This paper explores practical strategies for hardening C and C++ software against memory safety vulnerabilities without relying on memory-safe languages or rewriting entire codebases. It focuses on compiler-based mitigations, leveraging techniques like Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) and Shadow Stacks, and highlights how these can be effectively deployed even in complex, legacy projects with limited resources. The paper emphasizes the importance of a layered security approach, combining static and dynamic analysis tools with runtime protections to minimize attack surfaces and contain the impact of potential exploits. It argues that while a complete shift to memory-safe languages is ideal, these mitigation techniques offer valuable interim protection and represent a pragmatic approach for enhancing the security of existing C/C++ software in the real world.
The author recounts their experience debugging a perplexing issue with an inline eval()
call within a JavaScript codebase. They discovered that an external library was unexpectedly modifying the global String.prototype
, adding a custom method that clashed with the evaluated code. This interference caused silent failures within the eval()
, leading to significant debugging challenges. Ultimately, they resolved the issue by isolating the eval()
within a new function scope, effectively shielding it from the polluted global prototype. This experience highlights the potential dangers and unpredictable behavior that can arise when using eval()
and relying on a pristine global environment, especially in larger projects with numerous dependencies.
The Hacker News comments discuss the practicality and security implications of the author's inline JavaScript evaluation solution. Several commenters express concern about the potential for XSS vulnerabilities, even with the author's implemented safeguards. Some suggest alternative approaches like using a dedicated sandbox environment or a parser that transforms the input into a safer format. Others debate the trade-offs between convenience and security, questioning whether the benefits of inline evaluation outweigh the risks. A few commenters appreciate the author's exploration of the topic and share their own experiences with similar challenges. The overall sentiment leans towards caution, with many emphasizing the importance of robust security measures when dealing with user-supplied code.
The blog post "An epic treatise on error models for systems programming languages" explores the landscape of error handling strategies, arguing that current approaches in languages like C, C++, Go, and Rust are insufficient for robust systems programming. It criticizes unchecked exceptions for their potential to cause undefined behavior and resource leaks, while also finding fault with error codes and checked exceptions for their verbosity and tendency to hinder code flow. The author advocates for a more comprehensive error model based on "algebraic effects," which allows developers to precisely define and handle various error scenarios while maintaining control over resource management and program termination. This approach aims to combine the benefits of different error handling mechanisms while mitigating their respective drawbacks, ultimately promoting greater reliability and predictability in systems software.
HN commenters largely praised the article for its thoroughness and clarity in explaining error handling strategies. Several appreciated the author's balanced approach, presenting the tradeoffs of each model without overtly favoring one. Some highlighted the insightful discussion of checked exceptions and their limitations, particularly in relation to algebraic error types and error-returning functions. A few commenters offered additional perspectives, including the importance of distinguishing between recoverable and unrecoverable errors, and the potential benefits of static analysis tools in managing error handling. The overall sentiment was positive, with many thanking the author for providing a valuable resource for systems programmers.
This paper demonstrates how seemingly harmless data races in C/C++ programs, specifically involving non-atomic operations on padding bytes, can lead to miscompilation by optimizing compilers. The authors show that compilers can exploit the assumption of data-race freedom to perform transformations that change program behavior when races are actually present. They provide concrete examples where races on padding bytes within structures cause compilers like GCC and Clang to generate incorrect code, leading to unexpected outputs or crashes. This highlights the subtle ways in which undefined behavior due to data races can manifest, even when the races appear to involve data irrelevant to program logic. Ultimately, the paper reinforces the importance of avoiding data races entirely, even those that might seem benign, to ensure predictable program behavior.
Hacker News users discussed the implications of Boehm's paper on benign data races. Several commenters pointed out the difficulty in truly defining "benign," as seemingly harmless races can lead to unexpected behavior in complex systems, especially with compiler optimizations. Some highlighted the importance of tools and methodologies to detect and prevent data races, even if deemed benign. One commenter questioned the practical applicability of the paper's proposed relaxed memory model, expressing concern that relying on "benign" races would make debugging significantly harder. Others focused on the performance implications, suggesting that allowing benign races could offer speed improvements but might not be worth the potential instability. The overall sentiment leans towards caution regarding the exploitation of benign data races, despite acknowledging the potential benefits.
Rishi Mehta reflects on the key contributions and learnings from AlphaProof, his AI research project focused on automated theorem proving. He highlights the successes of AlphaProof in tackling challenging mathematical problems, particularly in abstract algebra and group theory, emphasizing its unique approach of combining language models with symbolic reasoning engines. The post delves into the specific techniques employed, such as the use of chain-of-thought prompting and iterative refinement, and discusses the limitations encountered. Mehta concludes by emphasizing the significant progress made in bridging the gap between natural language and formal mathematics, while acknowledging the open challenges and future directions for research in automated theorem proving.
