves around the security implications of using a closed-source, unofficial fork of Signal. Commenters highlight the inherent risks, emphasizing that without open-source code for scrutiny, there's no way to verify the claimed security features. The lack of transparency raises suspicion, especially given the sensitivity of communications involving government officials. Some speculate that the app might contain backdoors or vulnerabilities, intentionally or unintentionally, that could compromise sensitive information. The closed nature of the app makes independent security audits impossible, further amplifying concerns. One commenter specifically mentions the lack of reproducible builds, meaning it's impossible to verify that the distributed application matches the supposedly audited source code, even if it were made available.
Several comments also delve into the technical aspects of Signal and why forking it is problematic. They explain how Signal's security relies heavily on the open-source nature of its protocol and implementation. Forking the code and then modifying it, especially without public scrutiny, introduces the possibility of inadvertently weakening security. The commenters argue that even seemingly minor changes could have unforeseen consequences. This point underscores the importance of the open-source community in identifying and patching vulnerabilities.
Another thread focuses on the motivations behind using TM Sgnl. Speculation ranges from genuine, though misplaced, concerns about data privacy to a desire for more control over communication and potentially bypassing official channels. Some comments suggest a lack of understanding about Signal's existing security features might have led to the adoption of the fork, while others are more cynical, hinting at possible deliberate attempts to circumvent scrutiny.
Finally, some comments address the legal and ethical implications of government officials using an unvetted communication platform. They raise questions about transparency and accountability, particularly when public figures are involved.
Overall, the comments express a strong sense of skepticism and concern about the security and motivations behind the use of TM Sgnl. They highlight the importance of open-source software for secure communication, especially in sensitive contexts, and raise critical questions about the potential risks associated with closed-source alternatives.