macOS's Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) pop-ups, designed to protect user privacy by requesting permission for apps to access sensitive data, can be manipulated by malicious actors. While generally reliable, TCC relies on the accuracy of the app's declared bundle identifier, which can be spoofed. A malicious app could impersonate a legitimate one, tricking the user into granting it access to protected data like the camera, microphone, or even full disk access. This vulnerability highlights the importance of careful examination of TCC prompts, including checking the app's name and developer information against known legitimate sources before granting access. Even with TCC, users must remain vigilant to avoid inadvertently granting permissions to disguised malware.
The post "Everyone knows all the apps on your phone" argues that the extensive data collection practices of mobile advertising networks effectively reveal which apps individuals use, even without explicit permission. Through deterministic and probabilistic methods linking device IDs, IP addresses, and other signals, these networks can create detailed profiles of app usage across devices. This information is then packaged and sold to advertisers, data brokers, and even governments, allowing them to infer sensitive information about users, from their political affiliations and health concerns to their financial status and personal relationships. The post emphasizes the illusion of privacy in the mobile ecosystem, suggesting that the current opt-out model is inadequate and calls for a more robust approach to data protection.
Hacker News users discussed the privacy implications of app usage data being readily available to mobile carriers and how this data can be used for targeted advertising and even more nefarious purposes. Some commenters highlighted the ease with which this data can be accessed, not just by corporations but also by individuals with basic technical skills. The discussion also touched upon the ineffectiveness of current privacy regulations and the lack of real control users have over their data. A few users pointed out the potential for this data to reveal sensitive information like health conditions or financial status based on app usage patterns. Several commenters expressed a sense of resignation and apathy, suggesting the fight for data privacy is already lost, while others advocated for stronger regulations and user control over data sharing.
Summary of Comments ( 225 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43966089
Hacker News users discuss the trustworthiness of macOS permission pop-ups, sparked by an article about TinyCheck. Several commenters express concern about TCC's complexity and potential for abuse, highlighting how easily users can be tricked into granting excessive permissions. One commenter questions if Apple's security theater is sufficient, given the potential for malware to exploit these vulnerabilities. Others discuss TinyCheck's usefulness, potential improvements, and alternatives, including using
tccutil
and other open-source tools. Some debate the practical implications of such vulnerabilities and the likelihood of average users encountering sophisticated attacks. A few express skepticism about the overall threat, arguing that the complexity of exploiting TCC may deter most malicious actors.The Hacker News post "Can you trust that permission pop-up on macOS?" (linking to an article about TCC, the Transparency, Consent, and Control framework in macOS) generated a moderate amount of discussion with several insightful comments.
Several users discussed the complexities and nuances of TCC. One user highlighted the "security vs. usability" trade-off inherent in such systems, pointing out that while TCC is designed for security, it can lead to frustrating user experiences, especially for power users or those working with complex setups. This prompted further discussion about how Apple could potentially improve the user experience without compromising security, with suggestions like more granular permissions or better explanations of why certain permissions are required.
Another commenter brought up the issue of "TCC bypasses," explaining how some applications have found ways to circumvent the TCC framework, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the system in truly protecting user privacy. They also mentioned the "cat-and-mouse game" between Apple and developers seeking to bypass these restrictions.
The topic of sandboxing apps also emerged. A commenter explained how sandboxing, combined with TCC, forms a layered defense mechanism. They noted that even if an app manages to bypass TCC, the sandbox can still restrict its access to sensitive data and system resources. Another commenter elaborated on the concept of "entitlements," which grant specific privileges to sandboxed apps. This led to a discussion about the potential risks associated with overly permissive entitlements.
One user shared a personal anecdote about a frustrating experience with TCC, where they had difficulty granting an app the necessary permissions to access files on an external drive. This highlighted the practical challenges users can face with TCC in real-world scenarios.
A few comments touched on the differences between TCC and similar permission systems on other operating systems, with some suggesting that Apple's approach is generally more robust.
Finally, there was a brief discussion about the technical details of TCC, including how it uses a database to store permission grants and how this database can be inspected by users.
Overall, the comments section provides valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of TCC, highlighting the ongoing tension between security and usability, and offering various perspectives on how the system could be improved. While no single comment is overwhelmingly compelling on its own, the collection of comments paints a comprehensive picture of the complexities and challenges associated with managing permissions in a modern operating system.