This blog post analyzes "TM Sgnl," an Android app marketed as a secure messaging platform used by some Trump officials, including Mike Waltz. The author reverse-engineered the app, revealing it relies on the open-source Signal protocol but lacks crucial security features like forward secrecy and disappearing messages. Furthermore, TM Sgnl uses its own centralized server, raising concerns about data privacy and potential vulnerabilities compared to the official Signal app, which uses a federated server architecture. The analysis concludes that despite presenting itself as a secure alternative, TM Sgnl likely offers weaker security and potentially exposes user data to greater risk.
A writer for The Atlantic was accidentally added to a Signal group chat containing several prominent figures discussing national security matters, including a former National Security Advisor, a former CIA Director, and a retired four-star general. The chat's purpose seemed to be coordinating public statements and media appearances related to an escalating international conflict. The writer was quickly removed after pointing out the error, but not before observing discussions about strategic messaging, potential military responses, and internal disagreements on how to handle the crisis. While the exact details of the conflict and the participants remain unnamed to protect sensitive information, the incident highlights the potential for communication mishaps in the digital age, even at the highest levels of government.
HN commenters are highly skeptical of the Atlantic article's premise, questioning its plausibility and the author's motivations. Several suggest the author was likely added to a spam or scam group chat, mistaking it for a genuine communication from national security officials. Others highlight the unlikelihood of such high-ranking officials using a standard SMS group chat for sensitive information, citing secure communication protocols as the norm. Some commenters criticize The Atlantic for publishing the piece, deeming it poorly researched and sensationalized. The lack of technical details and verification also draws criticism, with some suggesting the author fabricated the story for attention. A few entertain the possibility of a genuine mistake, perhaps involving an intern or contractor, but remain largely unconvinced.
Summary of Comments ( 249 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43875476
HN commenters discuss the implications of using an obscure, unofficial Signal fork, TM-SGNL, by Trump officials. Several express concerns about the security and trustworthiness of such a client, particularly given its lack of transparency and potential for vulnerabilities. Some question the choice, suggesting it stems from a misunderstanding of Signal's functionality, specifically the belief that official servers could access their data. Others point out the irony of using a supposedly more secure app while simultaneously broadcasting its usage, potentially defeating the purpose. The feasibility of sideloading this app onto government-issued devices is also debated. A few comments highlight the difficulty of truly secure communication, even with robust tools like Signal, if operational security practices are poor. The discussion also touches on the broader issues of government officials' use of encrypted messaging and the challenges of balancing transparency and privacy.
The Hacker News thread linked discusses the article about TM Sgnl, an unofficial Signal fork used by Trump officials. The comments are generally critical of TM Sgnl and skeptical of its security.
One of the most compelling lines of discussion revolves around the security implications of using a closed-source, unofficial fork of Signal. Commenters highlight the inherent risks, emphasizing that without open-source code for scrutiny, there's no way to verify the claimed security features. The lack of transparency raises suspicion, especially given the sensitivity of communications involving government officials. Some speculate that the app might contain backdoors or vulnerabilities, intentionally or unintentionally, that could compromise sensitive information. The closed nature of the app makes independent security audits impossible, further amplifying concerns. One commenter specifically mentions the lack of reproducible builds, meaning it's impossible to verify that the distributed application matches the supposedly audited source code, even if it were made available.
Several comments also delve into the technical aspects of Signal and why forking it is problematic. They explain how Signal's security relies heavily on the open-source nature of its protocol and implementation. Forking the code and then modifying it, especially without public scrutiny, introduces the possibility of inadvertently weakening security. The commenters argue that even seemingly minor changes could have unforeseen consequences. This point underscores the importance of the open-source community in identifying and patching vulnerabilities.
Another thread focuses on the motivations behind using TM Sgnl. Speculation ranges from genuine, though misplaced, concerns about data privacy to a desire for more control over communication and potentially bypassing official channels. Some comments suggest a lack of understanding about Signal's existing security features might have led to the adoption of the fork, while others are more cynical, hinting at possible deliberate attempts to circumvent scrutiny.
Finally, some comments address the legal and ethical implications of government officials using an unvetted communication platform. They raise questions about transparency and accountability, particularly when public figures are involved.
Overall, the comments express a strong sense of skepticism and concern about the security and motivations behind the use of TM Sgnl. They highlight the importance of open-source software for secure communication, especially in sensitive contexts, and raise critical questions about the potential risks associated with closed-source alternatives.