macOS's Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) pop-ups, designed to protect user privacy by requesting permission for apps to access sensitive data, can be manipulated by malicious actors. While generally reliable, TCC relies on the accuracy of the app's declared bundle identifier, which can be spoofed. A malicious app could impersonate a legitimate one, tricking the user into granting it access to protected data like the camera, microphone, or even full disk access. This vulnerability highlights the importance of careful examination of TCC prompts, including checking the app's name and developer information against known legitimate sources before granting access. Even with TCC, users must remain vigilant to avoid inadvertently granting permissions to disguised malware.
AWS's new security tool, AWS Access Analyzer for S3, designed to identify public S3 buckets, ironically created a new security risk. The tool relied on temporarily making buckets publicly accessible to test their configurations, a process that could be exploited by attackers monitoring for such changes. Although the window of vulnerability was short, sophisticated attackers could potentially detect and exploit this temporary public access to exfiltrate sensitive data before permissions were reverted. This highlights the potential for unintended consequences when automating security checks, especially when involving sensitive access modifications.
Hacker News users discussed the potential for misuse of AWS's new trusted access tool, IAM Roles Anywhere. Several commenters highlighted the complexity of configuring the tool securely, particularly the reliance on external identity providers and the potential for those providers to be compromised. This, they argued, could introduce a single point of failure and negate the intended security benefits. Some suggested that using IAM Roles Anywhere with on-premise infrastructure requiring outbound internet access could expose internal networks to unnecessary risk. Others pointed out the irony of a security tool potentially creating new vulnerabilities and questioned the practical benefits versus the added complexity. A few users shared alternative approaches to achieving similar functionality with existing AWS services, arguing for simpler, less risky solutions. The overall sentiment leaned towards cautious skepticism of IAM Roles Anywhere, with many users advocating careful consideration and thorough testing before implementation.
GitHub Actions' opaque nature makes it difficult to verify the provenance of the code being executed in your workflows. While Actions marketplace listings link to source code, the actual runner environment often uses pre-built distributions hosted by GitHub, with no guarantee they precisely match the public repository. This discrepancy creates a potential security risk, as malicious actors could alter the distributed code without updating the public source. Therefore, auditing the integrity of Actions is crucial, but currently complex. The post advocates for reproducible builds and improved transparency from GitHub to enhance trust and security within the Actions ecosystem.
HN users largely agreed with the author's concerns about the opacity of third-party GitHub Actions. Several highlighted the potential security risks of blindly trusting external code, with some suggesting that reviewing the source of each action should be standard practice, despite the impracticality. Some argued for better tooling or built-in mechanisms within GitHub Actions to improve transparency and security. The potential for malicious actors to introduce vulnerabilities through seemingly benign actions was also a recurring theme, with users pointing to the risk of supply chain attacks and the difficulty in auditing complex dependencies. Some suggested using self-hosted runners or creating internal action libraries for sensitive projects, although this introduces its own management overhead. A few users countered that similar trust issues exist with any third-party library and that the benefits of using pre-built actions often outweigh the risks.
Summary of Comments ( 225 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43966089
Hacker News users discuss the trustworthiness of macOS permission pop-ups, sparked by an article about TinyCheck. Several commenters express concern about TCC's complexity and potential for abuse, highlighting how easily users can be tricked into granting excessive permissions. One commenter questions if Apple's security theater is sufficient, given the potential for malware to exploit these vulnerabilities. Others discuss TinyCheck's usefulness, potential improvements, and alternatives, including using
tccutiland other open-source tools. Some debate the practical implications of such vulnerabilities and the likelihood of average users encountering sophisticated attacks. A few express skepticism about the overall threat, arguing that the complexity of exploiting TCC may deter most malicious actors.The Hacker News post "Can you trust that permission pop-up on macOS?" (linking to an article about TCC, the Transparency, Consent, and Control framework in macOS) generated a moderate amount of discussion with several insightful comments.
Several users discussed the complexities and nuances of TCC. One user highlighted the "security vs. usability" trade-off inherent in such systems, pointing out that while TCC is designed for security, it can lead to frustrating user experiences, especially for power users or those working with complex setups. This prompted further discussion about how Apple could potentially improve the user experience without compromising security, with suggestions like more granular permissions or better explanations of why certain permissions are required.
Another commenter brought up the issue of "TCC bypasses," explaining how some applications have found ways to circumvent the TCC framework, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the system in truly protecting user privacy. They also mentioned the "cat-and-mouse game" between Apple and developers seeking to bypass these restrictions.
The topic of sandboxing apps also emerged. A commenter explained how sandboxing, combined with TCC, forms a layered defense mechanism. They noted that even if an app manages to bypass TCC, the sandbox can still restrict its access to sensitive data and system resources. Another commenter elaborated on the concept of "entitlements," which grant specific privileges to sandboxed apps. This led to a discussion about the potential risks associated with overly permissive entitlements.
One user shared a personal anecdote about a frustrating experience with TCC, where they had difficulty granting an app the necessary permissions to access files on an external drive. This highlighted the practical challenges users can face with TCC in real-world scenarios.
A few comments touched on the differences between TCC and similar permission systems on other operating systems, with some suggesting that Apple's approach is generally more robust.
Finally, there was a brief discussion about the technical details of TCC, including how it uses a database to store permission grants and how this database can be inspected by users.
Overall, the comments section provides valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of TCC, highlighting the ongoing tension between security and usability, and offering various perspectives on how the system could be improved. While no single comment is overwhelmingly compelling on its own, the collection of comments paints a comprehensive picture of the complexities and challenges associated with managing permissions in a modern operating system.