Hacker News users discuss AlphaProof's approach to testing, questioning its reliance on property-based testing and mutation testing for catching subtle bugs. Some commenters express skepticism about the effectiveness of these techniques in real-world scenarios, arguing that they might not be as comprehensive as traditional testing methods and could lead to a false sense of security. Others suggest that AlphaProof's methodology might be better suited for specific types of problems, such as concurrency bugs, rather than general software testing. The discussion also touches upon the importance of code review and the potential limitations of automated testing tools. Some commenters found the examples provided in the original article unconvincing, while others praised AlphaProof's innovative approach and the value of exploring different testing strategies.
This paper introduces a new fuzzing technique called Dataflow Fusion (DFusion) specifically designed for complex interpreters like PHP. DFusion addresses the challenge of efficiently exploring deep execution paths within interpreters by strategically combining coverage-guided fuzzing with taint analysis. It identifies critical dataflow paths and generates inputs that maximize the exploration of these paths, leading to the discovery of more bugs. The researchers evaluated DFusion against existing PHP fuzzers and demonstrated its effectiveness in uncovering previously unknown vulnerabilities, including crashes and memory safety issues, within the PHP interpreter. Their results highlight the potential of DFusion for improving the security and reliability of interpreted languages.
Hacker News users discussed the potential impact and novelty of the PHP fuzzer described in the linked paper. Several commenters expressed skepticism about the significance of the discovered vulnerabilities, pointing out that many seemed related to edge cases or functionalities rarely used in real-world PHP applications. Others questioned the fuzzer's ability to uncover truly impactful bugs compared to existing methods. Some discussion revolved around the technical details of the fuzzing technique, "dataflow fusion," with users inquiring about its specific advantages and limitations. There was also debate about the general state of PHP security and whether this research represents a meaningful advancement in securing the language.
Summary of Comments ( 53 )
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43532220
Hacker News users discussed the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed "TypeArmor" system for securing C/C++ code. Some expressed skepticism about its performance overhead and the complexity of retrofitting it onto existing projects, questioning its viability compared to rewriting in memory-safe languages like Rust. Others were more optimistic, viewing TypeArmor as a potentially valuable tool for hardening legacy codebases where rewriting is not feasible. The discussion touched upon the trade-offs between security and performance, the challenges of integrating such a system into real-world projects, and the overall feasibility of achieving robust memory safety in C/C++ without fundamental language changes. Several commenters also pointed out limitations of TypeArmor, such as its inability to handle certain complex pointer manipulations and the potential for vulnerabilities in the TypeArmor system itself. The general consensus seemed to be cautious interest, acknowledging the potential benefits while remaining pragmatic about the inherent difficulties of securing C/C++.
The Hacker News post titled "How to Secure Existing C and C++ Software Without Memory Safety [pdf]" (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43532220) has several comments discussing the linked pre-print paper and its proposed approach.
Several commenters express skepticism about the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed "Secure by Construction" approach. One commenter argues that while the idea is intriguing, the complexity and effort required to retrofit existing codebases would be prohibitive. They suggest that focusing on memory-safe languages for new projects would be a more efficient use of resources. Another commenter echoes this sentiment, pointing out the difficulty of achieving comprehensive coverage with this technique and the potential for subtle bugs to be introduced during the transformation process.
A thread of discussion emerges around the comparison between this approach and using Rust. Some argue that Rust's inherent memory safety features offer a more robust solution, while others point out that rewriting large C/C++ codebases in Rust is not always feasible. The "Secure by Construction" method is positioned as a potential compromise for situations where a complete rewrite is impossible.
One commenter questions the claim that the technique doesn't require memory safety, suggesting that it essentially introduces a form of dynamic memory safety through runtime checks. They further highlight the potential performance overhead associated with these checks.
Another commenter expresses interest in the potential for automated tools to assist in the process of applying the "Secure by Construction" transformations. They also raise the concern about the potential impact on code readability and maintainability.
Some commenters offer alternative solutions, such as using address sanitizers and static analysis tools to identify and mitigate memory-related vulnerabilities in existing C/C++ code.
A few commenters engage in a more technical discussion about the specifics of the proposed technique, debating the effectiveness of the different transformation rules and the potential for false positives or negatives. They also discuss the challenge of handling complex data structures and pointer arithmetic.
Overall, the comments reflect a cautious interest in the proposed "Secure by Construction" approach, with many expressing reservations about its practicality and effectiveness compared to other solutions like using Rust or focusing on more traditional security hardening techniques. The discussion highlights the ongoing challenge of securing existing C/C++ codebases and the trade-offs involved in different approaches.